DISSENT

A Conversation With Bayard Rustin

Where is the Negro Movement Today?

Henry Pachter

Historical "Revisionism" and the Cold War

Joseph Clark

Czechoslovakia: 1918–1968 A Record of National Martyrdom

Paul Goodman

Kropotkin at This Moment

THE ELECTIONS

HOW SHALL WE VOTE?

A Symposium With Lewis Coser, Michael Harrington, Irving Howe, Stanley Plastrik, David Spitz, and Dennis H. Wrong

BERNARD ROSENBERG
Chicago: Blood and Disaster

WALTER GOODMAN
George Wallace on the Stump

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1968 $1

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EDITED BY
JEREMY LARNER
& IRVING HOWE

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VIEWS FROM THE LEFT

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Irving Howe is, of course, the editor of *Dissent* and has written many books, including *Politics and the Novel* and *Thomas Hardy*. Jeremy Larner is the author of the novels *Drive, He Said* and *The Answer.*

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DISSENT

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1968

DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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When the U. N. Justified Itself—a Little

WATCHING THE PROCEEDINGS of the U.N. Security Council during the August crisis, one could not fail to be impressed by the young representative of Czechoslovakia, Ian Musik, who calmly and without any rhetoric read the documents which refuted the Soviet claims. He stated that there exists a legitimate government of Czechoslovakia; that no authorized person had called the Russians; and that in fact they had crossed the Czech border in contravention of all existing treaties and laws.

Conceivably, these same documents might have been sent to the individual chancelleries of the various powers, but that would not have been the same thing as submitting them to the U.N. Security Council, gathered in a solemn session and providing the Czech complaint with a worldwide resonance. That resonance, in turn, was fed back to the Czech people over the radio and fortified their will to resist; for certainly, knowing that the world is watching makes some difference.

World opinion may be a rather elusive concept, and one can also point to the great number of occasions when the United Nations failed to bring that power to bear on an offender, or only appeared to assist in a world crisis. Thus, the crisis of the Berlin airlift was settled after an American delegate approached the Russian Ambassador in the U.N. Delegates' lounge; but he might have done that in a neutral capital, too. In the first Suez War, the U.N. lent its premises to a ministers' conference, and a U. N. resolution confirmed the truce. But such conferences were held even before the League of Nations. The U.N. has been an agency to handle the logistic and financial problems of a peace force or an armistice commission; but this service is purely technical and could have been set up by the powers under other auspices. (In fact, some such agencies are deliberately being kept outside the U.N. framework in order to allow the Chinese to participate whenever they are ready.) In all these cases the U.N. was not the force that made a recalcitrant power yield.

In other cases—and here we may think of the tragic futility of its protests against the invasion of Hungary in 1956 or its inability to settle last year's Mideast War—the U.N. was the only agency available to call the aggressor to order yet proved itself unable to do so. But in the Czech case of 1968 it was capable of providing a unique service, and successfully. Or rather this service was used successfully. For no one denies that whatever freedom is left to the Czechs and whatever room for maneuver they have preserved, they owe to themselves, to their own courage and coolness, as a nation and as individuals. In fact, world opinion could be brought to bear only because the Czech government had a policy and knew how to use the U.N. Still, the U.N. was *there,* a forum and sounding-board that for once could be put to good use by an outraged nation.

World opinion still had no armed divisions in 1968, and I am sure the Russians would not have minded being watched with awe any more than in 1965. But the skillful combination of resistance in Prague and statements in the Security Council, the cumulation of the Russians' inability to find a Quisling in Prague, their inability to rally the Communist parties of other countries or to justify their crime in the eyes of governments with whom they desire to transact other business—all this may have forced the Kremlin to moderate its policy *vis-à-vis* the Czechs. The logic of their defeat may in turn have resuscitated some of the trust in collective security which had all but vanished these last years.—H. R.

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How Shall We Vote?

We present below some opinions of DISSENT *editors on the problem of voting in November. As usual, everyone speaks for himself.*—EDITORS

Lewis Coser

IN LAST YEAR'S U.S. PAVILLION at the Montreal World's Fair I noticed a sign reading:

Hall of the Great Society
—Emergency Exit.

Let's take that exit right now! After the obscene happening at Chicago that went by the name of Democratic National Convention this conclusion seems inescapable.

The McCarthy campaign was amazingly successful in bringing into the political process thousands of new activists whose dynamism, idealism, and ability to devote a great deal of time to grass-roots political activity gave promise that they might change the Democratic party in their own image and, by radically transforming it, take it away from the old pros. Had they realized their goals, this might well have meant a fundamental reorganization of the American party system and the emergence of a truly left-liberal mass party.

The traditional party politicians who ran the Convention under the guidance of L.B.J. decided quite consciously to oppose the threat to their domination inherent in the McCarthy movement. They indicated that they were even willing to take the risk of losing the election in order to rebuff the McCarthy forces. And, employing every weapon in the armory of the professional pol, they used force, fraud, deception, and manipulation to gain their end. The result is clear. Hubert Humphrey is the candidate of the machine, the candidate who emerges from a Convention that has decisively rejected its grass-roots support of liberal activists and relies on Southern racists, trade-union oligarchs, traditional ethnic voting blocks, and the remnants of local political machines to elect him on a hawkish platform.

What should be our response to this disgusting performance? I can see only one. We must teach the machine politicians a lesson by showing them that they can no longer win without the support of the young, the grass-roots idealists, the doves, and the previously uncommitted professionals. Hence we should abstain from voting in the Presidential election and concentrate attention on those Senate and House elections in which liberal candidates with a clear anti-Administration record on the Vietnam War are running on the Democratic ticket. If Paul O'Dwyer receives a higher vote in New York than does Humphrey, if Gilligan in Ohio and Cranston in California also do better, this will show the pros that the liberal voters can no longer be ignored and that neglect of these powerful grass-roots sentiments will only lead to continued Republican victories. My overriding concern at this moment is to teach the Democratic party a lesson.

But I already hear the major objection that is likely to be brought forward: this will lead to the election of Richard Nixon, and this Republic will not be able to stand four years of tricky Dickie, penny-pinching, budget-balancing and neglect of all those major projects of social reconstruction which are so urgently on the agenda. My answer is twofold. Nixon is indeed a most distasteful character, and it is not a pleasant prospect to have this opportunist at the head of the state in the years ahead, but it is also a fact that Nixon is not a fascist beast. I see no reason to believe that he has any intention of dismantling the welfare

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state, and neither has he the character nor can he command the social and political resources to change the overall trend of American politics set into motion during the New Deal. His would be a mean-thinking, uninspired, reactionary four years, to be sure, but they would not amount to a major structural change in the drift of American domestic policy. And as to foreign policy, I see no reason to suppose that he intends to reverse the key trends that have been developed ever since the Cuban confrontation for a gradual extension of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. I am not reassured by the idea of having a Nixon in the position to pull the atomic trigger; in fact this possibility gives me nightmares. But then I have similar nightmares right now when LBJ is in that position.

When it comes to ending the disgraceful war in Vietnam, I see no real difference between the two candidates. Both are committed to continuing the war. And just because they both have taken this position, I cannot possibly bring myself to vote for either of them, since I believe that the war is the foremost and decisive issue that confronts us. But I am willing at least to consider the argument that a new Administration, unburdened by the vested interests that have grown over the years on the part of key decision-makers of the old, might conceivably have an easier time in ending the war than an Administration that wil be bound by the same commitments and forced to use the same key personnel as the old.

But will not the Negroes and the poor suffer from four years of Nixon? Yes, indeed they will. But they will suffer under any Administration as long as the Vietnam War continues. And one would have to be unduly naive to expect that a Humphrey Administration, even after the end of the war, would engage in those desperately urgent radical measures that are required to stop the decay of our cities, the degradation of the poor, and the continued affront to the human dignity of American Negroes. Major Daley's candidate will not rebuild the American city anymore than will Senator Thurmond's.

We are in for a few very hard years, for rather desperate times. But if we can use these years to restructure and reorganize the American party system in such a way that there will emerge from the shambles of the present Democratic party a truly liberal-radical party, then those four years in the wilderness may be a necessary evil. Without a rebuilt Democratic party, there is no hope left for liberal and radical men of good will. Let's attempt to build such a party, and as a first step let us abstain from voting in the November Presidential election. Between the cholera and the pest there can be no choice. Let us concentrate our energies on those local elections where there *is* a choice. And let us hope that men like O'Dwyer, Gilligan, and Cranston will join McCarthy, McGovern, and other liberal Democrats to help fashion a new Democratic party based, in large part, on that deserving Gideon's army that made the McCarthy movement a watershed in American political history.

Michael Harrington

AFTER having participated in the dynamic mass movements of the new politics in 1968—both the Kennedy and McCarthy campaigns—I intend to vote for a candidate of the old politics, Hubert Humphrey, even though his nomination was a triumph of the machine over the political realignment which I have worked for in recent years.

Humphrey's position on the most decisive issue of the year, Vietnam, is unconscionable. He has either been the enthusiastic booster of the horror in Southeast Asia, or else the vacillator hinting, but never quite saying, that he is a dove in hawk's clothing. On the other main question in the election, "law and order" (otherwise known as "get the blacks, hippies, and welfare chiselers"), the Vice-President had shamelessly kind words for Mayor Daley after the police lawlessness in Chicago; and his support of the war precludes him from proposing the massive social programs which are an alternative to the nightstick.

In terms of political structures, Humphrey won the nomination by relying on moderate racists, the machines, and alas, most of the labor movement. In the process, he managed to turn back a youthful reform surge which is the most exciting, and perhaps most significant, thing to have happened in American poli-

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tics since the industrial workers of the CIO became an electoral force in the thirties.

The previous paragraphs do not exactly constitute a positive endorsement of Humphrey. My reason for casting a ballot for the Vice-President is, of course, straight lesser-evilism. Where there is a difference between Presidential candidates, and where a protest or third-party strategy can neither effect the present choices nor even prepare for decent options in the future, I believe there is a moral obligation to vote for the better man even though he inspires no confidence. In 1968, the middle-class puritan who refuses to soil his hands in this way is helping to condemn the American people—and particularly the black, the poor, and the young—to four years of Richard Nixon. Hubert Humphrey is clearly preferable

In making this argument, I do not base it upon a virulent personal antipathy to Nixon. I am appalled by the sorry history of Tricky Dickery over the years, and I am hardly comforted by the soulless, opportunistic technician who proclaims himself to be the "new" Nixon. But my position is not primarily based on such personal, visceral considerations. Nixon is the political incarnation of a drift to the Right. If he becomes President, it will legitimate the forces of repression, including the police militants. Moreover, a Nixon victory would result in a Congress even more reactionary than the present one.

Even if Nixon's economic policies are only as bad as Eisenhower's, the resultant stagnation, unemployment and poverty will either provoke minority risings and majority terror or else it will drive tens of millions of Americans into a passive, nihilistic, corrosive despair. If, as I think likely (since the Republican party of 1968 is to the Right of 1952), Nixon's domestic leadership will be even more catastrophic than Ike's, the situation will be worse.

On the most crucial issue of the day, Vietnam, Nixon is the institutional leader of the Cold War party. Given the fact that the Soviet imperialist crime in Czechoslovakia has strengthened the American hawks, this could have consequences well beyond South-east Asia.

However, there is one outcome of the election even more disastrous than a clear-cut Nixon victory: an ambiguous Nixon triumph in the House of Representatives in which the Presidency is won through a deal with the Wallaceite South. For Wallace is the nearest thing to a genuine American fascist since the days of Father Coughlin, i.e. he has a demagogic social appeal as well as the mentality of a prison guard. If his racist politics make a significant showing outside the South—and particularly among union members—that would be a blow to every democratic hope.

It is, therefore, impossible to say Tweedledum/Tweedledee. And it is reprehensible and idiotic to advocate a policy that puts the Right in power on the grounds that the consequent repression will "radicalize" its victims. In the first place, that is inhuman and manipulative, and vulture politics; in the second, it doesn't work—as the ghosts of the German Communists of 1932–33 can attest.

But having made a rather depressing argument for my Humphrey vote, let me conclude these remarks on something of an upbeat. The Kennedy-McCarthy forces managed to win about one-third of the Democratic convention in a campaign of nine months' duration. Indeed, they had achieved such a momentum that, had there been any alternative not named McCarthy or McGovern, the delegates at Chicago probably would have nominated him rather than the Vice-President. But that alternative did not exist.

I do not think that this phenomenon is confined to "kids" or is transitory. It reflects the growth of a college-educated constituency in which quantative expansion may well have turned into something qualitatively new: a mass base for "conscience politics." If that movement retains a certain cohesiveness, if it eschews fourth-party adventures and self-righteous gestures and concentrates on assembing a new majority in the mainstream, I think it can transform American politics.

Irving Howe

WE ARE ALL, in this discussion, revealing strong emotions—and not because we have clear paths to offer, but because we don't. We are frustrated by the fact that in 1968, a moment of national crisis unparalleled since the Civil War, we should be faced with so dismal

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a prospect as choosing between Humphrey and Nixon.

• Let's delimit the significance of voting. Old-time leftists, half-recalling the experience of large European Socialist parties, often think of voting as a way to register fundamental commitments: hence, they "cannot vote for a bourgeois candidate." Younger leftists look upon voting as a personal test: they would "feel sick" if they had to vote for X.

Both views, while appealing, are not very relevant to the American experience. Voting has little to do with one's fundamental programmatic loyalties, which are expressed—this is a dilemma of American radicals—more frequently in public actions and writings than through the electoral process. Nor is voting a test of rectitude. It is a way of registering a choice—if there is one—between two candidates, both of whom are likely, in varying degrees, to be unsatisfactory to radicals. If there were a significant socialist movement able to present its own candidates in more than token or ritual ways, that would be another matter; but there is not.

• To vote for "the lesser evil" *under these circumstances* can be a sensible kind of choice. Sensible, if there are differences of some magnitude; but if you have to decide, say, between a Thurmond and an Eastland, you might as well go fishing. Those who choose to refrain from voting, however, must recognize that they too may be influencing the outcome. For instance, all those who for good reasons denounce Humphrey *must* face the problem of whether their proposed abstention will help elect a reactionary Nixon Administration. You may decide that the price of four years of Nixon is worth paying in order to teach the Democrats the lesson that without liberal support they are doomed to defeat. Such calculations can't be made with certainty; but you must, if you are in politics, try to make them. For it is at least possible that the American Negroes will pay the cost of liberal-leftist rectitude in "sitting this one out" and thereby perhaps helping to elect Nixon. I don't say this is so; I do say you can't ignore such considerations.

• The best thing to have happened in American politics for some time is the McCarthy movement—the movement far more than the candidate. Whether it will survive is a question; it would be a pity if it became no more than a shared suburban memory. My view is that for the foreseeable future the main *political* arena (which isn't at all to say, the only arena) for the liberal-left in the U.S. is the Democratic party. That's where, politically, the action is. Will McCarthy's young followers who scored impressive gains in Colorado, Minnesota, New York, and Massachusetts remain in the clubs, deepen their hold, prepare for 1972, and meanwhile fight like hell for peace candidates? Or will they fade into quick disillusion?

There are some disquieting signs of a new sectarianism of the righteous: "we have gone into holy battle, the victory was snatched from us, and to hell with it." From such sentiments, understandable as they may be, you don't create a lasting political movement.

• The main issue in the country and in the campaign is the Vietnam War. No matter how many erudite arguments Leon Keyserling produces to show that the economy can sustain both the war in Vietnam and social advances at home, the political reality is that as long as the war continues, little will be done to solve our domestic problems. The war is a poison which courses through the entire body politic, and ending it is a prerequisite for significant advances on the home front. Any politics which tries to skirt the issue of Vietnam is irresponsible. And Humphrey is the man who has most ardently defended Johnson's course in Vietnam. Recently Humphrey has made a two-faced and multi-mouthed effort to span the gap between LBJ and RFK, but everyone—friend and foe, man and child—recognizes him for the sweating opportunist he is. Nothing so far in his program or promises offers a serious way out of the Vietnam disaster.

If Humphrey is elected, the war may soon end. The same for Nixon. From the point of view of American capitalism, the war has (I think) become a liability and needs to be liquidated. The question which agitates the decision-makers is this: what shall the terms of liquidation be? how high a cost shall be paid? is it worth fighting another year or two to get a "better" agreement?

I see no clear evidence that electing either of these lovable characters would hasten an end to the war—or would prolong it. Humphrey

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is almost beyond prediction, so rattled and unprincipled has he become. Nixon, untied to the LBJ past, might pull an Ike and negotiate more freely; but as a captive of reactionary anti-Communism and its constituencies, he might prolong the war and perhaps even opt for "victory." How can one know?

In regard to domestic politics there is a clear and significant difference between Humphrey as President and Nixon as President. A victory for Nixon would be interpreted, rightly enough, as a victory for "law and order," those who believe the way to solve urban problems is to crack more black heads. Nixon wouldn't dismantle the welfare state, he would simply (like Reagan in California) resist those extensions and improvements of it which are so vital. That would be enough of a disaster, for this is a historical moment in which standing still means going back. That Humphrey employs the rhetoric of welfarism, that he is bound by tradition and constituencies to the more liberal segment of the American population, that the Negroes are becoming an increasingly powerful force within the Democratic party—such reasons point to the probability that Humphrey would be more amenable than Nixon to pressures for domestic change. I say, "probability," because there are no guarantees.

If, then, the decisive weights on the political scale were domestic issues, I would vote for Humphrey. But they are not. Everything depends, politically, on ending the Vietnam War —which is not to say that ending it ensures domestic progress, it is only to say that ending it is a precondition for domestic progress. I therefore am inclined to agree with Stanley Plastrik: that Humphrey, the Uriah Heep of American liberalism, is part-and-parcel of the Vietnam disaster and that so long as this remains true, I will not vote for him.

What might make it no longer true? Only if Humphrey in effect were to repudiate the Johnson war policy. Only if he were to come out with a firm series of proposals enabling negotiations with Hanoi: e.g., an end to the bombing of North Vietnam, a willingness to consider a coalition regime in the South as a prelude to elections, etc. Then, with this not-yet-visible difference on Vietnam and the already-present differences on domestic policy, there would be sufficient warrant to vote for him. Not with enthusiasm, as we would have voted for McCarthy; not as participants in a campaign; but perforce and with discomfort.

Even such a contingency, however, seems—at least in mid-September—most unlikely.

These are hard choices. Unless you are content with striking a pose of virtue (nothing is easier these days!) and letting it go at that, there is no evading hard choices. Let's accept them in good spirit. I don't think Dave Spitz is betraying our socialist values when he decides, with massive reluctance, to vote for Humphrey, and I don't think Lewis Coser is becoming a wild sectarian when he decides not to vote for Humphrey. These are shadings of tactical estimate. Some of us have been in politics long enough not to draw blood-lines over such disagreements. So let's keep our cool and get on with our business. For it's stormy weather ahead and all good men will want to get the ship to port.

Stanley Plastrik

WHOM TO VOTE FOR? Since Nixon is impossible for any self-respecting citizen, and "fourth party" candidacies are sterile gestures, it boils down to this—*to vote for Humphrey or to abstain*. As things stand now, early in September, I shall abstain, but Humphrey could persuade me to change between now and November 5. I doubt that he will or that he cares. I care, however. If he travels the "high road" of a clear stance on Vietnam (*end the bombing to end the war*) and if he eschews "law and order" demagogy as the answer to America's domestic crisis, I'll vote for him.

But I have no illusions about this. His whitewash of Mayor Daley as a campaign starter is most unpromising. I know that a strong and perhaps even valid case can be made out for voting for Humphrey. ("Lesser evil" candidate, labor support, "do you want Nixon?" etc.) Such a case might hold for a "normal" election year, but not in 1968, an extraordinary year. American political life is undergoing a revolutionary upheaval (it has just begun, has years to run). Anyone who employs time-honored criteria for judging candidates, issues, etc., is

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out of touch. We are moving toward new criteria; we must raise our standards and the demands we make upon people.

What about Vietnam? Can anyone believe that Humphrey, with *his* Vietnam record and his double-talk on the issue, is more likely to end the war than Nixon? I cannot see any sharp distinction between the two candidates on Vietnam. The fact is, the country is proving increasingly ungovernable because of the moral and emotional havoc brought about by the war. *Whoever* becomes President must consider this. Is there any serious reason to believe that Nixon, precisely for this reason, would not terminate the war on the best available terms within a few months of his election? And that, having no ties with the Johnsonian past, he might conceivably bring this off easier than Humphrey? One thing is sure; the war cannot go on in its present form. Can one seriously think of Nixon escalating it? Remember, Nixon intends to be President for eight years; if the war were to go on indefinitely, he'd end up like Johnson, repudiated

To me, the one reason to elicit a vote for Humphrey is that at least, he is a human being with human faults and weaknesses. Garrulousness, flatulence, political-liberal opportunism, etc.—well-grooved characteristics for American politicians. Nixon, on the other hand, is like those plastic credit cards or delegates' badges that flashed green when inserted into one of those Chicago convention machines; he simply isn't human. But again, the extraordinary nature of the year 1968 precludes what might legitimately be a basis for voting.

Despite these discouraging signs, one ought not to draw overly pessimistic conclusions from recent events, particularly the Democratic convention. Amid all the noise and confusion, a new kind of national politics is clearly on the march; it is forming within the disorderly ranks of the Democratic party and a multitude of other groups, many of which have strong local roots at present. New leaders are appearing; their numbers are bound to increase. Can anyone believe that Mayor Daley has a future, or that *he* represents the future? (*Incidentally it ought to be clearly stated at least in one place that Johnson, not Daley, bears responsibility for Chicago, particularly the police episodes. This embittered man, knowing clearly who had toppled him, was having his last innings with the youth. A word from him would have halted the police.*) The avenue for action is within the Democratic party and the thousand turbulent eddies that swirl about it.

David Spitz

I AM TEMPTED TO SEEK reassurance in an ancient adage: that history is not really determined by the passions, purposes, and personalities of the powerful; that what counts far more is contingency and external circumstance, traditions and social forces. But the searing impact of two national nominating conventions does not allow to believe this. The nominees and their parties, their ideas, even their wrong ideas or lack of ideas, their sincerity or guile, their sense of commitment, more importantly the character of that commitment—all these suddenly matter; they matmatter very much. And so I am driven back to the elemental—to who and what these men and parties are, what they have been, what they are likely to do, and how one who finds himself in the role of dissenter should respond.

Clearly, he does not begin by bewailing the fact that he cannot choose between good and evil, between a man of conscience and one of ambition, between a party of principle and one of expediency. Were such a choice normally available to him, he would not be a dissenter. He must begin, instead, with the grim recognition that he can select the lesser evil or suffer the evil that someone else will select for him. Nor can he escape this dilemma by raising the cheerful specter of a fourth party. Such a political party is not a feasible reality in 1968; it lacks the leadership, the money, the organization, and the capacity to overcome state laws that will keep it off the ballot. Even more, save for some of the antiwar groups, it cannot now mobilize the elements that are required to make such a party viable. Labor, the blacks, and the poor, for example, are unlikely to bolt the Democratic party to which they have long been committed. Were such a party nevertheless to be formed, its con-

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sequences in the immediate situation might well be disastrous; for just as Strom Thurmond and Henry Wallace combined in 1948 to deprive Harry Truman of votes that would otherwise have gone to him, and thereby almost threw the election to Thomas Dewey, so a combination of George Wallace and a fourth-party candidate might well take enough votes away from Hubert Humphrey to give the electoral victory to Richard Nixon.

For those who see no important difference between Humphrey and Nixon, this is no calamity. Nor will it disturb those who are determined above all else to punish the Democrats for their refusal to nominate Eugene McCarthy, or for their high-handed and near-tyrannical mismanagement of the National Convention, or for the disgraceful conduct of Mayor Daley and his brutal Chicago police, or for the shameful failure of Hubert Humphrey to speak out in condemnation of these repressive tactics.

But to one who, like myself, believes there is a considerable difference between the two candidates, and between a party that can actually be disgraced by such conduct and a party that would indulge (as it repeatedly has indulged) in such conduct with aplomb, the matter is not so simple.

I distrust and cannot abide Hubert Humphrey, but I loathe Richard Nixon. Hence I shall, in all probability, and with no little reluctance, vote for a man I dislike in order to avert the horror of being governed by a man I despise.

There is no need to explain here why I feel as I do about Nixon. His past and present bespeak a record so devious and vile that none but our Babbitts can take him seriously. The trouble is, there are all too many Babbitts.

Humphrey might have been a different man than he is. But ever since he discovered in 1952 that he could not hope to secure the Vice-Presidential and ultimately the Presidential nomination without the support, or at least the acquiescence of the South, he has waged a steadfast campaign, not in behalf of civil rights, which had brought him a deserved prominence, but in behalf of "respectability."

In the course of this sad pilgrimage he authored the Humphrey Communist Control Act of 1954, which lumped together a varied group of people and read it out of the human race. It did not do what it professed to do: it did not *outlaw* the Communist party but fostered the illusion that it had done so.

It was promulgated at the very moment when history demanded not an abject surrender but a bold resistance to the earlier Senator McCarthy.

Inevitably Humphrey became a servant of the Crown, forgetting that in a democracy there is no Crown. Whether he did or did not share President Johnson's increasingly distorted views on Vietnam, did or did not share Johnson's opinions and policies on other issues, some wise, some otherwise—we may never know. It does not matter. Whatever his private opinions may have been, they were not uttered; like a puppet he recited only the thoughts of his master. So to demean one's individuality, is hardly a recommendation for the Presidency.

I am confronted then with two dismal candidates, several major issues, and a political direction or tone. What, short of a self-imposed exile, am I to do?

If the war in Vietnam is the primary issue, as it is, neither Hubert Humphrey nor Richard Nixon is the man to end it, though end it they probably will. Not because it is their idea to end it, on sensible terms; and not because they see that war as a political blunder or a moral shame; but because they will have come to believe that public opinion will no longer tolerate its continuation. This is one reason why they are, perhaps, to be pitied even as they are condemned. They are not minds but mouths, and they mouth only what they hear and repeat what public opinion says.

Now there is a sense in which this role satisfies the democratic theme. Leaders *should* respond to the changing tides of public sentiment. But there is another sense in which this role demeans the democratic idea. Leaders should give vent to the American imagination, should grasp the unarticulated but deeply felt urgings of the community, should anticipate and express the public will even as that will is discovering itself. Neither Humphrey nor Nixon possesses the intellectual depth and sensitivity to meet this greater requirement.

BUT ON THE major domestic issues of our time—the plight of the cities, the Negro and the poor, the Negro and student rebellions, the quality of our educational systems and our cultural life—there is, I believe, a signifi-

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cant difference between the two men and, by and large, between the two parties. Nixon would balance the budget and insist on "law and order." By these he means cultural regression, a continuation of unmerited and debasing poverty and urban blight, and that conception of order which seeks to suppress the manifestations of discontent rather than to remove its sources. Humphrey will strive for some amelioration in these areas. Here if not in Vietnam he can be expected to move with some strength and determination, for it is to the disadvantaged groups in these areas that he and his party are most beholden. I do not suggest he will do exciting things—but he may avert disaster or even that perpetuation of our present discontents that will make for continuing misery. These are scarcely exciting prospects, but they offer the possibilities that disaster might be averted and that pressures might subsequently be exerted to move him, as they moved Johnson, toward a more imaginative and constructive program.

This brings me, finally, to what I have called a difference in political direction or tone. It is a truism, but one that ought not to be forgotten, that we live today in a period of rising expectations as well as of achievements and that only a strong national government can provide the leadership and the means necessary to their attainment. Nixon and his party are the captives of an age-old past. They do not speak, because they do not understand, the language of modernity. They see the very government they seek to conquer and employ as an enemy rather than as a servant and friend. And to the degree that they will use it, as despite their rhetoric they will, they will make it an instrument of the upper and upper-middle classes. Politics, as Alexander Hamilton and Herbert Hoover taught them, is primarily the economics of "trickle-down," the sociology of "we fortunate few," the psychology of tranquility.

Humphrey and his party, outside the South, have at least moved into the present century. In the tradition of Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt, they seek to extend the binding force of "the common," of what unites rather than divides men. They look to government to change, even if not too drastically, the inequitable pyramids of power, status, and income. Hence they sense, even if they do not fully understand, the needs and rightful claims of the blacks and the poor. They are even able on occasion to talk to the artists and writers, the intellectuals and the young. After all, a political party that still has room for a Eugene McCarthy and a George McGovern, a John Kenneth Galbraith and a Julian Bond, is a far different breed of animal than one that is contemptuous even of a Lindsay or Rockefeller.

And so I return to where I began. Humphrey's cause is far from noble. But Nixon's cause is an abomination.

Dennis H. Wrong

AT LEAST since 1938 when, at the age of fourteen, I read Sinclair Lewis's now forgotten novel *It Can't Happen Here* describing the coming to power of an American Hitler, I have been listening to continual forecasts of the imminence of American fascism from various groups on the Left. Most of them seemed to me to be perverse or hysterical, stemming from ideological rigidity or wish fulfillment: the popular Marxist view that fascism is capitalism *in extremis* was an instance of the former, and various versions of "the worse it gets, the better it gets" or *"nach Hitler uns"* (echoed by so many New Leftists today) exemplified the latter. During the Joe McCarthy years some liberals and radicals became badly frightened, but, despite bureaucratic inroads on civil liberties, McCarthy and his imitators were exploiting frustrations with their source in international politics rather than domestic conflicts; and therefore passions only rarely exploded into overt violence.

The present situation is quite different, and for the first time I find myself frightened and gloomy about the immediate future. The Left surge that began in the late 50's with the victories of the Southern civil rights movement has clearly spent itself; and a reaction against further change and innovation has set in at a moment when the Left has succeeded in creating new issues, changing the political atmosphere, and achieving a few of its more concrete and immediately realizable objectives.

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All this has happened before in democratic politics, most recently in the late 40's and the 50's with the waning of the New Deal and the replacement of Nazism by Communism as the totalitarian rival abroad. Many of us who came of political age just before that period failed to realize that the movements and causes we identified with had already lost political momentum, just as many of the younger student militants today have yet to perceive that they may be in at the end rather than the beginning of something.

It would be depressing enough if all we had to face was a reenactment of the political rigidities and complacencies of the 20's or the 50's with Nixon or Humphrey cast in the role of Harding, Coolidge, or Eisenhower. But I'm afraid we may be in for something a lot worse: the racial conflict, the assault on lower-middle-class and provincial values by the young, from the hippies to the New Left, and the violence that has attended these, have aroused intense fear and antagonism in too many people. A mood of vengeance, wider and deeper than the desire of Republican politicians to pay back the long-successful New Dealers, is spreading and cutting across party divisions, as the support for Wallace and Daley's police indicates. It looks as if "there is a shitstorm coming" as Mailer, reacting largely to the war in Vietnam, prematurely predicted a few years ago.

From the standpoint of world peace and ending the war in Vietnam, one may find reassurance in the fact that the present turn to the Right has its roots in domestic tensions rather than in international conflict. I doubt that there will be any revivals of the bomb-rattling of Goldwater's 1964 campaign, and either Nixon or Humphrey is likely to prove more able and willing to end the Vietnam War than Johnson, committed as he is to his own disastrous policies. To be sure, the brutal Soviet suppression of Czech liberalization also contributes something to the reaction against the liberal-radical drive in America, particularly when so much of the New Left is indifferent to the fate of Czechoslovakia. But essentially it is the whiff we are getting of a "cold" civil war that is disturbing about the present state of the country. We democratic socialists have often in the past few years been called by the romantic revolutionaries of the New Left the equivalent of "nervous nellies" (when not something worse) for opining that their politics of confrontation and disruption would in the end arouse the anger of the majority and encourage the Right to adopt similar tactics. I wish I could believe that we had been too timid and faint-hearted about the opportunities for successful political action resulting from such tactics; but I fear that we are now about to reap the whirlwind.

Neither a Humphrey Administration, nor—less certainly—a Nixon Administration, is likely to be a powerful agency of repression and reaction, anymore than the Johnson Administration has been at home. But neither candidate seems capable of winning the strong allegiances or producing the inspirational rhetoric that could quiet the turbulent spirits loose in the land. The dialectic between protests and demonstrations in the ghettos and on the campuses, on the one hand, and white backlash and police bullying on the other, is likely to speed up. And, so many past precedents in Presidential politics having been overthrown in 1968, a Reagan or a Wallace may loom very large by 1972 after the incapacities of the next Administration have become evident.

It seems to me almost impossible for the Left to regain the initiative in the next four years. Yet in 1968, perhaps for the first time since Roosevelt ran for a second term in 1936, there were in Kennedy and McCarthy two candidates for the Presidency with large and passionate followings who gave promise of initiating real and long overdue changes in American society. If Kennedy had not been murdered, he would, I think, have won at Chicago. Humphrey is a decent, able man, but in tactics, rhetoric, and personality, if not always in policy, he has been a conventional American politician; and his capacities to innovate, inspire, and draw new men to him have been deeply compromised by his term as Johnson's Vice-President and the lackluster way in which he won the Democratic nomination. And anyway, it looks as if Nixon will win the election. I can sympathize with all those on the Left who prefer to sit this one out. For myself, I shall vote for Humphrey but without illusions, as a strictly private decision, making no effort to persuade others to do likewise or questioning the different options they may choose.

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Izak Hruska

Why Did the Russians March?

OUR READERS will have noticed that my comment in the last issue concerning Czechoslovakia was already dated by the time the issue came out. My apprehensions about Russian intervention were, alas, not dated.

To a limited extent, the Russians have succeeded in their objectives—which were, first, to bring "democratization" to a halt and, second, to bring Czechoslovakia back to a dependent position within the Warsaw Pact economic system.

Under Russian pressures but probably with the tacit approval of at least some leading Czech Communists, the Dubcek government has introduced into the National Assembly a bill prohibiting any political organization outside the National Front—which is to say, confining political legality to the CP and its front groups and abolishing the liberal and socialist clubs that had begun to spring up. Press censorship has been reinstituted and the most outspoken of the Czech papers—*Student, Literarni Listi*—have been banned.

Had the Russians been intent on demonstrating the validity of the central theses proposed by the anti-Stalinist Left on the nature of Communist society, they could not have done so with greater effect:

> • *The system of bureaucratic or totalitarian collectivism which prevails in the Soviet Union and the East European countries can, like capitalism, allow for a variety of political forms, but only for a limited variety: it can rule by terror, by mild authoritarian decree, or by some blend of the two. But it cannot tolerate the play of democratic forces. It will destroy, as soon as it can, incipient competing parties. The party dictatorship is a system of social organization incompatible with democracy, and thereby at the opposite pole from socialism.*
>
> • *After 50 years in office, after having transformed Russia into a major industrial nation and one of the leading world powers, the Russian Communist party-state remains persuaded —and we concur in this judgment—that it does not command the loyalty of large segments of its population, or the loyalty of still larger segments in the other East European countries. Whether these constitute minorities or majorities of the population there is no way to determine. The Communist bureaucracy fears nothing so much as subjecting itself to a democratic test, that is, allowing opposition candidates to run freely and accepting the electoral verdict peacefully. Not Brezhnev's Russia, not Tito's Yugoslavia, not Dubcek's Czechoslovakia has been ready to face this possibility.*

In one sense, the Russians suffered a defeat in Czechoslovakia. Their military technique was impeccable, their political preparation wretched. They could find no Quislings, no Kadars. They helped make Dubcek into a national hero—though, in truth, we do not yet know what his real role was. If anything, the Czech intervention was more ghastly than that of Hungary in 1956, since in Hungary there was at least the pretext that "anti-socialist" forces had arisen as defined political parties and Premier Nagy had declared that Hungary was leaving the Warsaw Pact. In Czechoslovakia, the intervention was simply a decision to prevent another Communist regime from taking its own course.

But the Russians have paid heavily. The prospect of a world Communist conference is at an end. Relations with the West European Communist parties are badly strained. And the domestic repercussions within Russia—not yet measured, but certain to be profound—can only lead the Communist autocracy to further repressions. Indeed, there has already been announced an ideological tightening-up in "cultural work." The Russian intellectuals will suffer.

Yet there was a logic of sorts in what the Russians did. We need not resort to categories

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of historical "inevitability," since it is conceivable that a slightly different vote in the Politburo would have meant a decision not to intervene militarily but to employ other means for pressuring the Czechs. But a logic there certainly was in the intervention. The Russians saw that, whatever the range of purposes and motives among the Czech Communists, there had begun in Czechoslovakia a socio-political process which imperiled the entire totalitarian system. What the Russians feared was not so much the steps Dubcek had already taken or allowed; what they feared was the political consequences of those steps, consequences that might go further than Dubcek might wish. So the Russians did achieve this much: before it was "too late," they blocked the dynamic of social change by which Czechoslovakia might have moved toward democratic socialism.

The price was heavy, but from *their* point of view it may well have been worth paying. Or from *their* point of view, no workable alternative may have presented itself.

Against the common enemy, the "liberals" in Prague and those who might be called the "national" Communists—i.e., party leaders who wished for a relaxation of authoritarianism without a venture into democracy—the Soviet leaders felt it necessary to close ranks.

It will now be some time before we can learn which of the Czech Communist leaders wanted to halt the Czech developments at the "safe" authoritarian point that we may roughly designate as Gomulka-like and which of them, though still employing the traditional Communist vocabulary, had in effect undergone a moral-intellectual rebirth like that of Djilas and Nagy a decade ago and were now, in effect, democratic socialists.

Theatre of the Absurd

TOKYO—*Red China's official news agency said today army surgeons successfully removed a benign tumor weighing 99 pounds from the stomach of a peasant woman last March—after studying the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.*

The report said the woman, Chang Chiu-chu, 37, on regaining consciousness after the 13-hour operation, passed her hand over her abdomen and cried out, "Long live Chairman Mao!"

—Boston Globe, *June 4, 1968*

THE SITUATION, as of mid-September, remains somewhat fluid, with a great deal of inner maneuvering within Czechoslovakia. The courage with which the Czech people met the invaders is beyond praise; the tactics of the Czech Communist leaders cannot yet be evaluated.

One aspect of this situation that ought to be remarked is its effect on U.S.-Russian relations. American liberals who like to stress the need for both a détente between the big powers and for autonomy of small nations ought to face the possibility, extremely unpleasant as it is, that these two goals are somewhat in conflict. It is amusing to read, in this connection, an editorial in the September 6 *New Statesman*:

> . . . the Americans gave the Russians *carte blanche* to invade Czechoslovakia . . . there can be no doubt that a cynical understanding between the two Great Powers does exist, whereby each may play the rogue elephant unopposed within its own sphere. . . . The most shameful official offspring of the cold war is the belief that hot war can only be averted by allowing Russia and America to smash anything each chooses to call heretical . . .

True enough, in a way; but what precisely is the U.S. supposed to have done? The most the *New Statesman* can suggest is that it should have issued a public statement warning the Russians not to invade Czechoslovakia—which is to forget that before the intervention liberals were praising the U.S. for knowing when to keep quiet. And I am sure that if the U.S. had taken a more belligerent stand (which, as Hungary showed, proves to be mere noise unless linked with a readiness to risk war), the *New Statesman* would have raged at the U.S. for exploiting the Czech crisis in behalf of its own cold-war ends.

We had better recognize the disturbing reality. A détente between the Big Powers does carry the considerable possibility of a tacit agreement that each "may play the rogue elephant unopposed within its own sphere."

The world grows used to horrors. When Hungary was invaded, indignation roared through Europe, Asia, America. Now, it is taken almost as a matter of course, and Senator Eugene McCarthy, in a political act that seriously marred his campaign, issued a statement minimizing its consequences. (A notable exception to this callousness has been Asoka Mehta, the Indian socialist leader who

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resigned from Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet to protest her failure to speak out candidly against the Russians.)

Latest dispatches from Prague report that the press is prohibited from calling the Russian action a "military intervention." It must be described as a gesture of "fraternal cooperation." How George Orwell, student of Newspeak, would have appreciated this grotesquerie!

Repercussions in Paris

Jean Bloch-Michel

WE WERE ACCUSTOMED to seeing the Communists and their friends in every country of the world quickly forget the "errors," even the "crimes," of the Soviet Union, attributing them sometimes to "capitalist encirclement," sometimes to the "cult of personality." But it is very likely that things will be different this time, and that the "error" or "crime" of 1968 will mark the beginning of a profound evolution in the history of world Communism. This likelihood is demonstrated by the fact that a Communist party such as the French PC (Parti Communiste Français), which was so obstinately faithful to Moscow through all the historic vicissitudes of these last years, should be troubled to the extent it is today. The PC is certainly not unanimous in its disapproval of Moscow, and a sizable fraction of its *apparat* is leaning toward unreserved approbation of the occupation of Prague. But the diversity of opinions which has been expressed by the Party or its usual spokesmen shows that its unity is only a facade.

The French PC, already deeply shaken by the events of last May and the grave defeat it suffered in the elections, today finds itself in the most difficult situation of its lifetime. Its present internal crisis cannot be compared to any it has previously undergone. It is no longer a question of an "infantile disorder," of a slight disturbance which the internal discipline and monolithic unity of world Communism would suffice to repair. Neither the old factional crises of its history, which evoke names like Frossard, Barbé, and Celor (names that no longer mean anything to today's militants), nor the small Titoist contagion which in its time infected some intellectuals, nor even the squalls set off by the Khrushchev report and the 20th Congress had repercussions comparable to those of the second Prague coup. The French PC, moreover, finds itself in that dramatic kind of situation where every initiative, whatever it is, can only do it harm: whether the Party approves or disapproves, whether it lets some speak and imposes silence upon others, whether it detaches itself from Moscow or remains attached—whatever it does, it is sure to lose on all fronts.

Leftists will not rally to it even if it eventually takes an independent stand—they will increase their demands. Obedience to the Soviet Union will alienate needed outside support and will create an internal crisis as grave as would disobedience. Waldeck-Rochet must have explained all this to Brezhnev when he went to Moscow. Now he must also learn that Communist opinion is unimportant compared to the necessities of power.

France's PC has expressed three opinions through its official organs, the Central Committee and the Politburo: at first it "condemned" the invasion; then it "disapproved"; and the third time, while maintaining its support of the Czechoslovak Party, mingled with expressions of its concern over the Czech policies, it rejoiced over the Moscow "accord." But Roger Garaudy, a member of the Central Committee, in an interview given to a Czech newspaper when this was still possible, stigmatized the occupation of Prague and demanded a "clean sweep at the Kremlin." And Aragon was responsible for the following in *Lettres Françaises*: "We cannot conceive of socialism assuming an aspect of military constraint, of survival of the fittest, of censure, of suffocation." But Aragon, after all, is only an intellectual who has already been trying to regain his liberty for several years. More important is the article by André Wurmser published not in *Lettres Françaises*—which is not an official Communist publication—but in *France Nouvelle,* which is.

Wurmser, in his articles for *L'Humanité* and

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in all his public activities, has always been one of those journalist-writers who remain docile under any provocation, to the extent that the word "docility" is no longer applicable—conformity has become second nature to him. He has accepted everything, without hesitation, Stalinization and de-Stalinization, anti-Semitism, and Budapest. He is the one who spoke the celebrated words at the Kravchenko trial, to the effect that "I swear that there are no concentration camps in the U.S.S.R.," and before the tribunal, speaking of Marguerite Buber-Neuman, "You are not about to believe what a displaced person tells you!" Today, in an official Party newspaper, he writes: ". . . the tragic decision of the month of August is wrong not only in our opinion, but according to our law, the law of Communists around the world."

No one can predict how so profound a crisis will end. For the moment the result is that the French PC finds itself once more in the isolation from which it had escaped with such difficulty in the past years. The accords between it and the Federation of the Left—itself moribund and perhaps even defunct after this last blow—are no longer conceivable. Mitterand has said so, and even Guy Mollet, who has recently been so anxious to maintain good relations with the PC (since it got him his re-election in the Pas-de-Calais), has said as much. Jean Daniel, who has always spoken for unity, spoke last week of the Soviet "bloody bureaucracy." He takes issue in *L'Observateur* with the argument which has been appearing here and there that by attacking the U.S.S.R. one plays into the hands of reaction. No, answers Jean Daniel, "when a reality serves as alibi for our adversaries it does not thereby cease to be a reality." And he adds that on the contrary it is by keeping quiet about Prague that one encourages American intervention in Vietnam. Elementary truths, no doubt, but they deserve to be spoken.

As for the reaction in other French circles, on the Right and on the Left, it has been unanimously condemnatory, even if there is on the part of the Right a suspect kind of joy mixed with the condemnations, or on the part of the Gaullists disappointment at seeing France's foreign policy destroyed in a single day, after the destruction of her domestic policy in several weeks in May. If M. Michel Debré was firm in his conversation with the Russian ambassador, this did not prevent him from saying that the Czech affair was no more than an "accident in passing" on the road to accord. Perhaps someone in high places has made him understand that such cynicism, even if it was in the Gaullist manner, was nevertheless excessive under the circumstances and, even worse, maladroit.

What more is there to say? Everyone has demonstrated in his way. Sartre, with his usual awkward and confused generosity, has declared the Prague coup a "war crime." His meaning is not clear. A crime has been committed, but is it a war crime? Did he mean to bring the Dubcek-Brezhnev affair before the Russell tribunal—which has kept so strangely silent about Biafra where the most horrible war crimes are committed every day? A crime has certainly been committed, but without even the excuse of war, and this kind of confusion of terms is not useful.

PROTESTS AND CENSURE mean nothing, as everyone knows. We have remained impotent before an act which has destroyed one of our generation's greatest hopes, the hope represented by a country animated in its entirety by the two words which have nourished us for 50 years: socialism and liberty. What our May revolution tried, however confusedly, to do—something like reconciling Marx and Kropotkin—we could have hoped to see attempted by the highest echelons in a unanimous country. Instead, we have seen it all destroyed, as so many of our hopes have been. And we have done nothing because history has made us impotent. I happen not to have been in Paris during these last weeks, but in Geneva, where I am writing these lines. One evening I went to a demonstration of solidarity with the Czechs in front of the Cathedral of Saint Pierre. With its staircase ornamented by pots of geraniums and white daisies it looked like the entrance to a casino. There were a thousand of us there, maybe two thousand. What could we do?

Translated by S. I. FLECKMAN

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Bernard Rosenberg

Chicago: Blood and Disaster

IN CHICAGO, Allen Ginsberg declared that the 35th National Democratic Convention was a mass hallucination. Maybe he is right, and the whole thing never happened. His account should be interesting; Jean Genet's more so; and Norman Mailer will have much to say. (One observer remarked that when Norman strode among the young it was as if Jesus Christ had materialized in the Vatican.) No image, however cockeyed, surreal, and extravagant is inappropriate—or equal—to the occasion. I confess that the events are too much for me. It would take an inspired Artaud to do them justice. For what we who were on the spot saw, smelled, and felt for nearly five wretched days was authentic Theater of Cruelty, a superproduction compared to which *Marat/Sade* is kids' stuff. Whether the principle performance took place inside or outside the International Amphitheater, that stockyard converted into a stockade, is debatable.

Babbling, shouting, milling, and churning were omnipresent. A local drama critic likened the proceedings to a concert reading, in Finnish, of Shaw's *Back to Methuselah.* He was being charitable. You needed a portable TV set to orient yourself on the floor. Lacking that equipment, quite a few delegates and alternates left the hall early and never returned. Those who stayed, exposed themselves to a noise level many decibels above that of any discoteque going full blast. Pop politics probably did lasting damage to delicate eardrums, and yet it was the least serious of several grave hazards from which no one was exempt.

How to sort out the multitude of impressions? How to tell the ocean from the waves so soon after they have swept over your consciousness? How to dispel the specter of Fortress America which Dick Daley's megalomania has conjured up for us? Should deep green and ubiquitous khaki become the national colors? Was the derangement merely episodic or has it settled into a chronic condition?

After the first round of police brutality, graveyard humorists called Chicago Prague East; after the last, they called Prague Chicago West. I believe we got a taste of unbridled police power. I think we got a foretaste of something worse. But who knows? Who, especially if he happens to be a diehard McCarthyite like myself, with gas still affecting his respiratory system because he ventured too close to the action? Was the Battle of "Boul Mich" and Balbo (after Mussolini's intrepid airman) a passing abberation? It was mostly the work of a "liberal Democratic mayor" who typically sided one day with the doves in supporting Ted Kennedy and, a day later, with the hawks in supporting Humphrey. Are we going to see more of the barbed wire, submachine guns, tear gas canisters, bayonet-tipped rifles, and chemical sprays directed at unarmed youth in burnooses, Indian blankets, and beads, at doctors in their "whites," at snoopy journalists, and solid citizens who happen to be in the way? Was it just chance that provoked the only tumultuous applause for Presidential candidate Humphrey when, in his acceptance speech, he pledged eternal opposition to crime? I am afraid not, but you must make allowances for my bitterness.

A more sanguine commentator would emphasize the plus factors. The Democratic party, although, far from restructured, did move to democratize itself. The Negro caucus or-

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ganized by A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, and John Conyers was effective enough to produce 337 Negro delegates, out of 5611, thus approximately doubling the black 2 per cent the Republicans could claim in Miami Beach. The party kept its word on Mississippi, incursions were made in Alabama despite "Bull" Connor, and to have had Julian Bond's Georgia loyalists seated was altogether heartening. That voteless Washington, D.C., put a Negro in nomination for the Presidency deserves applause. Next time there will doubtless be more progress along these lines.

Permanent abolition of the unit rule should facilitate further beneficial change. The Bourbons' grip on states like North Carolina and Texas will be loosened. And so on. Furthermore, if the meetings were interminable and intemperate they also focused now and then on controversial issues about which rational discourse could sometimes be heard above the general uproar. Challenges did not go entirely unheeded, and more planning might have yielded slightly better results. Accelerated procedural reform ought to keep some Democrats from straying too far afield, while disembarrassing the party of those like Governor Maddox, the fried chicken vendor who was so recently embraced by Vice-President Humphrey.

SO WHERE ARE WE? A detached *realpolitik* judgment at this moment would seem to be that, although gains were made and more are in the offing, they are outweighed by losses. Gene McCarthy captured the idealism not just of the educated youth and academic intellectuals who were at the forefront of his movement. As the polls and the primaries made clear, housewives and suburbanites and other large segments of the electorate also got involved. It was clear for some weeks that their man could not be nominated, and he was resigned to it. Not by nature irreconcilable politicians, McCarthy and his forces, once defeated, need not have been humiliated, throttled, drowned out, and sequestered. They were. And it will cost their oppressors a lot, perhaps more than the democratic process can bear.

The phantasmagoria unfolded as planned by a trio of impresarios: Daley, Bailey, and Albert. (Behind them stood the equally truculent and immensely more powerful figure of LBJ who put his chosen successor in a strait-jacket from which Harry Houdini could not have escaped.) They must be credited with a certain romanticism (except in their selection of Edmund Sixtus Muskie); for if pragmatism had prevailed, we would not now have to consider voting for a bubbly hawk, a pink-faced evangelist, the conventional orgman from hicksville. "Dump the Hump," protesters chanted on Monday and Tuesday. But Wednesday, when he had it clinched, their slogan became, "Humpty Dumpty is heading for a great fall." No more than his momentary "success" is his apparently impending débacle cause for jubilation. But there you have it. The appalling circumstances that surrounded a garrison convention immeasurably weakened a none too attractive candidate. And those circumstances were avoidable; one touch of generosity or of adroitness and finesse rather than the dominant primitivism and, for what it was worth, the Democrats would have had a reasonably united party.

Didn't the bosses want a winner? Of course they did. Thanatos is more at home in the Republican party. Which is why Ted Kennedy was the savior they would only too gladly have accepted. As it turned out, the surviving Kennedy did not allow Unruh, Daley, and his brothers' old team to draft him. By that decision Kennedy guaranteed that Humphrey would be the nominee. The pols were affected by the polls (and as Muskie's presence on the ticket indicates, by the Poles as well). Their preferred candidate looked singularly bad in the big states: California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania. Better to lose the election than take McCarthy, a loner and a cool exponent of the new politics. But Teddy who, for all they knew or cared, might be more radical than the

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quietly subversive Senator from Minnesota, was their boy. The Kennedy boomlet must have caused President Johnson to tremble. Its advent coincided with a Southern rebellion: nine racist delegations, piqued by their little frustrations before the Credentials Committee, were preparing to desert Humphrey. With the Kennedy threat, they executed a smart about-face, delivering the 400 votes required to put Hubert over. If the South had not rescued Humphrey, as it did Nixon, a hermetically closed convention would have cracked open. With more than one ballot, against all odds, the party might even have been able to beat the machine that asphyxiated it as surely as Mace did the same job on the kids downtown.

The fix was on, and only another, more desirable fix could have prevented it. Hope for "a breath of fresh air"—the McCarthy slogan transformed into a reality when his followers literally sprayed the Conrad Hilton with a sweet smelling substance to counteract the pungent odor of vomit mixed with tear gas and stink bombs—that hope went down the drain when a majority of delegates rejected the peace plank. Intelligent amendments sponsored by Clark Kerr and Walter Reuther of the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam, tied to no specific group of partisans, were sympathetically received at several state caucuses—by those already converted to the cause. But Johnson dictated the hard-line majority report. Humphrey supporters claimed against all reason that their aspirant was forced to take a position that in fact he characteristically championed with masterly ferocity.

The week before, Humphrey, out scrabbling for votes, variously maintained that his personal views did not appreciably differ from those of Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy *or* the pestiferous Senators McCarthy and McGovern. And since when, his aides demanded, do platforms mean anything? Less than 24 hours after the Convention ended, Humphrey asserted that he would not be inflexibly bound by the planks in his platform. Offer 'em one thing and give 'em the opposite: his mentor in the White House who never had a more obsequious servant cannot have failed to teach him that much.

A little public posing and a little surreptitious maneuvering would have provided a plank to which the disaffected could have rallied, whether rightly or wrongly. But this was before the last outrage perpetrated at McCarthy headquarters by Daley's storm troopers—during which the Senator's 21-year-old niece asked on what grounds she and her friends were being clobbered, only to be told, "Coffee grounds," followed by pow! boom! bam! Until that last straw, a superficial way out of the impasse seemed possible: McCarthy would withhold his endorsement, seek a meeting like the one Taft had with Eisenhower in '52, and attempt to wring a peace commitment out of Humphrey. Not that this would necessarily have been worth much, but it is now less likely to take place at all. Beholden to Johnson *and* to Daley, the Democratic standard-bearer is compromised up to his neck, round which an incubus has been added to the albatross already strangling him. More power to Humphrey if this "decent and warm-hearted man," who long ago personified American liberalism, can squirm out of his predicament. I would not bet on it. Nor would I take his tarnished word for it.

AND WHAT OF THE GADFLY, anathema to all party regulars, quirky, prickly, perverse, dogged, and unflappable, successful when he fails, down and out when he succeeds: "I got 42 per cent of the vote in New Hampshire, and they said I won. I got 58 per cent of the vote in Wisconsin, and they said I lost." "Lazy and passive," McCarthy for almost nine months was the most active politician in America. To some extent, the Tet offensive made him, and the rape of Czechoslovakia unmade him. (Right now, Hanoi and Moscow determine the shape of American politics almost as much as Washington and Chicago.) The stand he took on gun control and his reaction to the Czech tragedy were indefensible. If the pre-Convention glow

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nevertheless was followed by an afterglow that shows no sign of dimming, neither one is to be mistaken for a halo. Those closest to McCarthy constantly find fault with him, but they are not looking for an angel to lead their "government-in-exile." An honest man will do. McCarthy simply stepped into the breach when a whole flock of doves, beginning with Robert Kennedy, would not or could not do so. He thereby set forces in motion which, if we are able to survive the next Administration, may do much to reconstruct his party and help save an affluent nation whose petty bourgeoisie has gone more than half mad. Those of his staffers who contend that the movement matters more than the man, and that it can outlast him, are certainly right. I hope they keep saying this—and act on it.

Chicago presented a panorama of a likely alternative to McCarthy. Apologists for the cops, the guardsmen and the troops persisted in the refrain-after-Eichmann: "They were just doing their jobs"; as if journalists, ambulance drivers, and physicians who were blocked from, and slugged for, doing *their* jobs had no right to do them. Fascism, including the Red variety, is precisely that condition in which agents of repression have a job to do that transcends everyone else's. The unfathomable police hostility to medics administering first aid can be abundantly documented. Jack Mabley, a *Chicago American* columnist with no love for yippies, hippies, or flippies, but indignant at the sight of their unnecessarily bruised bodies, also reported—to take one example—that a Detroit newsman, overcome by gas, lay unconscious on Clark Street, that the police supplied neither a wagon nor any other assistance, and finally that white-clad physicians were unable to get their own ambulance past police lines. They were ultimately allowed to carry him away.

THE DANGEROUS GAME of confrontationism as a prelude to violent insurrection as played by Tom Hayden, Dave Dellinger, and their cohorts, worked beyond anyone's wildest dreams because officialdom cooperated so fully with it. Convinced that "worse is better," confrontationists seem to want to be beaten. (Shooting is reserved for blacks who got their share of it in Chicago after Martin Luther King's assassination, and steered pretty clear of the current scene.) They want Hitler first and the millenium next. If their way prevails, they will get little-league Hitlers, Ronnie Reagans and Dick Daleys, and then the real thing—first and last. *Worse is worse, damn it!* And victory for the Dellingers would hardly be less horrendous than victory for their opponents.

Now who played into the Dellingers' hands if not Mayor Richard J. Daley? Some before the convention, while he publicized what was in store for his city. A front-page story told Chicagoans to anticipate that Communist agitators were going to poison the water supply, dynamite natural-gas lines, strew boulevards with nails, and stage stall-ins of old jalopies on expressways. To forestall the calamity which in fact he invited, Daley put his cops on 12-hour shifts, airlifted 6000 U.S. troops to O'Hare Airport (of whom 100 Negro GI's from Fort Hood declined to join the others and were suitably punished), mobilized over 18,000 Illinois National Guardsmen, and welcomed approximately 2000 FBI and secret service men. Recently, he explained this expensive and elaborate operation on the basis that Presidential candidates had to be protected from assassins. Did his bully boys think Dan Rather and Mike Wallace of CBS or Hugh Hefner, the Playboy king strolling in his own neighborhood, were assassins? *Was it to protect the candidate from his own staff that a dawn raid had to be made on McCarthy headquarters?* Is that why a billy club broke in two when it cracked a young aide's skull? One could write a book, a black book, consisting solely of such questions.

"The police are only human. Abuse them and they get angry." Well, sure. But aren't the rest, even the worst of us, human too? Can't cops, whether or not they are organized in unions that deserve to be renamed Police-

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men's Malevolent Associations, learn a nursery rhyme that begins, "Sticks and stones may break my bones?" Daley, oleaginously justifying the mayhem he had let loose, asked Walter Cronkite on network TV, "How would you like to be called a pig and a four-letter word?" Said Cronkite, in a riposte for which I am practically willing to forgive mass culture all its sins, "Mayor Daley, you've been reading my mail." Those in khaki were noticeably more impassive than Chicago's finest in the face of jeers they both had to endure. The provocateurs were there, no doubt about it. A hippie leader, after news of the nomination reached him, announced exultantly, "We have won the Battle of Chicago. Our objective was to elect a pig President of the United States. The Republicans *and* the Democrats have accommodated us. 'Porkie,' our candidate has been arrested. But, either way now, a pig will occupy The White House." Porkie's fate subsequent to arrest is unknown. His supporters are worried. Chicago, after all, is the hog butcher to the world.

Playful, all that, even if it does enrage the dunderhead behind a shield. Something else should deeply concern lovers of freedom and democracy. Police brutality in Grant Park, in Lincoln Park, and in the Amphitheater transformed a large number of peaceful kids who had never heard of Maoist, Guevarist, Leninist, or Trotskyist ideology, into militant proponents of revolutionary violence. As a result, escalation toward guerrilla warfare in a country sufficiently torn by racial, regional, and generational conflict has been notably advanced. The youth who a few days before would have turned a deaf ear, listened respectfully to Tom Hayden's plea in Grant Park for an abandonment of nonviolence. Crash helmets and the lock step are in evidence as a certain amount of youthful insurgency moves dialectically toward the militarization of its own cadres. Friend on the street, or on the beat, watch out—or we will all be caught in the same fearful net.

Shortly before his death, the Rev. King raised two question: Can America be saved? Should America be saved? The second is easy to affirm. Leaving Chicago, many of us felt unsure about the first.

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Walter Goodman

George Wallace on the Stump

A FORTNIGHT BEFORE George C. Wallace visited Fort Wayne, Indiana, for a rally in his pursuit of the Presidency, there was looting in the city's Negro areas. Several hundred youths roamed the streets, breaking the windows of white-owned stores and throwing rocks at policemen. The outburst was still on the minds of Fort Wayne's citizens when Wallace came to town on August 17; especially on the minds, and the lips, of his supporters.

As it happened, the first two Fort Wayners I had occasion to talk with—a young clerk at the airport motel and the cab driver who took me to the evening rally—were Wallace fans, and both, with just a little prompting, gave "the racial thing" as the main reason for their support. The motel clerk, who was getting ready to enter the University of Indiana in the fall, was a mild youth, who could not bring himself to use the word Negro; it was always "they": "Wallace doesn't want to do anything bad to them, to hurt them." It seemed to this boy that they were being unreasonable. They had it good in Indiana, which, after all, was not the South; movies and swimming pools were open to everybody; unemployment was low, and the big companies like Magnavox and International Harvester employed hundreds and hundreds of them. The clerk's father was a bail bondsman—"He gets them out of jail"—and he too was a Wallace supporter. As the outstanding example of their unreasonableness, the clerk cited their demands that their children be bussed from their school in the inner city—"It's a real nice school"—to schools in white communities.

The same example was put forward by the taxi driver, a very talkative little man with a border-state accent into which a scent of the South occasionally drifted. He was not as mild as the clerk; the insistence on school bussing he saw as a case of "you give the colored a finger, they want your hand. If you give them something nice, that's not enough for them, they want what you've got." He was a booster of Fort Wayne, and as we drove along, he pointed out the two new bank buildings and the big Sheraton hotel under construction, the new luxury apartment houses ("everything anybody could want"), the site of a proposed cultural center, the shopping center with 57 stores under one roof. It was beyond him why people in a city where "the colored can sit anyplace they like in any park" should behave so belligerently, and he was pretty sure, from personal contacts ("I know a lot of colored"), that outside agitators, probably Communists, were at work.

It may be that the driver thought he had deduced my political leanings from my destination and was trying to please me. His discourse went on, almost uninterruptedly, for the 30-minute drive from the motel to the Memorial Coliseum where the rally was being held, and it assumed a certain man-to-man quality of plain speaking. He told me that the recent disturbances had been confined to the city's Negro sections, and added: "That's the beauty part." He reported, with emphatic approval, that the city's police were on order to shoot to kill looters. He was worried about the depreciation of houses in nice neighborhoods when the colored moved in—"a man who paid eighteen thousand for a house can only get twelve thousand for it." And he observed that the police have most trouble in

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colored areas: "I'd like to have somebody explain *that* to me." He evidently liked this comment and repeated it a couple of times. So warm were our relations by the end of the journey that he parked his cab and accompanied me into a restaurant near the Coliseum, introduced me to the hostess and impressed upon her my need for quick service so that I could be at the rally by eight o'clock.

WANDERING AMONG the 7,000 people who had gathered at the Coliseum, a modernistic barn more accustomed to the reek of basketball than of politics, was like tuning in a medley of themes from every Far Right extravaganza of the past quarter century in America. One woman called forth the shade of Alger Hiss and another recounted the villainies of the United Nations. Yet another, who wore a glittery little American flag beside the Wallace button on her glittery dress, explained how the Constitution of the United States, which had been created by men under the direct guidance of God Almighty, was being subverted by the Supreme Court. She spoke for States Rights, and testified that the North had in fact lost the Civil War. One man loudly affirmed that he was not descended from the apes, and no one within earshot evinced any surprise.

As to Vietnam, the prevailing view was one of truculent isolationism. Any war against Communists is, to state the obvious, good and just; the emphasis among the Wallaceites, however, was not on the values which we are upholding in Vietnam, but on the moral deficiencies of our so-called allies who not only are not supporting us, but are actually *trading with our enemies*. The thing to do, ran the consensus, is to get out "honorably" and bring our boys home, or else unleash the military: "If we can't get out, we ought to just blow up the whole place." The speaker left no doubt which alternative he preferred.

Just as there were no big or even middling personages on the Wallace platform (not even the odd state legislator or maverick ex-congressman who used to adorn Henry Wallace's platforms), so there were no fat cats in the audience. Where a rally for Joe McCarthy was like bingo night at the parish house, this was a fundamentalist picnic; where a Goldwater meeting was a convention of home-appliance franchisers, this was a Veterans of Foreign Wars clambake. There were proportionately few young people, and they had the look of the gas station, not the campus. My cab driver was much better represented than my motel clerk. It was an audience of the blue collar and the soiled white collar, and it parted slowly with its dollar bills and change when the cutely outfitted Wallace girls tripped down the aisles.

As if to lay to rest any doubt as to the nature of the enemy of this congregation, he appeared among them incarnate. A score or two of students, mostly white and from the University of Indiana, were on hand, and as the band played a jazzed-up version of *Old Man River,* they raised handwritten placards: RACIST GO HOME! WALLACE: QUIT POLITICS AND GO BACK TO BEING A TRUCKDRIVER! SHOULD A MADMAN HAVE A-BOMBS? A pair of Negro youths held a sign that affirmed WE SHALL OVERCOME GOV. WALLACE!

Their boos at the appearance of the candidate were lost in the ovation, and Wallace himself, dark-haired and surprisingly slight, quietly greeted their cries of "GO HOME!" with, "We're glad to have you folks here." He had been through this before. He chided the demonstrators a bit as the yelling continued, suggesting that the TV cameras get a picture of them because that was why they had showed up. "Why don't you all rent the house tomorrow night?" he asked. "I rented it tonight." That brought a laugh from the audience, and he got another big laugh when he remarked, "What you need is a good haircut." But the cheers came when he said, "After November fifth, these anarchists are gonna be through in this country."

Everyone's attention at length came to bear on one well-built youth, clean-shaven and not

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particularly long-haired who stood his ground up front with his RACIST GO HOME sign raised high; each time Wallace began to speak, the young man put it to him in a voice that carried through the auditorium, that he was a liar and a dirty racist and ought to go back to Alabama. Here was the enemy, and despite mollifying words from the candidate, voices began yelling back, "Sit down and shut up!" At one point, hundreds of people on the main floor were on their feet, shaking fists at the lone protestor and screaming "OUT! OUT! OUT!" For those moments the hatred was electric. There were several attempts to grab the cardboard sign from his hands, and a couple of men with battery in their eyes were held off by uniformed guards. Finally, after the youth, still holding his now ragged cardboard as high as his arms would reach, walked down the center aisle and took a seat close to the platform, Wallace had the police escort him out of the auditorium. He left peaceably to cheers, howls, and catcalls, and the speech proceeded, but the memory of this protesting student and his kind hung over the rest of the evening like an unexorcisable spirit at a revival meeting.

His hated image ran through Wallace's speech, not only in the form of the unwashed demonstrators who would lay down in front of no more cars if they ever laid down in front of President Wallace's car, but in the form of the bureaucrats at the Department of HEW whose briefcases President Wallace was going to throw into the Potomac, the guideline writers with pointed heads, the editors in their ivory towers looking down on the peasants, the millionaires with their machinating tax-exempt foundations, all the sophisticated folks and liberal judges and preachers, the whole elite cult in Washington and on college campuses that have no use for the average man. The college-bred upsetter of custom and decency, the fancy gentleman who from an unassailable sanctuary tells ordinary folks where they have to send their children to school and who is going to live next door—there, and not the poor simple, misled Negro, is the enemy. There is the enemy of the policeman and the fireman and the electrical worker whose opinions nobody in Washington asked for, of the good Baltimore cab driver who knew long before the *New York Times* discovered it that Castro was a bad man. Wallace delivered his one liners forcefully enough, now and then falling for variety's sake, into a homely drawl, but the talk lacked spontaneity. He had only the one speech and he had given it too many times. Still, it was what these thousands of Fort Wayners wanted, needed. They cheered and cheered.

POPULISM in America has thrived, when it has thrived, on a deeply felt sense of being abused by powerful and remote forces. Once these forces were the banks and railroads; now, in Wallace's social populism, they are the bureaucrats and professors and other people who hold down big jobs and use big words. These, he pounds home, are the powers, effete and insidious, who are hamstringing our GI's in their efforts to beat the Communists in Vietnam and hamstringing our cops in their efforts to keep down unruly Negroes and unwashed traitors in this country. It is they who have given the Negroes ideas, making them dissatisfied even in the heaven of Fort Wayne. What wonder that the flag is mocked and that perverts take over the streets?

In Indiana, where he got a third of the votes in the 1964 Democratic primary, and elsewhere in the North, George Wallace has directed his appeal to people on the line. They live in border neighborhoods and don't have the money to fly to the suburbs. They hold border jobs and can only mutter in the bars at night over having to work beside blacks and watch limp-wristed punks with degrees in engineering and business administration get promoted over them. It is not just racial prejudice that draws them to George Wallace: it is survival. Wallace works on their desperate consciousness of being pushed aside. Too in-

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articulate to develop a rhetoric of powerlessness of the sort that intoxicates the New Left, they look to Wallace to do it for them. Lacking education, they lack hope of beating the game, and what is left but bluster? "I could of guessed you were from Indiana U.," a burly, crew-cut man told one of the anti-Wallace youths after the rally. "You're a typical spoon-fed socialist. Me, I graduated from the school of hard knocks, boy." My motel clerk, though the son of a bail bondsman, will probably pass through his Wallace phase in a couple of years, but my cab driver is trapped.

The law and order George Wallace celebrates is the kind that will stand before the schoolhouse door, and it has awakened the hope among his followers that, through the cops or the soldiers or other simple, virile fellows unspoiled by degrees, they may yet regain control of things. Wallace confirms their faith that they have more common sense and common manliness than the professors and bureaucrats, that they are more *American* than all those funny-looking, funny-sounding people who are constantly calling for changes that can only further demoralize the nation and further jeopardize their own shaky positions. It is no small band that troops behind the American Independent party in 1968 —though how big it will be depends on what happens in our cities before November and how low a campaign Richard Nixon feels he must wage. Behind George Wallace is a part of America at bay.

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Where is the Negro Movement Now?

A Conversation with Bayard Rustin

The following conversation was taped toward the end of August, 1968. In addition to BAYARD RUSTIN, the well-known civil rights leader and Executive Secretary of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, the participants included IRVING HOWE, editor of *Dissent;* TOM KAHN, executive secretary of the League for Industrial Democracy; and PAUL FELDMAN, editor of *New America.*

IRVING HOWE: One of the things that strike people not directly involved in the Negro movement is the tremendous difference between the way it looked in 1963 or '64 and the way it looks now. In 1963 the movement had a coherent structure, there were a number of national organizations; whereas today there seems to be considerable disintegration of the main groups. What would you say are some of the main reasons for the change from '63 to today? Let me add that the reason usually given—that Negroes were made promises and the promises were not delivered—while it has some truth, doesn't seem a sufficient explanation.

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BAYARD RUSTIN: The major factor is a psychological one: not being able to achieve what Negroes consider—this is over and above the question of whether there *was* progress—their objectives. I mean objectives that can make their block on 122nd Street look and feel different. They can no longer endure the struggle outside, and turn the struggle inward; and thus, instead of being interested in NAACP or Urban League, they begin to be interested in their block associations, their tiny little teachers' and parents' groups. They turn to whether you call yourself Negro or black. They turn toward how you wear your hair—and not to whether you are prepared to join some group such as NAACP in integrating schools. I believe that a good deal of this is a substitute for failure on the outside . . .

HOWE: A kind of compensation?

RUSTIN: . . . not the first time this has happened. The Booker T. Washington movement was up against a situation where there could not be victories in voting. There could not be real economic integration. So Washington said, "Turn in on yourselves. Become nice people. Cast down your buckets where you are." And I think that another period in our history when this happened was after World War I, when the Negro had expectations, came back and found lynching and unemployment. The Garvey movement was tailored for this situation. "What is a black man? Associate yourself with the Africans. Go back to Africa." In times of frustration, there is a turning inward.

HOWE: The comparison you made between the Booker T. Washington period and the present one seems to me to hold, but only up to a point. I think of Washington as a leader of a defeated people. He knew that defeat was unavoidable, there was nothing you could do about it. But the difference between then and the present period is, I think, that he set himself a series of very limited, practical goals. He got a little bit of patronage from Teddy Roosevelt. He set up schools for occupational training. He, in effect, said, "We have to behave like a subjugated people, but nevertheless, within those limits, to improve our conditions." Well, whether that was right or wrong . . .

RUSTIN: What some of the "militants" are saying is very similar, really. We are never

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going to make it in *that* world, or in *that* part of New York. Therefore, let's concentrate on building new black schools with a black culture within. Let us concentrate on building a black capitalist structure within the ghetto. To that extent, they are very much like Booker T. Washington.

HOWE: Your point is that while they use a very extremist or "revolutionary" vocabulary, their real idea is that of trying to make the best of what they inwardly look upon as a defeat.

RUSTIN: Right. And you have to separate their rhetoric from their behavior. The rhetoric is very "radical," but their behavior just the opposite. They are now adopting the worst concepts of capitalism and attempting to apply them to the ghetto, a sort of petty-bourgeois small-business entrepreneurism that is presumably not affected by capitalist society as a whole.

HOWE: But there's one new factor—violence. Though the demands of some "militants" may finally not be very different from those of Booker T. Washington—you know, having a Negro finance company, setting up little cooperative dry goods stores, just the kind of thing that Washington would have favored . . . nevertheless there's also the element of riots and even now the beginnings of something resembling guerrilla action.

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RUSTIN: I think you've pointed out the essential difference between the Booker T. Washington period and this period. In the Washington period Negroes felt so utterly defeated, they could not even allow themselves to think in terms of violence. In this new period, where our aspirations are very high precisely because there has been some progress, Negroes can now see themselves as utilizing violence. Also, in the Booker T. Washington period, you had about 90 per cent of the Negroes in the country living in the South, while now the violence is made possible by urbanization and industrialization, which throws them into large black communities in Northern cities. Whereas in the South they were spread out and the Ku Klux Klan could ride at night with sheets over their heads, and economically they could be frightened because they were sharecroppers.

HOWE: The mere fact of geographical concentration and physical concentration . . .

RUSTIN: That's what makes the violence . . .

HOWE: . . . much more possible. You know, you were, just before, describing the idea of Negroes turning inward. Instead of thinking in grandiose terms about transforming America—"I have a dream" and all that—a fellow on 122nd Street decides at least he's going to transform his school.

RUSTIN: Right.

HOWE: That has been justified by some people (apart from the rhetoric of local democracy) as realism. You know, it seems reasonable: if you can't transform America, at least do something about your own school.

RUSTIN: Well, my feeling is simple. I don't want to choose between these two things. I believe that if for 5, 10, 15 years there are going to be schools which are predominantly Negro, then they should be improved. Where I disagree with some "militants" is with their abandoning the ultimate solution, which is integration. So I say that the slogan ought to be "Integration where possible, and improvement where integration is not immediately possible."

HOWE: Or improvement in any case.

One of the justifications that I hear—which is a very tricky thing, because it involves both realistic social observation and a new kind of liberal condescension toward Negroes—is this: "Look, we know that many of the things that are going on, or that CORE says are nonsense. We know that teaching Negro kids Swahili, who don't even know where Africa is, that that's nonsense. We know that much of the rhetoric of Rap Brown is nonsense. But if you have a situation of a people that has been so very long subjugated, and suffered the indignities the Negroes have, then you can't expect that the process of self-liberation is going to be purely rational, or that it's going to conform

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to all your humane or humanistic preconceptions. You have to understand there will be emotional outbursts and excesses, and acting-out and self-dramatization. Some of the things many of these people say, probably, if you get them alone, they laugh about and realize it's not really serious. In other words, "there has to be some kind of emotional wildness, which you rational social democrats, socialists, liberals, etc., don't appreciate."

RUSTIN: Oh, I fully appreciate this, and I think that a good deal of what appears to be irrational is not really so irrational. Where I become disturbed is when they attempt to use the frustration methodology as a means for social change. That's the problem.

If a group of Negroes were sitting in a room with white people 10, 15 years ago, having been taught to be fearful, taught that they weren't equal, they tended always to play games and understate what they felt. Now comes what A. Philip Randolph rightly describes as the "cultural revolt," asserting the Negro's sense of manhood. Yet, sadly the situation is that if you talk with them now, they *still* cannot tell you the truth. The pendulum has swung from understatement to overstatement. And I believe that there's no need to decry that; it is a part, psychologically, of the maturation process. Perhaps, 10 years from now, for the first time they will be able to tell you honestly what they think without overstatement. Another way to put it is that if Negroes had been taught over 300 years that we were "children" and somewhat believed it . . . I can remember the time when I was a young man who went from city to city. I would go up and down the main street of the city, looking in every restaurant, and I didn't go in until I saw another Negro there, because it was too painful continuously to face insult. Thank God I got over that.

What I am trying to point out here is that, socially speaking, we sometimes "believed" we were children. Now what is happening in the Negro community is that we have become a bit like social teen-agers. The teen-ager is caught in a maturation process. He must do certain things; he must reject those on whom he's dependent; he must overstate his case. So that the Negro is really in the middle of a maturation process, moving as a group toward social manhood. Now the one thing you know about the maturation process is that as many things will be done that are stupid, frustrated, and dangerous, as things that are creative and imaginative.

HOWE: The problem is the one you touched on earlier. It depends which hat you wear. If you are the detached social psychologist or cultural historian, the kind of approach you've just outlined makes sense and you can have a certain amount of detachment and understanding and sympathy. But if you're involved, say, as you, Rustin, are in day-to-day politics, then there is, I would guess, a tremendous conflict between your understanding and impatience or despair at what may be the unhappy political consequences.

RUSTIN: Right. And I can give you a good illustration. Suppose you turn to young Negroes now, saying, "Your problems are political. We have now got to get a Congress that will really bring about the kinds of social change, the redistribution of wealth, that is necessary to improve the ghetto. You've got to get money for that. Money isn't everything, but you can't do anything without it." This won't get you very far right now. Many of them are much more concerned with debating whether you should be called Negro, Afro-American, or black; and many of the organizations, including CORE and SNCC, are encouraging that kind of debate as against doing the real job. This becomes very heartrending to me. Nevertheless, I have an obligation to understand why it happens.

Another illustration is in regard to the schools. I am for the community having a strong voice in the schools. But I am not for certain plans which have been devised, because they give the Negro a voice *but no money with which to work* and therefore, I think the result of that kind of decentralization is going to be the *deterioration* of the

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ghetto school. Now, there are all kinds of people who want to fight for "decentralization" but who do not see the need to fight for money. I fear what's going to happen in most of these cases is that whoever screams the loudest, regardless of his qualifications, is going to be put on the Boards to run the schools. And the reverse is also true—that people who are really able to help run the schools are going to abandon them because they know they cannot win in this setup and they do not want to become targets.

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HOWE: Let's stay with the school issue for a few minutes. I think the present mood of the whites—and this seems to me probably to run a very considerable gamut, all the way from liberals to reactionaries—is this: since the blacks are making trouble, we'll buy them off, let them have their mess, do what the hell they want with the schools . . . we don't care whether they teach Swahili or post-Russell symbolic logic, or whether they can spell or can't spell, they can do anything they want as long as they stay on their own turf. *As long as they don't come on my block*!—that seems to be, at the present time, the essential view of whites. And this is where I wonder whether what you said might not require some modification. It even seems to me possible that there *will* be money. I mean, just as, for example, foundations are willing to give money to all kinds of projects within the ghetto, I think there will be money, too, for some of the schools, even though we may wonder what the quality of education is going to be in those schools.

The tacit precondition is to end the drive toward integration. So there may be a very curious alliance—in fact you already see the beginnings of it politically—between the Negro nationalists who say "we want our own schools, we want to control the police," and the conservative whites. And to go a step further, it's conceivable that even if the educational levels drop, nevertheless, kids who come out of these schools will be admitted into colleges—even if they haven't been very well taught. This would be part of the view that says we have to, in effect, "carry along" Negro students, whether they have been properly taught or not, and this is part of the social cost of a major transformation. But meanwhile, goes the message, *"stay away from my suburbs . . ."*

RUSTIN: Look, I agree with everything you've said, and I think this is the basic danger, in a multiracial society, of attempting anything which has as its ultimate objective racial separation. The white liberal opts out of the struggle and ends in the same camp with the reactionary, both of them saying: "Let them have their own schools, let them do with them what they will." And why? Because they simply don't want any longer to be bothered with all the problems involved in attempting to integrate our schools.

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TOM KAHN: I think the problem is not just that this approach is morally objectionable, but that it's simply not going to work—and for two reasons. There will be private money available, but not enough money. There won't be enough resources made available to change these institutions basically. There's enough money around to provide some Negro professionals with $18,000 a year salaries as school supervisors. But there's not enough money to overhaul the school system and provide quality education—not from *private* sources. So what you'll get is not a solution of the problem, but a postponement of it, and thereby a worsening. The attitude of liberal condescension that you're talking about simply sets the stage later-on for a worse racial conflict in the country, because among the majority of white people there'll be a growing resentment toward the young Negro admitted to college whether he has the grades or not . . .

HOWE: It also lays the basis for a pseudo-confirmation of the idea of Negro inferiority.

RUSTIN: Yes, and it does something else too. It is going to deepen the class conflict *within* the Negro community. Now if you will look at who it is that is leading the fight for the Negro to completely take over the schools

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in the ghetto, it is not the working poor, it is not the proletariat, it is not those who have decent jobs because they're organized in labor unions. It is the well educated Negro middle class, more interested in the fact that if there are jobs for principals, Negroes get them; if there are jobs for supervisors, Negroes get them. This is a fight on the part of the educated Negro middle class to take over the schools, and I maintain that by and large they want to take them over not in the interest of black children, or a better educational system, but in their own interest, because they have nowhere to go economically. To be more precise, I am not saying that they have no ideals, that they are indifferent to the children and the need for better education. Rather, they tend to identify these social concerns with *their own* economic advancement and mobility, with their own professional careers. These issues provide an outlet for their status needs. Of course, all this rarely takes place on a conscious level.

HOWE: But suppose somebody said, "All right, let's assume everything you say is true. Nevertheless, whether for good or for bad, at least in *some* places Negroes are going to be running the schools. Maybe they're not the best educators and maybe they want to use this for propaganda rather than education, but still, Negroes will be running the schools. And instead of white teachers and white principals the kids will be seeing black teachers and black principals, who'll be set up for them as models. And it's possible that the less well-trained, Negro teacher, because he has a strong incentive, will be able to arouse the kids to learn in a way that the better trained whites may not be able to arouse them. That at least will raise morale."

Now I'll give you an equivalent. If you remember, Bayard, you used to say all the time, "A movement needs something—victories—that's one of the reasons we're going to do this and we're going to do that, we need to inspire the people to continue the struggle." Couldn't it be argued that taking over some of the schools, even if in the short run it means suspending integration, would at any rate have the desirable effect of increasing pride? I mean, do we have to assume that any place, like 201, or Brownsville, has to be a fiasco or a disaster? Why can't it, after all, end up with a lot of Negro mothers chipping in and helping out the devoted Negro teachers, inspiring the kids, and maybe making a good school out of it?

RUSTIN: Oh, sure, this is possible in certain circumstances. But I'm less interested in this or that example than in how you achieve social goals—as against immediate victories which may plague you.

HOWE: Why should the immediate victories plague you?

RUSTIN: Because I believe that the effort on the part of liberals as well as conservatives now, merely to turn over the schools and let Negroes handle them themselves, really means that whites are going to abandon the city with its bad tax structure and with less and less money for these schools. Whereas if we were really mixing the thing up and getting some Negroes into the suburbs and their schools, I think you'd have a better tax base. We ought to be approaching the matter another way. We ought to be fighting so that more qualified Negroes be made principals and supervisors *wherever* there are openings. Because, you see, I think the white children need examples of Negro teachers and principals . . .

KAHN: At least as much as the black.

RUSTIN: Right. Furthermore, the black child is going to have to live in an interracial society and he needs not just black teachers but black and white teachers. Both sides need to be trained for the kind of society they're going to live in.

KAHN: That's a very important point. The most authentic and impressive manifestations of pride came during the early sit-ins and the Montgomery bus protest. With the movement now turning inward, I think that what we are seeing in many places is not a genuine self-confident pride, but a defensive, compensatory, and abrasively insecure imita-

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tion of pride. I suspect that some sense of achievement and hope is a prerequisite for pride, and when these ingredients are supplanted by cynicism and frustration, pride is transformed into the kind of pathetic arrogance that has recently become so familiar in the ghettos. Many of the leaders of groups like SNCC and CORE cast their programs in terms of hope, but if you talk to young Negroes on the street, the underlying emotion is *disappointment,* and the pride they try to assert . . . it's extremely defensive. I was talking last night to a young fellow whom Bayard knows, who was saying, "Well, look what happened to Martin Luther King. When you try to get into the larger world, look what happens to you." He wasn't talking in terms of hope. He had a basic feeling of disappointment, a desire to pull back.

RUSTIN: I think that's right.

KAHN: In every movement, there's a mixture of hope and despair. It wasn't all despair in the days of Booker T. Washington, and it is not all despair today. It's a mixture, and the important thing is to find out what the blend is. In the days of Washington, for example, there was hope among certain Negroes, because there was a group of white industrialists and philanthropists who had made it pretty clear that if "you go along this road there is going to be success at the end of it." Other roads had been closed off. Now it's the same today, but now the underlying feeling is one of withdrawal.

HOWE: Let's not move too fast. Let's stay with the point Tom raised. Suppose a lot of Negro militants or young Negroes feel something like this, "Well, we tried. Martin Luther King, he represented symbolically the whole push for integration. It didn't work. We were pushed back. Unless we're to suffer total demoralization, what else can we do except try to build our own enclave in our own world and even if we know it's a little artificial to look to African languages, to which we have no real organic connections, still we've got to try to find symbols by which to express this ghetto culture."

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PAUL FELDMAN: This is based on the assumption that the Negro movement has suffered a total defeat over the last eight years, that there's a feeling of total hopelessness. But I wonder if that's really the mood that exists. The defeat hasn't been total. From some of the polls I've seen, there's a feeling among a large section of the Negro community that progress in some areas is being made. So the ambivalence of some of the militants might rest on something more complicated than a recognition of defeat. Maybe it's a problem of responding to a new situation.

HOWE: Recently I heard that the rebelliousness among the French students was among those who were in the humanities and the social sciences, that is, in the "vague" disciplines. But the students in the professions where there was hard, concrete knowledge, discipline and mastery required—science, engineering—were not involved in these rebellions, because they feel that they have an assured future in the increasingly technological society of France. I wonder whether part of what is happening in the Negro community may be a similar phenomenon. A small section of the middle-class Negroes clearly is improving its position in the society, getting jobs in corporations, in universities, etc. At the same time, there is appearing a generation of young Negroes who are bright, articulate, enraged, intelligent, but who don't really have a way into the society. Is it like the kids in the Sorbonne?

RUSTIN: This is one of the ambivalences of the situation. Often those Negroes who are best off spout the most extreme rhetoric, and I think this has to do with their being ashamed of having "made it," when others haven't. While they hold onto their sports cars and split-level homes, they go on with the extreme rhetoric. Stokely Carmichael, I suspect, is going to have to get a little more militant now that he's bought a $70,000 house. He's got to do something to offset that.

HOWE: The premise behind all you've been saying, Bayard, is that somehow the drive toward integration, with whatever difficulties,

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is virtually inevitable, inherent in the situation . . . That finally, screaming, yelling, bitching, the white society is going to be made to accept it . . .

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RUSTIN: Well, I'm all in favor of Negroes opening co-op stores and shoe shops and groceries in Harlem. I'm for this because Negro youngsters should see Negroes owning business. That's good for psychological reasons. But if you're talking about the economic emancipation of the ghetto, it cannot be around little grocery stores, where an A & P can move in the next day and put them out of business, or in a situation where everybody knows that one of the economic trends of this nation is that small businesses are forced out and large combines taking over.

Now, you talk about black capitalism, which makes everybody feel good. Nixon picked it up, CORE's picked it up, but in regard to basic economic construction, steel, automobiles, etc., what is there that the Negro community as such can invest in and make go? Henry Kaiser, when he was free, white, 21, and a millionaire, at the end of World War II tried to break into making cars, but he soon realized that it was too late, the boys had the thing under control and could squeeze him out. So I'd say I understand the entrepreneurial urge, I feel it must be done because it's psychologically necessary, but it can't be the economic salvation of the Negro, or a way to clean up the ghetto. What the Negro community is going to discover is that the Negro businessman will ultimately be a businessman before he is a Negro, just as white businessmen are businessmen before they are white.

KAHN: You're getting all kinds of proposals to set up corporations in the ghetto. You set up a couple of profit-making enterprises, and the profits are supposed to support various social services in the community, like day care centers, etc. So what you end up with is a social rationale for increasing your profits. You've got to accumulate as large a surplus as possible in the interests of supporting these various social services.

RUSTIN: Which the government should be doing anyhow.

KAHN: How do you accumulate that kind of surplus? Only through exploiting black workers.

HOWE: To use an old-fashioned vocabulary, this may even intensify the class struggle within the Negro community.

KAHN: Yes, the problem is one of accumulation of capital. And I think here of the argument that the authoritarian process of accumulating capital is justified on the grounds that a surplus is needed for social development. The same argument's going to be used in the ghetto. There have already been some instances, along these lines, of an exacerbated conflict on economic grounds within Harlem.

FELDMAN: Norman Hill gave an example when he was working for the UAW community unions. He went in to organize rent strikes, and some of the buildings were owned by black landlords. Among the tenants were black nationalists, but some of the black landlords were also black nationalists. Norman said that the landlord appealed to the tenants not to join a rent strike because it was a white honky union coming in to disrupt the black community.

KAHN: Where was this?

FELDMAN: In Chicago.

HOWE: The same kind of thing happened 50 years ago, when the Jewish garment unions were first formed. The employers made the same kind of ethnic appeal: "We have something in common, and don't get mixed up with the gentile trade unions, we'll work it out, we'll go to the rabbi and adjust it peacefully, but don't organize a trade union."

RUSTIN: Another illustration: For seven weeks the *Amsterdam News* was on strike. On two occasions, I joined the workers in marching on the picket lines, whereupon one day, a man in Harlem who has a substantial business pulled me aside and said, "Mr. Rustin, I don't think you ought to picket the

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Amsterdam News, which is owned by a Negro." He said, "Sooner or later, they'll be picketing and trying to organize my building." And he made a great appeal to me on the basis that he didn't have the capital people had downtown, he couldn't afford a labor union coming into his place.

HOWE: That's exactly what Jewish employers always said.

RUSTIN: Not CORE nor any of the black nationalist groups, who would have been out there by the dozen if a white man owned the *Amsterdam News,* not one of them showed up on that line to support that strike.

KAHN: Most of the employees on the *Amsterdam News* are Negro.

RUSTIN: They have two white employees, out of what must be a hundred.

KAHN: The other limitation is that there's no way to escape the consequences of decisions made by the white corporate power structure. A simple decision, for example, by U.S. Steel, to raise steel prices 5 per cent can have a much greater impact on the value of the dollar in the Negro community than a hundred neighborhood corporations employing thousands of people (if it ever got that far) trying to improve community services. Ghetto enterprises are all, or practically all, retail outlets. They have to purchase their goods and equipment from white companies at the latter's prices. All that the Negro entrepreneur can determine is how large a profit margin he wants to make. And this need for investment capital will encourage him to expand that profit margin, not reduce it. There's no reason to believe that black capitalism will bring lower prices or better wages to the ghetto.

RUSTIN: Just so there's no misunderstanding: we all agree that for psychological reasons, Negroes certainly should try to own businesses in the ghetto. What we are saying is that those who propose black capitalism as an economic way out for the Negro community as a whole are mistaken.

HOWE: Yes, and the argument seems to apply even to Negro co-ops, which I'm sure we all would favor far more than Negro small businesses. For while the internal life of a Negro co-op might be better than that of a business owned by an individual Negro, the co-op, as a unit in relation to the economy as a whole, has to function pretty much in the same way as a capitalist company. It is subject to the same economic pressures.

On the political side, there's a real danger of the appearance of a new elite in the Negro community, an elite which will be based not on a tradition of struggle, such as, for better or worse, say the people around Martin Luther King were, but an elite which would consist of the guys who will set themselves up as the self-appointed spokesmen, and the guys who can deliver a certain amount of social peace and maybe votes, and who in turn will be decidedly well rewarded. And you can begin to see this, I think, in relation to certain Negro leaders and the foundations, in the political parties and the more progressive city administrations. There is now a new kind of patronage which was not available in the traditional political machines. It's a patronage which is very different, say, from that which Negroes could get from Mayor Daley or through Tammany Hall.

RUSTIN: Well, Negroes already know this, and among the most despised Negroes in the ghettos are the people who work for the government, O.E.O. and Haryou Act, making $18,000, $20,000, $25,000. By contrast, the proposals we make should be to get the money down to the people through public works and guaranteed income of some kind. These are things which we, as radicals, must be fighting for—not this black capitalist stuff, which essentially is going to benefit only a small class within the Negro community.

KAHN: For a long time, militants have labelled as Uncle Toms those Negroes who played the role of a broker, those who go out to get something from white people. But I think that, from one extreme to the other, all Negro leadership has that characteristic. It's probably inevitable. So long as Negroes are an oppressed, segregated minority, which

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depends on what's happening in the larger society, any Negro leader is going to have to play the broker role.

HOWE: Unless he's totally powerless . . .

KAHN: Unless he's totally powerless. And the black power people today play that role even more than the Uncle Toms did, because their role depends almost exclusively on their ability to scare white liberals and white moderates into granting concessions. Their leadership depends much more on the white television and the white newspapers than was ever true of Booker T. Washington or DuBois, or Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young, for that matter. So I think the question is not whether a Negro leader has relations with white people, or whether he tries to get something for the community from white people. It's a question of *what* he is trying to get. Charles Evers in Mississippi is an entrepreneur. He owns stores and a hotel and . . .

RUSTIN: A filling station, I think.

KAHN: He's got a bunch of businesses, and there's no doubt that when boycotts of white stores are called in Mississippi, he gains. But that's not an argument against the kind of leadership he's provided. He has a business and Stokely Carmichael does not have a business. But even if Stokely does not talk to a single white person (and of course he does), his effectiveness lies in his ability to frighten the white moderates into granting certain kinds of concessions.

RUSTIN: Certain elements of the Negro community are not unaware of the problem which you have mentioned. What they want to know is—Did you get it by being nice, or by calling him a son of a bitch? They are happy if you got it by frightening whitey, cursing him and threatening him. Right now, if you were to get even more through persuasion, political education and political action they'd reject it. And this goes right back to what I called the maturation process.

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HOWE: This is a good transition point, maybe, to come to some description of what is the current position of the Negro movement. For example, does CORE still represent a significant movement, to the extent that it once did, or is it down to a tiny minority of black nationalists? What's happened to SNCC? Why does NAACP, which still has over 400,000 members, maintain the image in the white community as still the most adaptive Negro organization? What's the significance of the rebellion within NAACP? Why did Whitney Young come out at the CORE convention with something that sounded like black power?

RUSTIN: Well, the first thing you have to understand is that if you talk about Negroes organized in movements, there are probably many more than ever before; but as I said earlier, they're organized around committees in the local community, sometimes a block group. They're organizing around health facilities, education, all kinds of committees set up trying to find jobs, housing committees, improvement committees, people cleaning up the neighborhood, making vest-pocket parks. Organization has moved to the grassroots level. Many of these organizations know what they're doing, many of them don't. Many are in existence for some time, many for a few months. It usually depends on whether there's a key person around who can keep the thing going.

Now let's take the major organizations. There are several significant points about the NAACP. It is now the *only* national organization with a considerable membership. It has 1600 branches. It has some 450,000 members, and it is the only organization in the Negro community which raises anything in the millions *from Negroes*. The Urban League is not a mass Negro organization, it does not have a substantial membership. SNCC and CORE are very small. SCLC is not an organization, it's a collection of ministers who raise money and do projects. So that the NAACP, no matter what anyone says, is the one solid, basic organization in the Negro community. Without it we would be in serious trouble.

Both the Urban League and the NAACP have within them elements reacting to the

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black-power movement; and I really believe that Whitney Young's program for "going into the ghetto" is not substantially different from what Whitney Young has in fact been doing all along. Whitney is trying to wrap his basic program in black-power Christmas paper, hoping that it will sell better. Now, when it comes to the conflict within the NAACP . . .

HOWE: Wait, before you go ahead. Essentially, Young's program has always been to try to get jobs for Negroes in white industry, things of that sort . . .

RUSTIN: That's right.

KAHN: But there is a new twist. Young made a statement recently suggesting that corporations supporting the Urban League had pushed the Urban League in the black-power direction, and he turned around and said, "You are the guys who pushed us in this direction. Now we want the money to carry out the program." A number of the black-power conferences have been financed by the large corporations like the Bell Telephone Company. A lot of the New Left have denounced corporate liberals, people like Tom Hayden, for example—I wonder what their reaction is to this latest development. If ever there was a form of corporate liberalism, this is exactly it. Corporations moving into the social arena to encourage a form of black power—that's a form of intervention the New Leftists themselves have deplored.

RUSTIN: The businessman would prefer to engage the energies of the black-power elements in all kinds of propositions where he can get tax rebates, tax guarantees and write-offs—as against what is really radical, the kind of changes in priorities and basic social change, as in the Freedom Budget.

HOWE: You were beginning to talk about the NAACP and the Urban League. You see, what Tom is suggesting is interesting, that Young may be pulling a double switch, first to establish a connection with the black-power people, and then to use it with his own clientele in the industrial community. Do you see the revolt within the NAACP as another version of what you were speaking of earlier, namely a turn toward a kind of rhetorical excess, an impatience with traditional forms of protest?

RUSTIN: I think it's also personalities; there are some people in there who think Roy Wilkins speaks too softly. They would do the same things he does, except in a more militant style. I think it's also the fact that there's a genuine feeling that the NAACP board has too much power, and they want to cut that down.

KAHN: Wouldn't you say it's also that in many of the areas they come from they're under constant attack from the CORE and SNCC people?

RUSTIN: Right. But I think you have to see what really happens at the NAACP. Almost all the Southern delegates supported Wilkins. and where you got revolt was out of such places as St. Louis, New York, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the troubled ghettos. Where people feel, as in the South, that they are making some political or economic progress, you get one sort of an attitude. In the ghettos, where things don't seem to be changing, they have all these pressures on them that Tom and I were just talking about.

HOWE: What's likely to come of this revolt in the NAACP?

RUSTIN: Well, my own view is that sufficient concessions will be made to contain it.

KAHN: The NAACP, by virtue of its size and structure, is able to make internal concessions, without having to undergo an upheaval in the national office. The other organizations can't do that. Every time CORE decides on a policy change, a new executive director has to be brought in.

HOWE: CORE functions more like a left-wing ideological sect.

FELDMAN: What is the significance of the split in CORE?

RUSTIN: Well, the two groups which got out of CORE are led by very strong-willed men, Carson and Lynch. And they have been

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calling for some time for a more militant expression even than Innis and McKissick.

HOWE: What would that mean?

RUSTIN: I don't think what they have concretely in mind is very important. Lynch can call for a still more militant stance—yet work for the Urban Coalition, which is establishment if there ever was one.

HOWE: That seems a classical example of political schizophrenia.

RUSTIN: Right. And they also were asking that McKissick's and Innis's desire for a more centralized structure be rejected. In other words, they want to be free to act out their role before the television cameras in the way that they want to act it out. They don't want any centralized control over what they say or do.

HOWE: Would you say that in any major urban communities CORE represents a significant force in the Negro world? Is there any place where it resembles a mass movement?

RUSTIN: No, I don't think CORE is a mass movement anywhere.

HOWE: You mean it's become pretty much, for better or worse, the home of a range of black nationalists?

KAHN: One of the problems they have in an organization like CORE is that once you take it over and you're running it for a couple of years, your ambition grows. You want a larger outlet, something with more impact. In part this explains the quick turnover in the CORE leadership. Just about every one of CORE's executives, no matter what his political position, has gone out into the larger white world and tried to get a position there. CORE seems to be the organization to which the liberal white establishment is most responsive. The Panthers, they're too far-out. The NAACP is looked on with a kind of contempt. But in its ideology and verbal militancy and the kind of people it puts forward, CORE just fits the present mood of the foundations, city establishments, and the like.

HOWE: If we look for an analogy, it might really be with the socialist movement in its earlier phases when it became in part a training school which prepared a large section of the Jewish intelligentsia for roles in trade unions, the academy and government, and middle-class institutions. This doesn't at all impugn the sincerity of the people who are involved any more than we're trying to impugn the sincerity of the people in CORE. But as you look back upon it, the Jewish socialist movement served as a kind of way-station through which people could move into the established society.

I have three or four more questions which I think are important. First, I wish you'd say something, Bayard, about one of the arguments I encounter over and over again in the academic world, and I'm sure you find equivalents of it everywhere. That's in regard to riots, violence, etc. The argument is: "We know in principle that it's not a good thing. We don't approve of it. But when you have a society that is not susceptible to pressure or moral appeals, the only way you can get them to pay attention is through an equivalent of guerrilla warfare. That is, through raising hell."

KAHN: Are you saying that people who riot in ghettos have this as a conscious purpose?

RUSTIN: Some do.

HOWE: Somewhere very deep down in their feelings there must be some sense that they just have to raise hell to the point where attention will be paid and concessions offered. Now, this is a very tricky argument, because it really justifies quasi-revolutionary or quasi-nihilist violence in the name of a reformist objective. What they're saying is, I'm not in favor of revolution, none of that nonsense, but in order even to achieve what you or the reformists or liberals want, the only way to do it is through violence.

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RUSTIN: There are two tragedies here. One is that to some extent if you look at the situation objectively they're right. You don't get concessions until there's been trouble. I always give the example of Randolph setting

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up a committee to get a Negro policeman appointed to captain over the Harlem district. Four or five years of agitation about this, and nothing happens. The minute there's a riot they appoint him. Same thing in Watts. No hospital, no transportation system. King and I go out to Watts and they're falling all over themselves talking about a transportation system—not before the riot even though the need was there, but after. I was in on the planning of the Urban Coalition but I can assure you the only reason it was founded was because of the rioting.

The second tragedy is that although we will receive minor concessions from the establishment, once the rioting reaches a certain point there will be repression against the entire Negro community.

HOWE: Raising the ante indefinitely isn't going to work . . .

RUSTIN: Right. equally important, to repress one-tenth of the population will require an assault on the civil liberties of everyone. And in an atmosphere where everyone's civil liberties decline; where no genuine progress in the redistribution of wealth, no putting people back in school and getting them educated can take place. You will have created a political atmosphere wherein the Right will increasingly take over.

The final tragedy is that while political action to achieve our goals, I would be the first to say, has not achieved enough, and while the coalition of forces required to achieve them has not been strong enough, that coalition will be completely decimated if the rioting continues to escalate.

HOWE: This seems so important, I want to see if I can repeat it in a more general way. You are saying there is, tactically speaking, a certain shrewd perception in the idea that if you want to get something, you can do it by force or the threat of making trouble or the reality of making trouble, and this would get certain things . . .

RUSTIN: Has gotten . . .

HOWE: . . . has gotten certain things, but that it is like playing with fire, something like Russian roulette, because it raises in the minds of some Negroes the idea that if you can get a small concession with a small riot, maybe you can get a big concession with a big riot, or with more than a riot. Yet that is not true. At a certain point it boomerangs.

RUSTIN: There's another factor here, which is internal: sooner or later the degree, small as it is, of Negro unity in making demands on the whole society will be splintered, instead of congealing around a fight for political and economic objectives. Now when the riot began in Cleveland, the Negroes living up on the hill took the attitude: thank goodness our young people are not just going to take it lying down. But as the riots approached their $25,000 homes, they . . .

FELDMAN: Whose $25,000 homes?

RUSTIN: The wealthy Negroes who only the day before had been applauding the rioters. They then got out their shotguns to keep the rioters from near those $25,000 homes.

HOWE: As a subpoint here, what do you make of these new things, both in Cleveland and Brooklyn, where there seems to be something beyond riots. It seems to have a semi-insurrectionary character. That is, the ambushing of cops in Brooklyn. We all understand why Negroes hate cops, but one possible consequence of this is that cops are going to stop heeding any calls in Negro neighborhoods and that the person who will then suffer most is some perfectly innocent Negro woman who has her purse snatched or some black storekeeper who's held up and has no protection.

RUSTIN: This is a process that's been going on for some time, and I'll give you two illustrations. The logic of the violent rhetoric and talk of future violence is destructive at two points. First of all it's destructive in terms of the ultimate protection of innocent Negroes. If in 1963 in a North Carolina college three Negroes had been shot and many wounded by the police, there would have been a hue and cry in this country. But this year neither the Negro community nor the Negroes' white allies could become excited

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for the reason that deep in their minds, *though erroneously,* they felt there had been so much talk of young Negroes using guns that some people thought maybe they did shoot at the police first. Now we're moving into a situation where the rhetoric means we're not even going to be able to defend innocent people.

The second tragedy is this: Let's say there're 15 of us who've been sitting around for a year now talking about how devilish the white man is and how he won't do anything unless you shoot him or kick him in the nuts. And finally we all say, "Oh, well let's not be chicken." "What do you mean, chicken?" "You haven't got a gun. Shut your fuckin' black mouth." So he buys a gun. The next step is, "You say you want to shoot a white man? Okay baby, you got your gun, I've got mine, who else is going to go with us?" It's a teen-age way of doing things, where the boys say, "Okay, there are nine feet between these houses," and you see the kids jumping across them all the time. Periodically some kid falls and dies.

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HOWE: One last question. There are approximately 1½ million to 2 million Negroes in the American trade unions. And there is considerable internal organization of Negro workers in the trade unions, some of it informal, some of it formal through the Negro American Labor Council. This is potentially a tremendously powerful force. After all, these are people who within the Negro community have relatively better conditions of life. They have higher morale. They hold down regular jobs. Some of them are rising in the trade-union structure; they are getting more and more important posts in the unions. Yet as it appears to an outsider, the Negro trade unionists *within the Negro world* don't seem to play a role commensurate with their numbers, their social stability, their potential strength.

RUSTIN: Well, I think there are several reasons for this. One is that they're isolated. That is to say, unlike Jewish groups; as they developed, they didn't have unions which were predominantly Negro. You don't have a Negro union. Second, in several unions which have increasingly high Negro membership, like the ILGWU, they're women who have to run home after their eight hours of work and make a meal and look after children, and who therefore do not attend union meetings, cannot be prevailed upon to serve on committees, and do not develop much power in the union. Third, and quite honestly, many of them are in appointed positions, which means they are required to carry out the will of the various Boards. There has to be a tremendous education of rank-and-file Negroes, so that they'll take the time and energy to attend union meetings and vie for elected positions, which would then give them a base from which to operate.

HOWE: Those all seem cogent reasons, but take a place like Detroit, where the Negroes now form something like 40 per cent of the population, and where their percentage within the UAW in Detroit must be a third. Thus far there have apparently not yet developed well-known trade-union Negro leaders. And as a force within the community, the Negro unionists there don't seem to play a major role—or do they?

RUSTIN: I think that you've selected a good example because people like Horace Sheffield in the UAW and others have had a tremendous effect in Detroit through the TULC, the Trade Union Leadership Council. What's happened in Detroit is that the Negroes in the UAW are splintered over political candidates, and only recently have they begun to work together in the union.

HOWE: How about the other way around, though? That is, the role of these unionists in the community?

RUSTIN: I think their role in Detroit has been very profound.

KAHN: Negroes in the large industrial unions like the UAW, Steel, and others, have experienced pretty much the same kind of transformation in their lives that white workers have. The white workers are more and more becoming suburbanites, more and more

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becoming home owners, moving out of the old central city neighborhoods that they used to live in. So to some extent Negro workers in these unions are removed from the ghetto itself and from its day-to-day problems.

HOWE: I wonder how true that is though, Tom, because first, my guess would be that although obviously the conditions of Negro workers in Detroit have improved, their mobility has not been as great as that of white workers of an equal economic level; for example, that in the big Detroit riot of last summer, according to research that has been done, it was not the declassed elements that were dominant. There was a very considerable number of Negroes with relatively decent jobs who were involved in the riot.

RUSTIN: No, not in the riots, but in the looting. A profound distinction. It was those in the Negro community who live by their wits, the hustlers, the whores, the pimps and others, around whom the riot got started. It was the uprooted slum proletariat. My experience in the community is that once there is wide-spread looting, people of *all* classes ultimately get involved in it. There's something about people, they can't stand around seeing somebody get something for nothing without getting involved. And there's a marvelous story that Norm Hill tells of Newark, where this well-dressed Negro woman who looks like a schoolteacher stands in front of the store for 15 minutes pleading with these young Negroes not to loot the place, but who finally walks out with a small television under her arm. I think we have to see that the rioting is usually triggered by an incident that involves the *lumpenproletariat* or working poor. Then the criminal element moves in to exploit it, and I mean the minor criminal element, because if there's anything that organized crime hates it's a riot. It disrupts its procedures. That is then followed by excessive police force which then gives the whole community a justification: they brought in too much force, we ought to strike back in the way we can, go on looting.

KAHN: I don't want to get too far away from the question of the Negro trade unionists. The progress that the Negro industrial worker has won through the unions has served to remove him to some degree from the problems of the ghetto. The Negro UAW member in Detroit is a homeowner. He does not live in a slum. That's number one. Number two, trade unionists in general, whether they're black or white, do not tend to participate in community affairs *as trade unionists*. I'll bet if you looked at the NAACP membership in Detroit you'd find it very heavily influenced by members of the UAW; they participate in community affairs as members of NAACP and not as members of the UAW. The third point is that this is beginning to change. Bayard gave an example of Detroit with TULC's very impressive black working-class operation. Another example would be Watts, where the IUD has started to organize the union members in the area to go into the community and play a role in political and economic struggles.

HOWE: I guess this is a good place to end. But it really strikes me as an incredible failure that if this is true of Watts and Detroit, nobody knows it.

RUSTIN: No. That's because many times these creative projects don't get written up. Let me say one final thing, and that is that the chief social characteristic in the United States is grasshopping, whether you're white, blue, or pink. The minute Jews could get out of Allen Street, they got out. And they beat it up to West End Avenue. Anybody who expects the Negroes who are making it economically not to want to get out of these God damned ugly cities just doesn't know the grasshopping nature of the American. Obviously the Negro in the trade union movement is going to behave pretty much the way all union members behave, and I think it's to the credit of people like Sheffield that they've set up their street academies and clubs, and gone into neighborhoods to get the boys into the trades. In the long run, their impact may be greater than that of the TV desperadoes.

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Henry Pachter

Revisionist Historians & the Cold War

NOT ONLY THE EAST has its revisionists. In this country, too, and even more insistently in Western Europe, honest research has led to a thorough and often painful re-appraisal of recent history. The conventional view of the so-called Cold War, as it still appears in such widely used textbooks as Spanier and Lukacz,[1] is under attack. This view may be crudely presented in three propositions:

- *After World War II the Soviet Union tried to expand its power through military conquest and Communist uprisings in as many countries as possible.*
- *But it was restrained by vigorous counteraction of the Western powers which "contained" the Soviet advance by measures of mutual assistance short of war.*
- *Fortunately, United States opinion had abandoned isolationism and America now was ready to assume its responsibilities as a great world power dedicated to the principle of collective security.*

In this view we appear virtuous, restrained, and almost passive; our policy was largely defensive, and if we sent soldiers abroad, it was only to help the oppressed or to ward off aggression. Moreover, such moves were clearly meant as "deterrence." Only twice were we unfortunate enough to be drawn into military actions—in Korea and in Vietnam, both places where we had to fight under conditions not of our own choosing—and on two occasions we barely avoided military conflict: in Berlin and in Cuba. But on the whole we managed to keep the war "cool" in spite of tempting provocation, as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Sinai.

The professional historian will instinctively distrust such a pat presentation. He can hardly remember a twenty-year period in history where right has been consistently on one side and wrong with equal regularity on the other. He is used to the play of force and counterforce with little reference to good and evil, and he expects to see every hero debunked in due time, every patrtiotic myth destroyed in the light of newly found documents, and every decision which had been deemed "inevitable" or "forced upon us," after diligent research proven avoidable. Therefore, he is not surprised to read, in Mr. Louis Halle's magisterial study of *The Cold War as History* that diametric labels such as "wicked and virtuous," or "aggressor" and "peace-loving nation" have little meaning in a conflict that on both sides was experienced as an irreducible dilemma.[2]

Taking a cool view of the East-West conflict, Mr. Halle pleads for an understanding of the Kremlin's motives and concludes that Stalin was as much afraid of us as we were afraid of him. He does not claim that newly unearthed evidence changed his mind. Rather, his dispassionate view of both sides is a matter of interpretation, and whatever new insight is gained by his method is due to his attitude: having participated in many cold-war decisions as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning staff, he now sits

[1] John Lukacz, *A History of the Cold War* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961; rev. ed. 1967); rev. ed. somewhat more critical

John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1967). Professor Spanier's book is a conventional history; Dr. Lukacz's work is a philosophical history, comparable in scope to the one cited in footnote 2.

[2] Louis Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). A superb work, both personal and scholarly.

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back and reflects on the impact these decisions may have had on the other side, and he comes rather close to the admission that some of the early critics of the containment policy, like Henry Wallace, Walter Lippman, and P. M. S. Blackett,[3] may have had a point: the Russians refused to play the game according to our rules, and instead of being contained they strained every effort to break out of the "iron curtain" which from their side looked like "capitalist encirclement."

The view that Mr. Halle presents would contrast with the three propositions of the conventional view in the following way:

- *After the defeat of Hitler, the balance of power was not restored in Europe, and from both sides of its outer fringe, therefore, attemps were made to establish a new equilibrium.*
- *The Cold War, though widened to encompass worldwide conflicts is essentially the continuation of the international power contest which has raged from the time of the Seven Years' War through the Napoleonic wars and the two world wars of this century to the present day.*
- *The U.S. was drawn into this conflict because it is basically a European-Atlantic nation, and this entanglement seems to have been fatefully inevitable; but accidental outbreaks of military hostilities in Asia created a climate of "crusading" which needlessly embroiled the U.S. in areas where it had little interest, less power, and no traditional ties.*

Even before Mr. Halle, similar views had been expressed by conservative critics like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau who warned that the Cold War must not be escalated into a military confrontation, must not be extended to areas outside Europe, and must not be conducted in the name of one ideology against the other.

Mr. André Fontaine, foreign editor of the Paris *Le Monde*, also abandons the black-and-white view of history in his two-volume *History of the Cold War*.[4] Each side, he laments, sees the enemy as an outlaw against whom no holds are barred, and each feels righteous about its cause. Viewing a confrontation of two *righteous* causes makes tragedy and history close neighbors. But is the Cold War so much past history that we can look at it in this way? We shall see that on the contrary, the revision of our views on the Cold War is no academic exercise—like admitting that George III was a fool rather than a tyrant—but a passionate matter of partisanship. Even the contention that the Cold War is over is a partisan slogan.

To perceive this, a man has to abandon the vantage point of a contestant in the field and view the past with the historian's detachment. "It is night when Minerva's owl sets out on its flight." The new view, therefore, is somehow associated with deep-seated attitudes of the academic mind. The statesman must act from a conviction of righteousness. But a dispassionate view of our own and a compassionate view of the other side naturally appeal to intellectuals, who not only are more immune to propaganda but also disgusted by its methods and distrustful of its aims. From their vantage point, the Cold War appeared as a contest between two brain-washing crews, and perhaps even as the outgrowth of hate ideologies.

Professor Walter La Feber has rendered a valuable service in tracing the relationship between the domestic and the international

[3] Walter Lippman, *The Cold War* (New York, Harper, 1948). Consists of 12 articles originally printed in the *New York Herald Tribune* in reply to George F. Kennan's "Mr. X." article.

P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (London, 1948; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949). The famous British weapons expert was the first to criticize the concepts of nuclear deterrence.

[4] André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1968). The scope and point of view of this brave attempt is indicated by its starting date—the October Revolution. Writing from the vantage point of French politics, M. Fontaine usefully reminds us that in 1944 Ho Chi Minh liberated part of Vietnam with the help of the CIA (or its predecessor) and that Maurice Thorez, then the French Communist leader, told the Vietnamese that he "would not like to be considered the liquidator of French positions in Indochina."

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phases of the Cold War and in describing the struggle between the cold-war ideology and the critical forces in this country.[5] He shows how much of the cold-war anxieties and of our responses was due not to enemy action but to our interpretation of it. Regrettably, language difficulties and lack of access to Russian documents bar him from attempting a similar study of the cold-war climate in the Kremlin. But like other revisionists, he tends generally to attribute too much of what happened in the last 80 years to American initiatives. *We* did this, *we* did that—as though diplomacy were not an interaction of many powers. Revisionists have justly criticized the self-centered, arrogant view that this country is called to maintain the world order single-handedly. They are no less provincial in assuming that different attitudes in this country alone could at will have changed a course of events that was largely determined by others and by its starting point. Mr. La Feber neither quotes the European promoters and critics of the cold-war policies nor does he analyze the *European* interests and forces that drew or pushed the United States into the Cold War. Revisionists fail to combat but rather tend to amplify the legend that Europe was a mere object of American policies. This is not true. Reading La Feber or any other revisionist book, no one would guess that British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin did more than anybody else to muddle a postwar settlement in Europe, or that Ernst Reuter single-handedly forced us to fight for the freedom of Berlin. Today our European allies demand that we punish Moscow for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Nor would he learn the full measure of Stalin's contribution to the Cold War. Mr. La Feber begins his book with the statement that in October 1945 the magazine *Bolshevik* and President Truman more or less simultaneously ("meanwhile") sounded warlike trumpets. Only in the footnote does he acknowledge that when Truman spoke, *Bolshevik* was already three months old, i.e. it had appeared *before* the end of the war. Even earlier, at the time of Roosevelt's death, two public statements announced a reversal in Kremlin policies: one was Jacques Duclos's "Open Letter" in *Cahiers du Communisme* for April 1945; the letter has been quoted frequently because it denounced the wartime truce between the Allies, deposed Earl Browder as leader of the CP, U.S.A., and reinstated the slogan of fighting capitalism in all its forms. Mr. Christopher Lasch, another revisionist, writing in the *New York Times Magazine*,[6] brushes this letter off as just a quibble about electoral tactics and takes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to task for considering it a key document. Mr. Lasch displays ignorance of Communist affairs; an open letter was about the most solemn announcement, next to a speech by Stalin himself, of a shift of policy in Comintern usage. Messrs. Lasch and La Feber also omit Molotov's speech at the opening session of the U.N. April 26, 1945, where he accused the Western powers of complicity with Hitler.

Leaning over backward is a laudable attitude, but this is going rather far. American intellectuals have been angered by cold-war lies; but instead of concluding, like Mr. Halle, that both sides lie, many seem to feel that if we lie, the other side must be telling the truth. Mr. Halle carefully says that in such a great conflict where two historic forces meet, it really does not matter "who started it." In fact, every experienced historian will agree that this is a question for nursery-school teachers. To the younger (and some not so young but equally naive) revisionists, however, this question seems to matter: in order to prove the U.S. government wrong they must prove Stalin right. This calls for three kinds of operations:

- *Finding a suitable date for the beginning of the Cold War;*
- *finding documents which disprove Western propaganda claims and prove the claims of Soviet peacefulness;*

[5] Walter La Feber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–1966* (New York: Wiley, 1967). Probably the best of the historical narratives.

[6] *New York Time Magazine*, January 14, 1968.

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- *re-interpreting or ignoring documents which up to now have formed our view of the Cold War.*

This endeavor goes beyond the intentions of moderate critics like Halle and La Feber. They assume that any errors of judgment or mistakes of policy were made in good faith, perhaps under the pressure of circumstances or as the consequence of honest miscalculation, misinformation, and misunderstanding; that even in ideological warfare the participants believed in what they were saying and that indeed the conflict came about rather like a Greek tragedy—through a confusion of the minds wrought by jealous gods. We shall hear about those gods later on; first we must speak of the new revisionists who disclaim to recognize them but charge that vicious men with malicious purposes started the Cold War. For obvious reasons we shall give them the name they prefer, radicals.

IF THE LIBERAL CRITIC of the Cold War laments the alleged fumbling of our policies,[7] and deplores the fateful but involuntary military and ideological escalation—or if establishment historians impute all criminal initiative to Stalin—the radical says it just was not so. Nor is he content with giving merely his own interpretation to known facts. He cites a different set of facts and he sets out to prove with documents that the real course of events was quite different from what people believe. The most impressive and best documented work of this sort has been presented by Gar Alperowitz in his analysis of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945.[8] It will be remembered that President Truman was on his way to Potsdam when he received the "good news" from Almogordo, that the first atomic bomb had been successfully tested. He relayed this top secret to Stalin in such a way as to minimize its importance, and he chuckled when he told Churchill that the Russian apparently had not grasped the significance of the information. In fact he still chuckles when he remembers the incident in his Memoirs.[9] Mindful of the coming election year, eager to "bring the boys home" and also aware that an early victory over Japan would give "Uncle Joe" no chance to claim his part of the spoils, Truman made the fateful decision to use the bomb at once. The world has since questioned the wisdom of this decision but not the alleged reasons. These seem to me quite sufficient to explain Truman's action, given his background and position.

Alperowitz, however, amasses documents to show that the real reason for an early use of the bomb was not victory in Asia over the Japanese, but intimidation of the Russians in Europe. At Potsdam, indeed, where the powers implemented the Yalta arrangements for the future of Europe—we must now say for the partition of Europe—the Western statesmen tried to secure some measure of freedom for their friends in the Eastern countries which they had abandoned to Russian hegemony. Mr. Alperowitz shows

[7] Others have suggested that Truman could have avoided the Cold War if he had not abruptly stopped Lend-Lease operations after V-E Day, or if he had granted Stalin a loan. Lend-Lease was stopped not only to Russia but to England as well since the programs's authorization automatically ended when it had fulfilled its purpose—victory in Europe. The U.S. remained at war with Japan while Stalin already was retaining ships loaned to him for war purposes. As to the loan, the Kremlin could have used drawing rights in the amount of $1.5 billion had it ratified the Bretton Woods agreements. Later, Molotov appeared with a large staff of experts to participate in setting up the Marshall Plan machinery; but he was called out of the meeting by a telegram from Moscow and never returned.

[8] Gar Alperowitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965). Mr. Alperowitz impresses his point of view on the reader by an excessive display of irrelevant scholarship. However, I have no quarrel with his method. The truth can be known only by careful study of the documents. But so far the results have been meager: the documents Mr. Alperowitz quotes show indeed that the relations between the allies were distrustful throughout the war. This could surprise only Stalin's faithful who had to believe the myth of the anti-fascist, Popular Front coalition. No similarly detailed study exists of the decision to re-arm Germany.

[9] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 419.

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how possession of the bomb made the Anglo-Saxons feel much more "confident" that they might be able to negotiate from strength. Lasch flatly maintains that they "asked Stalin to accept hostile governments" or even "tried to force the Soviet Union out of Europe."[10] Alperowitz tells us how: Truman wished to show Stalin his real strength; for that purpose he needed a demonstration of the awesome power of the atom. Therefore he ordered the bombing of Hiroshima—in order to gain room for maneuver in Eastern Europe!

To the odious crime of releasing the djinn that since has hovered over the future of mankind, Alperowitz adds the indictment that this was done wantonly, for an unrelated purpose, in an action that was not even directed against the enemy but against an ally. Since we agree that the use of the bomb was heinous, we are tempted to grant Mr. Alperowitz that the reason for this crime must have been at once sinister and ludicrous. Since Mr. Alperowitz names such a sinister and ludicrous reason, we are further tempted to agree that he must be right, and from there it is only one step to the conclusion that, since all this is so shameful, Truman's hope to save a little democracy in Eastern Europe must also be condemned. On such notions radical revisionism builds its case against the U.S. government's actions in the early months of the Cold War.

But the entire deduction is fantastic. If Truman wished to frighten Stalin, why did he chuckle instead of plopping the bomb with all its awful statistics on the conference table? Why does Mr. Alperowitz fail to mention the Oppenheimer-Compton report which recommended the military use of the bomb without any reference to Europe? Why did Secretary of State Byrnes publicly concede that the "Soviet Union has a right to friendly governments along its borders" and Under-Secretary, later Secretary, Acheson even speak of "a Monroe doctrine for Eastern Europe"?[11] Why, in fact, did they all look on meekly while brutal ultimatums expelled their friends from the governments of Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and later of Czechoslovakia? All this happened while the U.S. still enjoyed its atomic monopoly, and Mr. Halle usefully reminds us that the U.S. demobilized its armies, did not prevent the development of atomic energy elsewhere, and did not try —as I think it should have—to barter its monopoly against the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. In all the quotations with which Mr. Alperowitz smothers the reader, we do not find a shred of evidence for his contention which is based on pure conjecture. Immersed in the documents which have earned him the reputation of scholarship, he neglects to look at the acts of the various governments and to reconstruct the climate of the year 1945. So obsessed is he indeed with the search for secret evidence of evil that he never notices the evil which was being done in plain daylight.

Radical revisionism, we see, is not content with suggesting that wrong may be evenly distributed over both sides; it reverses the roles of hero and villain completely. Where we had pointed an accusing finger at Stalin, charging him with bland disregard of the Yalta agreements, we now find ourselves in the defendant's dock, indicted not with an isolated misdeed but with the consistent, systematic, and—one is tempted to say—congenital pursuit of Empire. Mr. Ronald Steel gives his book the angry title "*Pax Americana —The Cold War Empire,*"[12] and begins by quoting de Gaulle to the effet that the U.S. "feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies . . . yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself." The general merely was repeating the anguished outcry of his compatriot, Alexis

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[10] *New York Times,* January 14, 1968.

[11] *New York Times,* November 1 and 15, 1945. Mr. Alperowitz indeed has an answer: Byrnes was trying to lull Stalin into complacency. That kind of logic can prove anything.

[12] Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana: The Cold War Empire How It Grew and What It Means* (New York: Viking, 1967).

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de Tocqueville, 130 years earlier, that "there are today two great peoples which, starting out from different points of departure, advance towards the same goal—the Americans and the Russians. . . . Each of them will one day hold in its hands the destinies of half of mankind."[13]

TEMPTING as it may be to trace the European roots of revisionism, we must now inquire what is the nature of this American imperialism which has motivated American initiatives in the Cold War. There are three main lines of thought indicating long-term American commitments:

• To the first proposition of the conventional view, Professor Denna D. Fleming answers that the world need not be concerned with Soviet expansionism—but with the systematic and consistent encirclement policies of the West, beginning with the interventions of 1917-20, and later methodically enlarged to form coalitions threatening the Soviet Union with atomic destruction and organizing the Cold War as a holy crusade.[14] No Soviet actions but the mere existence of the Soviet Union called up Western ire.

• To the second proposition Professor William Appleman Williams replies that American interventionism abroad needed no provocation by the Soviets.[15] He maintains that it dates back to well before the October Revolution, to be precise to the Open Door policy of the nineties of the last century, a policy designed to "keep China sovereign for purposes of exploitation by the burgeoning U.S. industrial complex while the Russians who could not compete, tried to assure themselves political leverage by creating spheres of influence."[16]

• To the third proposition David Horowitz replies that not idealism led the U.S. into an internationalist policy but the defense of narrow economic interests,[17] to wit those of the rich. He concludes by quoting Arnold Toynbee, that America is today "the leader of a worldwide anti-revolutionary movement in defense of vested interests."[18]

In all the last-named books the scholarship is unbelievably poor. Mr. Fleming's work reads in places like a scrap book of newspaper clippings; he never distinguishes between opinion and document, as he will triumphantly exhibit a silly Letter to the Editor of the *Ashville Courier* as though its author were speaking for the U.S. government, while glossing over the most important statements by Lenin, Stalin, and their successors. Mr. Horowitz requotes Fleming's quotes with admiration and adds nothing but vulgar Marxist explanations or plain misinformation. To show that Stalin was prepared to sacrifice the odious Ulbricht regime in East Germany, he quotes Molotov's unification plan of March 10, 1952. But he fails to mention that Molotov refused to allow free elections under U.N. supervision. Moreover, he fails to mention that the entire "peace plan" was nothing but a desperate, last-minute bait to prevent West Germany from joining NATO. I happen to think that the Western powers should have taken Molotov's offer and trusted the dynamics of further development—the German uprising a year later then might have been a different affair! Had Horowitz analyzed the episode instead of quoting propaganda notes, he would have seen that it provides an argument for, not against cold-war tactics: Molotov had never made even as limited an offer

[13] See concluding page of Vol. I of *Democracy in America.*

[14] Denna D. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins 1917–1960,* 2 Vols. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961).

[15] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy* (Cleveland: World, 1959).

[16] La Feber, *op. cit;* see also the contributions by Lloyd Gardner and Robert Freeman Smith to the New Left anthology *Towards a New Past,* Barton J. Bernstein, ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1968). All three authors acknowledge W. A. Williams as their master. With the exception of Professor Genovese's contribution, the scholarship in Mr. Bernstein's volume leaves much to be desired.

[17] David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965).

[18] Arnold Toynbee, *America and World Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).

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as his March 10 plan until the Germans actually threatened to join NATO! If Acheson needed proof for his theory of "positions of strength," it is here; but though German revisionists have asked why Molotov failed to follow suit, American revisionists remain silent—for good reason; they try to avoid the issue of power.

Mr. Horowitz's treatment of the episode is a rather typical example of the half-truths on which much revisionist writing is based. As for his teacher Fleming, his file of episodes, which throws a bad light on Western governments, may be a good thing to have handy when a government apologist offers nothing but a similar file indicting the Soviet government. But as a serious historical work the Fleming book is beneath discussion. A series of episodes does not show consistency of a policy; by merely suppressing the long periods of coexistence, by ignoring the differences between the attitudes of various Western governments in their relations with the Soviet Union, and by taking the Soviet-Western relationships out of the context of the constantly shifting play of coalitions and constellations, Mr. Fleming misses every point.

Moreover, if Fleming is right, William Appleton Williams must be wrong: if the United States interventions antedate the October Revolution, as Mr. Williams maintains, they cannot have been provoked by it, as Fleming will have it. As George Kennan has shown,[19] Wilson's decision to intervene had no cold-war motivation.

Professor Williams, the most influential writer in this field, ostensibly follows the classical lead of Scott Nearing,[20] in his attempt to reduce U.S. foreign policy to economic causes. He is no Marxist, however, but a Christian populist who became a convert to mercantilism. He is fanatically devoted to the idea that closed economic areas are healthy for development and for peace. Whatever disturbs this imaginary idyll is bad, above all the American efforts to prevent any pieces of geography from being fenced off as empire. He calls the Open Door policy "anti-colonialist imperialism" and condemns the Marshall Plan as another attempt to force a door open—an attempt which apparently left Stalin no choice but to save Europe from U.S. control.

As to the economic motive, the trouble is that our China trade never lived up to the expectations of the "100 million lamps,"[21] but remained 1 - 2 per cent of our total imports and exports. Nor were American capitalists eager to invest in China as the modern theory of the "surplus" would require. At the beginning of the century the State Department vainly tried to encourage American bankers and railway magnates to help in offsetting the Japanese and European influence; but to no avail. Far from practicing "dollar imperialism" the U.S. was not even capable of practicing dollar diplomacy—the use of dollars for political ends. The indifference of U.S. capital made it necessary for Dr. Sun Yat-sen to turn to Lenin for help.

Nor has Professor Williams been very fortunate in the quality of his followers. Robert F. Smith descends to the following trick:[22]

[19] George F. Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, paper, New York: Atheneum, 1967).

[20] Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Imperialism* (New York: Viking, 1925).

[21] Title of a prewar book exhorting America to deny the great Chinese market to the Japanese. Critics of U.S. Asian policies have always argued that we have no substantial "interests" there. If this is true, Professor Williams would have to postulate that potential development of hypothetical interests has the same effect on policy-making decisions as actual interests. I am not contending, of course, that the "Open Door" policy was disinterested or that it was morally superior: in fact, the U.S. demanded no real open door but only equal rights with the Japanese and other colonialists. However, it so happened that U.S. interests coincided with Chinese interests. Many critics of U.S. policies think their job has been done when they can prove an "interest." They forget that all business relations between people, institutions, and states are based on "interest," which may be beneficial either to both or to only one side. Opprobrium should properly be cast not on interests as such but on exploitative interests that subordinate other interests.

[22] Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

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to show that U.S. policy was antisocialist even when it seemed to be antifascist, he quotes *Foreign Affairs* for July 1937 to the effect that "capitalism is lost where it is not built on liberalism." On closer inspection, the quoted passage turns out to be by a German exile, editor of a respected business magazine, trying to warn American business to beware of Hitler. In the Cold War, too, the economic tools of propaganda and of diplomacy are often mistaken for ends or motivations. Thus professor La Feber quotes A. A. Berle testifying in 1947 that "within four years the world will be faced with surplus production." He then proceeds to interpret this threat as "one paramount motivation" for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.[23] It is, of course, much more correct to say that the Marshall Plan was the economic arm of the Truman Doctrine. Berle then was Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, and he was particularly concerned with promoting the "Point Four" program which was designed to win the friendship of underdeveloped countries in the world struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for supremacy. The aim of this policy, including its economic measures, was not economic penetration but the preservation of independent states in all areas of the world. So much for "the economic motive," the search for which only shows that American liberals rarely understand power as a motive. Now let us see how power has been understood by U.S. policy-makers.

As originally conceived, the policy of containment meant the creation of strong, self-reliant states along the periphery of the Soviet empire, but especially in Europe. It meant measures short of war, and there was then no premonition of NATO or other military confrontations. Therefore, Bernard Baruch quipped that we were engaged in a "cold war"; he was varying the coinage "dry war," which had been used before World War I.

This policy was consistant with Wilson's policy of creating independant national states in place of the old empires, and with F.D.R.'s anticolonial thrust during and after World War II. Long before he had ever heard of Bolshevism, Col. House warned Woodrow Wilson that "an Entente victory would mean domination of Russia on the Continent,"[24] and 30 years later George Kennan expressed the same fear in the now famous "long telegram." As a remedy he recommended the "containment" policy spelled out in the controversial "Mr. X" article.[25]

This indeed has been the red-white-and blue thread that runs throughout American foreign policy. Shorn of the anti-Communist rhetoric to which Kennan objected, this was the message of the Truman Doctrine of which Kennan approved. It said "hands off" to Stalin, and so did Eisenhower in his first inaugural, as had F.D.R.'s "Quarantine Speech": irrespective of the expansionist's philosophy, the U.S. has been opposed to closed doors indeed, everywhere and at all times. There is something incomprehensibly sectarian in the revisionist charge that all American and indeed all Western policies have always been directed against Russia. The Open Door policy clearly was directed first of all against Japan, second against Western colonialists, and only third against Russia, imperial as well as Soviet. For we are dealing here with the kind of tension between powers that is the usual stuff of history. Its permanence is reflected, for instance, in A.J.P. Taylor's title *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe* 1848-1914. Ideology has done very little to embitter or alleviate these conflicts. World War I started between nations of like ideology, and World War II saw nations with opposing ideologies allied nevertheless. The U.S. conducted the Cold War by helping Tito, a Communist—but Mr. La Feber can quote senatorial diaries endlessly to the effect that

[23] La Feber, op. cit., p. 43.

[24] Quoted by La Feber, from A. S. Link, *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 48.

[25] *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947. Both Documents are now contained in his *Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

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Acheson was staunchly anti-Communist, yet forget to mention that he supported Tito's Communist economy.

IN A STRANGE WAY, revisionists reflect the mirror-image of their opponents: both think that "ideology" was the cause of the Cold War, or that some conspirational power was hiding behind the ideology—be that power the Communist world leadership, or America's military-industrial complex. They find it difficult to admit that conflicts arise out of the fact that "we live in a system of states" (Lenin), and that in such a system of conflicting and converging interests all combinations are possible.

The Cold War is such a conflict for the "mastery of Europe" in which political, diplomatic, psychological, and economic pressures are the principal weapons but military deployment is used in a symbolic and logistic fashion short of warlike action. It makes no sense to apply the term "cold" war to the hot wars in Korea and Indochina or to areas where no such conflict rages. The Asian and African wars must be explained in terms of their specific origins; they were fought in a different area, with different means, and against a different enemy. But there is not the slightest connection between "Communism" or "anti-Communism," and the quarreling factions in, say, the Congo or Nigeria.

Cold-war ideologists, of course, like to subsume all the post-1945 wars under the heading of anti-Communism or of the "Sino-Soviet bloc." These efforts must be strongly resisted—if only for the practical reason that one may disagree with U.S. conduct in Asia while agreeing with it in Europe, or agree in 1950 but not today. It is regrettable that the revisionists here do not go far enough. Instead of accepting Mr. Rusk's cold-war generalizations—which they denounce in another context—they should analyze each of these wars in terms of its particular condition, its weapons and conduct, its particular ideology, and above all—its particular enemy. It will then be found that the Cold War alone, as we knew it in the forties and fifties, may soon be over. Like many great wars, it was not settled, had no victors or vanquished, but is simmering down. Both sides in that war recognized rather early in the game that its solution could only be a confirmation of the status quo: for all his propaganda antics about the "liberation" of "captive nations" and the "roll-back" of the Iron Curtain, the late John F. Dulles did the most to "freeze" the Cold War where it stood. In Asia, on the contrary, even the most ardent Kremlin partisan of coexistence never wavered in his support of "wars of liberation."

Back to the Cold War. This conflict arose out of the postwar situation: Russia had just emerged from her most excruciating trial. Even without resorting to Stalin's paranoia one must understand his desire for a protective glacis. The U.S., on the other hand, could not allow any power to combine the potential of a reconstructed Europe with the resources of Asia. She is always opposed to the building of empires, as we saw.

But it was not just the actual fear and the recent experience which determined Stalin's expansionism. Rather, Mr. Halle impresses on our sympathetic heart, the Russians are suffering from a deep-seated, historical encirclement complex, an anxiety which the Western powers have clumsily fostered instead of allaying. The Cold War, Mr. Halle gravely informs us, cannot be understood unless we go back into history—not to Churchill's Fulton speech that some use as the date of its beginning, nor to Yalta that to me seems the most reasonable date, not even to November 7, 1917, as Messrs. Fontaine and Fleming suggest, and not to the Pan-Slav agitation that led to World War I. No, we must go back to the Day of Creation when Nature failed to endow Russia with frontiers that can easily be defended. The rulers of her wide-open plains, we learn, could protect themselves only by seizing adjacent territory, a strategy called "defensive expansionism." What with the understandable reaction of their neighbors the Russians un-

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happily acquired, over the centuries, that feeling of insecurity and the resulting ferocity which can be appeased only by giving them mastery over other nations. (Never mind how *their* anxiety is to be soothed.) The pattern which the Czars established reproduced itself in the relations of the Bolshevikis with their neighbors and even (I am writing at the peak of the Czechoslovak crisis) with other "socialist" countries. Long before the end of World War II, it was therefore clear to Professor Halle, who then was in the State Department, that ultimately a confrontation between the victors could not be avoided: "The dynamics of the postwar situation produced an expansion of Moscow's tyranny that was not altogether voluntary but provoked a reaction in the West that in turn awoke Moscow's persecution mania. Had it not been for this persecution mania, the Western reaction might have provided the basis for a settlement." The finger of God driving men into mad confusion and conflagration!

With all due respect to Professor Halle's eminence and scholarship, this is history stood on its head. Russia's open plains indeed were invasion roads for Napoleon and Hitler. But the Tatars had come through the inhospitable Urals; the Varangians and the Swedes had come across the sea, and so did the allies in the Crimean War. On the other hand, Russia's open frontiers permitted the Cossacks to invade Poland-Lithuania and to conquer Asia. It was Russia's neighbors who had reason to complain about Nature's disfavor, and Russia's belligerency was a product of her state rather than of her geography. Lenin, and to a greater extent Trotsky, needed no "persecution mania" to conceive of the Soviet state as a revolutionary bastion in a worldwide uprising of the underprivileged proletarians and colonial peoples. Zhdanov revived these conceptions when the power vacuum in postwar Europe opened an opportunity, and Stalin felt "secure" only with Communist governments installed in each European capital. Khrushchev felt incircled by the free city of West Berlin, and today Brezhnev does not feel secure behind the Carpathian mountains. "In a conquered country," Stalin said after Machiavelli, "each of the hegemonial powers must install its system." As Engels said, no border is ever strategically safe.

An important function of the Cold War is to keep the bloc allies in line. This aspect has been very little commented upon by the revisionists because it is the one which is least likely to disappear so soon, and it is also the one that keeps the cold-war ideology alive. I do not think the Russians had to march into Czechoslovakia because they were afraid of internal reform—after all, the Czech economy is still 100 per cent socialist and Czech agriculture is the most collectivized of all the satellites. What the Russians were unable to tolerate was the softening of Czech relations with West Germany, and for that reason they had to insist on ideological conformity throughout the satellite empire, too.

THE REVISIONISTS' ability to empathize with Stalin's tender nerves is at times limitless. Christopher Lasch laments that it was inconsiderate of Mikolajczyk to inquire how 4,000 Polish officers came to be buried in a mass grave in Katyn. Could Stalin really be expected to tolerate such a man in a Polish cabinet, even a cabinet totally dominated by Communists? Small nations, on the other hand, have no right to tender nerves. Exalting Stalin's magnanimity, Mr. Brian Thomas reminds us that Groza was not even a Communist.[26] Correct! Nor was Laval a Nazi. Groza was only the man on top of the list of the ministers which Vishinsky handed the king of Rumania with an ultimatum to appoint them within two hours.

The examples of revisionist writers exculpating Soviet policies by psycho-sociological explanations, or even by doing a touch-up job on the events, are as numerous as the apologetic somersaults of our Establishment champions. After all, reasoning from inse-

[26] Brian Thomas, in the *Journal of Contemporary History* (London) January 1968.

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curity is available to all parties and every nation may need "defensive expansion."

This is the domino theory in reverse, and we must ask ourselves how far it may lead. Would it not justify a Hitler, too? Strangely enough, some revisionist writers have drawn this uncouth consequence. It is not Dean Rusk who proposes the false analogy between Hitler and Stalin or Ho Chi Minh; it is Mr. Robert Freeman Smith, writing in a New Left collection, who suggests that the conformist interpretation of World War II supports the cold-war arguments.[27] Mr. Smith is amused by "simplistic" people who still believe in "the Adolf Hitler syndrome"; he cannot conceive that Hitler and Hirohito had any design to rule the world, and Pearl Harbor to him "revealed the full implication of [Brooks Adams's] imperial logic," which also made the Cold War inevitable. For it was not Japan but the United States which "in 1941 rigidly asserted that any order in Asia would have to be in terms of its objectives."

Professor A. J. P. Taylor, in his turn, author of a book which absolved Hitler of all guilt in unleashing World War II,[28] writes in—of all places!—the *New York Review of Books:*

"Germans were no more wicked in aspiring to dominate Europe . . . than others were in resolving to stop them. They were in a sense less wicked. For their domination was achieved with little physical destruction and comparatively few casualties, whereas the effort to resist them produced general devastation." The wanton destruction of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War, of Lidice, of Coventry, of Amsterdam and Kharkov—all brought about by the wicked resistance of the victims. The 6 million Jews were so wicked as not to see that Hitler was merely trying to do them a favor. Not the murderer but the victim is guilty! This atrocious statement is followed by more sick jokes and by an interesting aside which reveals the purpose of Taylor's revisionist effort. Citing Poland's Quixotic refusal to become either Hitler's or Stalin's satellite, he says: "Western historians exaggerate Soviet faults as much as they condone Polish ones. This is only to be expected in the era of the cold war, which historians are still loyally fighting when most sensible people have forgotten about it."[29]

Professor Taylor, it will be remembered, was a member of the infamous Astor set which tried to buy peace for England by encouraging Hitler to acquire an Eastern empire. He still thinks that in September 1939, the peace might have been preserved if Poland had yielded some territory and in exchange had been compensated, perhaps, with a piece of the Ukraine. The English have always been very generous with land that did not belong to them—but why does the *New York Review* lend its columns to this kind of 18th-century statecraft? Do the revisionists of World War I, World War II, and of the Cold War have more in common than the name?

It may be possible to point to an aversion which they share—the fear of ideologies and in particular of the idea of collective security. The Astor set had to resist the pressures which came from the Popular Front in the name of both antifascism and collective security. These two themes were intimately linked with each other since the fascist governments were by nature and ideology aggressors, and to resist them was tantamount to the creation of international police forces against the disturbers of the peace.

One needs no imagination to see the trap here: the Cold War, too, has been fought on this side under the ideology of collective security against a power that had openly proclaimed itself as the challenger of the status quo. The New Left, which accepts the arguments of radical revisionism, sees the similarities between the cold-war ideology and the ideologies which were used to bring America into both world wars:

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[27] Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[28] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1962).

[29] *New York Review of Books,* June 6, 1968.

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- In all three cases the U.S. was defending the status quo against challengers who attacked the traditional power of the Western, colonialist states.
- In each case ideology was used more or less deliberately to proclaim a "crusade" against a militant force of change.
- In each case the notion of collective security was propagated to justify American involvement in alliances which allegedly were contrary to its interests and which perhaps overtaxed its power.

WE CAN NOW understand the importance of this ideological identification. To the liberal it matters whether Ho Chi Minh can be compared to Stalin or maybe even to Hitler; to the radical it does not matter at all. He may even find it easier to proclaim his solidarity with a frankly revolutionary Ho Chi Minh than with a pacific one. What matters to him is not whether this country has obligations to come to the aid of others, but that it returns to the isolationist stance which was imparted to it in George Washington's Farewell Address.

Liberals usually know that this is not possible. Conservatives and Radicals cherish the pious legend that once this country lived in a state of innocence but at some point evil spirits, power-hungry politicians and greedy capitalists, contrived to entangle it in foreign alliances and wars. Though a superficial glance at 19th-century history should dispel such fantasies, most criticism of U.S. policies is based on some version of a Fall. A particularly flattering version of the legend is the Woodrow Wilson myth: that a misguided "idealism," an arrogant, puritanical sense of mission drove this country to assume the mantle of world policeman, which sat awkwardly on its shoulders; it had not been created to "take up the white man's burden" and was not fit for empire. The country was able, therefore, to play a role in world politics only if armed with a righteous ideology. The late John Foster Dulles, with his solemn countenance, was ideally suited to make this image plausible. But let us note that for all his talk about brinkmanship Dulles failed to come to the aid of East Berlin in 1953, or Hungary in 1956; he kept Chiang Kai-shek on the leash and made no move to get the Russian armies out of Europe. He concluded armistices in Korea and Vietnam and seemed reasonably happy with a world divided between "theirs" and "ours": his rhetoric was no guide to his politics, which were defensive and unimaginative. While he sought to contain the Communists he also recognized that they were containing us.

Moreover, this policy was bipartisan. Rusk took it over from his predecessor, and Stevenson endorsed it shortly before his death in a letter to Paul Goodman.

The essence of this policy was not ideology or anti-ideology, but collective security (even the Communist scare was mobilized only to make containment acceptable to a reluctant Congress and a war-weary public). As formulated by Niebuhr: *for peace we must risk war.* In the less poetic language of the Secretary of State: "Let no would-be aggressor suppose that the absence of a formal defense treaty . . . grants immunity to aggression."[80]

The "cool," sophisticated postwar generation feels superior to the generation of its parents which stumbled into two or three wars because they either believed in ideas or placed their faith in collective security. The New Left rejects these illusions: containment policy, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO have led to other alliances and to wars in Asia; they have dispelled the world political dream of the liberals that peace can be won by power. Conservative and radical critics of the Cold War may differ on the precise phase of it which they began to reject: some started the day Henry Wallace was fired, others after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the more moderate would still go along with the European confrontation until

[80] Senate Preparedness Committee, quoted in the *Washington Post,* August 26, 1966.

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after the death of Stalin,[31] or even side with the U.S. government in the first phase of the Korean War[32]—but all share the contempt for "idealism":

> He [Rusk] is a meliorist, a liberalist and moralist . . . the heir to the Wilsonian tradition . . . Ultimately it was Wilson's effect to convert the First World War, initially a European [!] dynastic and commercial carnage, into a war for the unattainable goal of universal peace and justice. . . . It has escaped notice that the "war to end all wars," that black joke of the Wilson era, has emerged once more in our day as the war to end all insurgency.[33]

It may not be easy to recognize in this caricature the person of the Secretary of State; but it is not difficult to recognize the bastard which conservative *realpolitik* has begotten on Populist pacifism. The noblest principle of American foreign policy, or perhaps the noblest principle in the foreign policy of all ages, has been ridiculed in order to disparage the policies of a particular Secretary of State. Instead of attacking him for misapplying the principle, the principle itself is attacked; instead of denouncing the use of great ideas for petty ends, ideas as such are held up to ridicule.

The revisionists are poor historians if they don't understand the importance of principles and ideas, either in guiding or in moving the men who act.[34] No part of history, not even foreign policy, is a game on a checker board where every move can be figured out coldly with all its consequences. The responsible statesman is distinguished from the chess player in that he does not see all his enemy's forces on the board and has no way of knowing his true intentions. The revisionist, who can study the archives at a later time, obviously has the advantage over the statesman who was in the middle of the rumble. He knows what each of the acting governments should have done. He can leisurely study all the pertinent documents and ignore the pressures of time, opinion, and other business that act on the statesman. Nor do his documents reveal the anxieties of contemporaries.[35]

Professor Taylor can calmly assure us that we only needed to give Hitler one more country to have eternal peace—he does not choose to remember the anxious moments when Hitler's, Mussolini's, and Hirohito's ultimatums followed each other with the inexorable regularity of a military march. Mr. La Feber may blame Acheson for throwing the Communist scare into the Congress debate when obdurate isolationists like Taft would not grant Greece the aid she needed; fortunately Mr. Halle, writing from personal memories, conveys the sense of urgency that set the pace for those who had to respond to a sudden change of the situation. He also makes it clear that the somewhat confused message which soon was to be called "Truman Doctrine" was hardly conceived as the blistering pronunciamento which it seemed to Kennan in retrospect.

To the orderly mind of the political scientist, historical events always seem to be planned, or at least conceived to suit some idea or conception. In real history nothing ever hap-

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[31] Ronald Steel, *op. cit.*

[32] William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman, *The New Politics* (New York: Harper, 1961), and *The Politics of Hysteria* (New York: Harper, 1964).

[33] Edmund Stillman, "Dean Rusk: In the American Grain," *Commentary*, May 1968, p. 36.

[34] Revisionists of the conservative school reject "ideologies" but at least are aware that "principles" or political concepts are necessary to understand and to shape foreign policy. Such a principle is the old-fashioned "balance of powers." A more modern one would be "collective security"; very ancient ones are "empire" and "hegemony." The New Left, in its general waste land of theory, does not understand the difference between ideologies, which supply rationalizations or justifications for action, and theories or concepts and principles, which are tools. A genuine difficulty is that some principles may be used as ideologies. A perfectly good tool of foreign policy, e.g., such as "arbitration," may be used as an excuse for having no policy. But even such debased principles are easy to distinguish from ideologies, such as Communism and anti-Communism, which cannot serve as guides for a policy and never have served so, but merely described an imputed motivation.

[35] There is no more dangerous trap for the inexperienced historian, nor any more dangerous weapon in the hands of the experienced propagandist, than the pseudo-fact: a well-documented record of irrelevant events.

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pens that way. No one had conceived of the "cold war"; the statesmen reacted to situations into which they tumbled. No one seemed to have planned a crusade, many wondered later on how they came to be in one. We have to accept as the lesson of history that forces which were more or less blind and guided by their own dynamism clashed in conflict and therefore had to hate each other. It was the diplomats' business to keep this conflict under control, not to fan it. We must judge them by their success in disentangling the entanglement because they could not avoid it in the first place.

This does not mean, of course, that we must absolve the governments of the charge that they blundered, or that at least some of the blunders were avoidable. But the revisionists have failed to prove that the postwar coexistence could be anything but antagonistic; it might even be possible to argue that the cold confrontation was among the milder forms which that antagonism was capable of taking. In certain respects it might even be said that the phrase "cold war" exaggerates the gravity of the situation. There was no war plan and no concerted effort to achieve well-defined aims; no proof has been given that either Stalin or Truman was having designs for the destruction of the other's power. What we see, rather, is a series of disconnected actions which happened at opportune moments, of opportunities seized and of weaknesses exploited. We also see a certain awareness on both sides to spare the other's susceptibilities and to carry provocations just to the threshold but not beyond. This must be said even of Dulles whose often misquoted simile emphasized the need to step to the brink *and back*.

Speaking of Dulles, finally, one remembers the worst feature of the Cold War, its ideological aggressiveness, its crusading spirit, its grandiloquacious militancy. Well, Homer's heroes are hollering at each other when they are not giving battle, and ideology in the Cold War served the most degrading purpose to which an ideology can finally be put—as a cover for inaction. We won all the battles of righteousness but, thank God, the Cold War did not really break out into a hot war. Most of it was shouting.[36]

Ideologies rarely are the cause of action; they provide rationalizations for actions, they justify the division into parties. Once created, however, ideas may transcend the immediate propaganda purpose and become myths or rigid doctrines which tend to alienate their faithful from reality, freeze hostilities whose real causes have long been forgotten, and prolong loyalties which no longer make sense. By searching for the sources of the Cold War, revisionists might contribute to the thawing-out process, to loosen up the ideological rigidities, and on the whole to de-ideologize the antagonisms.

Unfortunately, most revisionists are doing the exact opposite: instead of understanding how the ideologies were first manipulated and then began in turn to manipulate the manipulators, the revisionists have become victims of the ideological impact. Instead of separating the cold-war ideologies from the power conflict, they have carried them into more areas of conflict, such as the wars in Africa and in the Middle East. They have fallen down on their self-assigned task; instead of questioning the ideological foundations of the crusade, they have simply changed the labels of villain and victim.

[36] U.N. Security Council debates provide good examples of "cold-war" language signifying nothing. After the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of five Warsaw Pact powers, Mr. George Ball deplored, berated, and condemned the Soviet Union, but carefully avoided key words such as aggression which might have obligated the U.S. to take or support countermeasures. The invasion of Hungary in 1956 was subjected to the same "cold-war" treatment. Yet, some political scientists still seize upon such rhetoric to prove that there is a "cold war." One may criticize this rhetoric on many grounds, except on the assumption that the Russians take it seriously. This they leave to our simpletons on the Right and Left.

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Paul Goodman

Kropotkin at this Moment

THE NEW INTEREST in Kropotkin is part of the worldwide revival of Anarchist action and thought, in both "private enterprise" and socialist countries. So Bakunin, Kropotkin, and the other Anarchists were right after all: the real enemies have proved to be the State (whose health is war), overcentralized organization, the authoritarian personality of people. The call is for grassroots social structures, spontaneity and mutual aid, direct action and doing it yourself, education for self-reliance, and agitation for freedom. Marxists now talk a good deal about alienation and liberals have picked it up, especially "youth alienation," but this is what Anarchists were always talking about, without neo-Hegelian trimmings. They knew it by human feeling and common observation. Closely studying the social history of rural communes and medieval towns, Kropotkin concluded that man did not have to be ruled.

Yet mankind being what it was, it probably has been necessary to experiment the obvious abstract recipe of "rational" central planning, in order to get a bellyful of it. Kant said that men always try out all the wrong ways before, perforce, they choose the right one. Writing in 1898, Kropotkin was far off base in his slighting estimate of the prospects of Marxian socialism! Indeed, for the first half of this century it seemed that the trend toward universal social engineering and a general shambles was irreversible. But the recalcitrance of human nature, that Kropotkin used to admire, has stubbornly begun to reassert itself and we shall not have universal social engineering. We may still have the general shambles. The bureaucracy and stupidity of the Great Powers are now no worse than when Kropotkin wrote his *Memoirs,* but their technical and organization ability to do mischief is immensely greater. Patience is a salient virtue of political moralists, but the philosophers of the past did not have to figure with atom bombs and so forth.

When young radicals come across *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* they are surprised at how similar their peers were in 1875. Kropotkin's description of the generation gap is poignant —all the "older brothers" had been, as we say, co-opted. Those who have done work among the dispossessed in Harlem, Roxbury, and Detroit recognize V'Narod, going to the people where they are and on their own terms, and they also recognize the ambiguities involved.

Some young people are miffed at the similarities and do not want to hear about them, for it is an article of faith among *moderni*— as they called themselves in 1500!—that nothing like themselves has ever happened. But these are the lively youth of every prerevolutionary age, when the powers that be have become morally bankrupt and administratively incompetent. They sprang up before the Reformation, as *Sturm und Drang* before the French Revolution, as the Narodniki in Russia, and as our hippies and New Left. And it is not just an eternal return; something useful did come out of the previous upheavals, though we certainly need to do better.

Kropotkin's running critique of the system of formal education also continually strikes home. With a trenchant empirical observation he solves the precise dilemma that bedevils our most prestigious pedagogical theorists. Some hold that you can teach any proposition

This is a preface to Peter Kropotkin's *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* being published this fall in a new, facsimile edition of the entire 1899 original by Horizon Press, New York.

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to anybody, whereas others insist that there is required a long prior training in intellectual habits, which the "culturally disadvantaged" do not have. Kropotkin says, "My experience is that when you speak to the Russian peasant plainly, and start from concrete facts, there is no generalization from the whole world of natural and social science which cannot be conveyed to a man of average intelligence, *if you yourself understand it concretely.*" But oh what a revolution in our school system that little clause implies!

But the chief lesson, in my opinion, that Kropotkin has to teach young people is how an authentic professional becomes a revolutionary. Today many of the best students believe that to be a professional at all is to be a fink of the System; and to be a scientist or artist is frivolous when there is so much injustice and suffering in the world. Kropoktin himself was an archetypal 19th-century scientist: a lone adventurer warmly cooperating with his peers in their voluntary associations, scrupulously dutiful to the scientific method, and blushing with pride when Mother Nature occasionally came across with an answer just for him. Of course he could not give this up —it was his way of being in the world. There is a pathetic hilarity in the story that, whereas other agitators could get out of town and escape the police, he had to stay and explain to the geological society his thesis on the Ice Cap. He had plenty of time to write it up in jail. His experience, however, was that just by trying to pursue his profession with courage and integrity, he found that there must be revolutionary changes in society. Perhaps the critical episode was his effort to do something for the agronomy and economy of the Siberian Cossacks:

> When I returned with my report, I received congratulations on all sides. I was promoted. I got special rewards. All the measures I recommended were accepted—special grants of money were given. . . . The higher administration of Siberia was influenced by excellent intentions. Everything considered, it was far more enlightened than the administration of any other province of Russia. . . . But it was an administration—a branch of the tree that had its root in St. Petersburg, and that was quite sufficient to paralyze its excellent intentions and to make it interfere with all beginnings of local spontaneous life and progress. . . . I become convinced of the absolute uselessness of such efforts.

It was so that one became an Anarchist.

THE NEW ANARCHISM is in, so to speak, a Bakuninist phase: the emphasis is on agitation, direct action, sometimes disruption to bring bad operations to a stop. Kropotkin, in his prime, belonged to a more mature anarchism that did revolutionary agitation as the day's work but was already "discussing," as Kropotkin calls it, the possibilities of Anarchist technology, ecology, pedagogy, rural life, industrial management. It was just here that the Scientific Socialists thought of nothing and have accomplished nothing, despite their agitational success. They have merely carried on the arrangements of the old order, sometimes a little better, sometimes a lot worse. Our young Anarchists have few such "discussions." They understand as well as Bazaroff the need for a new style of life, but it is hard to tell what the content of this is, except for interpersonal relations. Often they sound as if the high technology, after they have disrupted it, will grind on automatically, while they are supported like Indians on a reservation, with motorcycles and good hi-fi, occasionally hitch-hiking to a be-in in Golden Gate Park. Kropotkin's generation had a more interesting notion of freedom.

Yet it is only by the way that *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* is about Anarchist thought and history; it is as a work of literature that it lives on. Except for the last section, which Kropotkin added later and which deals like a chronicle with matters almost contemporary, the book is a work of long reflection and literary imagination, a series of pictures vividly particular and tellingly typical, the poetry that is more philosophical than history. The episodes are chosen with great economy to give

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the essence, "a man in his times." Everything is what the hero directly experienced, as in a biography, yet he himself almost entirely vanishes into a sequence of responses to important social scenes: serfdom and the nobility of Russia, city and country life, the pages' academy and the Czar's court, adventure in the wilderness and the world of science, prison, escape to the West. It is a very artful performance, an individual life as pure social action. Yet it is undoubtedly ingenuous. The taste of it is like a sprig of peppermint or a stalk of spring rhubarb.

Anarchy is the political philosophy of skilled artisans and farmers, who do not need a boss; of men in dangerous occupations, like miners, lumbermen, or explorers, who learn to rely on themselves and one another; of aristocrats who can afford to be idealistic and who know what is behind the show of power; of artists and scientists who respect the facts but are not timid about inventing something out of their heads. Kropotkin was all of these.

The psychoanalysis, the deep motivation, is embarrassingly obvious; Kropotkin could never have written it this way if he had known Freud, which would have been a pity. Beautiful Mama dies when our hero is a small child. Papa, who is of coarser clay, takes another wife who is cold and tries to expunge all traces of previous paradise. Only the serfs conspiratorially keep alive the warm sentiment of Mama. The boy is under pressure to become a warrior like Papa, but he bides his time, accumulates experience, and then goes his own way, to strike at the very principle of paternal authority, the State, the Czar himself. What is remarkable about the story in the case of Kropotkin, however, is that, blessed with intellect, boyish beauty, money, and luck, he altogether abjures resentment and envy, and seeks reconciliation. In the book this happens almost comically during the description of M. Poulain, the pedantic tutor brought in after Papa's remarriage. The passage starts with an account of idiotic authoritarian lessons and a taste of the birch-rod; but suddenly the child is rescued by his sister, and the author at once relents: "No sooner had M. Poulain discharged himself of his heavy educational duties than he became quite another man, a lively comrade instead of a gruesome teacher." From that point, on page 16, there is not a trace of ill will in the *Memoirs* of Kropotkin, not toward anybody. And 400 pages later he explains his position as editor of a revolutionary periodical:

> Socialist papers have often a tendency to become mere annals of complaints about existing conditions. The exploitation of the laborers in the mine, the factory, the field is related; the misery and sufferings of the workers during strikes are told in vivid pictures; their helplessness in the struggle against employers is insisted upon; and this succession of hopeless efforts exercises a most depressing influence on the reader. . . . I thought, on the contrary, that a revolutionary paper must be, above all, a record of those symptoms which everywhere announce the coming of a new era, the germination of new forms of social life, the growing revolt against antiquated institutions. These symptoms should be watched, brought together in their intimate connection, and so grouped as to show to the hesitating minds of the greater number the invisible and often unconscious support which advanced ideas find everywhere when a revival of thought takes place in society. . . . It is hope, not despair, which makes successful revolutions.

By and large, this is true. To keep going requires a thirst for paradise. Just to get out of a trap does not produce a lasting commitment. To wreak vengeance, or for the oppressed to take the place of the mighty, changes little. But of course this is the point of view of a natural aristocrat, who assumes that all men are potentially aristocrats.

THERE IS a curious doctrine of Will in Kropotkin, paradoxical for a philosopher who was so conscious of biological, social, and historical forces. It is a much less arbitrary and "existential" kind of Will than in Bakunin or Max Stirner, but it is certainly more personal and psychological than historical determinists would allow. It *is* paradoxical; in my opin-

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ion, it is just about what the reality seems to be—among energetic and resourceful people.

Without doubt, the tonic objectivity of these *Memoirs* is protected by a certain amount of repression. The sexual reticence is extraordinary, far beyond the Victorian (public) standard. I count one disapproving comment on the fun and games at the pages' academy, and one disapproving comment on remarks about women that Michael (Bakunin) would have put down—that is all. On page 424 we are suddenly told about "my wife," but not a mention before. There is an absolute silence about either his own religious beliefs, or the organized church, or the religion of the serfs. His literary references reveal the same diffidence toward irrational experience; he praises the classical Turgenev and the satirical Goncharov, but there is one glancing mention of Tolstoi and no mention at all of Dostoevsky. Except for horses to drive, there are no animals, although he speaks of them so lovingly and admiringly in *Mutual Aid*, where there is a political and scientific reason to do so. Indeed, though everything is spirited and feelingful, the single passage that is not active and objective, that is passional, is the terrible cry when he is locked up and as if abandoned in the Fortress. I guess that John Dewey is the only moralist of equal intellectual power who is literarily quite so cagey about self-revelation, at the same time as being perfectly open. It is a bonus of pragmatism. Being always concerned for the problem, one can disregard oneself. But what if oneself is the problem?

Conversely, Kropotkin has an obsessional lust to praise, and to have something to praise. The viability of mankind is hopefully a self-proving hypothesis. He gives us lists of his beautiful friends and enumerates their virtues and achievements.

For an American—writing in the summer of 1968—there is a particular poignancy to Kropotkin's occasional sentences about the United States. He takes it for granted that we are the free common people, whom he believes in. (We had recently liberated our serfs.) He mentions the happy dream of a United States of Siberia, presumably to be federated with ourselves. He points out that the dissident pacifist communities of the Dukhobors find "hearty support in the United States."

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Joseph Clark

Czechoslovakia: 1918–1968

A Record of National Martyrdom

THE STORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA has meaning far beyond the suffering and hopes of its 14 million people. Its establishment in 1918 was a tribute to aspirations for national self-determination and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Its betrayal by the Western powers in 1938 at Munich was a milestone of Hitler's march to conquer Europe. Its submersion under Communist control in 1948 intensified the Cold War. Its efforts to liberalize, and perhaps even democratize, in 1968 gave hope to the people of the Communist countries seeking freedom. Its invasion by the Soviet Union is a sign of both the depth of the crisis gripping Communism and of the grave threat Communist totalitarianism continues to present to the world.

With what wicked irony the Soviet Communists consummated the rape of Czechoslovakia! They arranged it so they were not alone as invaders. Has Germany long been an oppressor of Czechs and Slovaks? The Soviets took along their East Germans. Has Poland returned to its traditional anti-Semitism? The Soviets were accompanied by Polish troops. Was Hungary the victim of Soviet tanks a dozen years ago? Hungarians too were dragged along to invade a land they had helped despoil under the old empire.

Ever since the rebellion of Jan Hus, Czechs and Slovaks have been compelled to fight for national freedom. For five centuries their oppressors were primarily Germanic. Now the tanks that rumble into Prague belong to a Russian empire. How did they get there? Some background may be helpful.

DELEGATES at the Republican convention would have been startled to discover that the original Communist wedge in Czechoslovakia was made with an assist from General Eisenhower. The delegates aren't much different in that respect from most people who have rather vague notions about the history of Eastern Europe. Eduard Benes, colleague of the founder of the Czechoslovak republic, Thomas Masaryk, and later Masaryk's successor, felt confident during the early years of World War II that the Soviet Union would not threaten his country's freedom. Benes believed that his people would know that "Communism was a step backward, not forward," because the Czech social and economic structure was "in better balance."[1] Besides, in 1943 Stalin assured Benes that there would be no Soviet interference in Czech affairs.

In March 1945, two months before V-E day, Stalin declared at a dinner for Benes that the latter had been justified in his previous fears that the Communists intended to bolshevize Europe, including Czechoslovakia. "You were justified in sharing this opinion," Stalin said with disarming candor, as he assured Benes that now things were different; the Communists were becoming nationalists and wouldn't tamper with Czechoslovakia. He even promised the Czech leader that the Czech Communists in Moscow who "wore blinkers" would reform![2]

On May 5 General Patton's troops crossed into Czechoslovakia. The day before, Eisenhower had informed Soviet General Antonov that he was ready to move on Prague from

[1] Herbert Feis, *Churchill—Roosevelt—Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
[2] *Ibid.*

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the Pilsen area. Antonov quickly replied and told Eisenhower to withdraw his troops, as he had done just before on the lower Elbe. Meanwhile, on May 5 the people of Prague, led by the underground, with Josef Smrkovsky as a leader, liberated Prague. The Russians never forgave Smrkovsky, who became chairman of the National Assembly during the brief liberalization, that the Czechs, not the Red Army, accepted the German surrender in Prague. When Eisenhower complied with Antonov's wishes, it was the soldiers of the Red Army who later entered Prague as "liberators."

Revisionist historians of the Cold War might ponder the proclivity of the American military in World War II to let the Red Army have its way, especially when political, rather than military, objectives were involved. How irritated U.S. military figures, from Marshall to Eisenhower, became when Churchill suggested that Communist military moves had political and territorial overtones!

As the war came to an end, Benes began to have misgivings when the Russians insisted that 7 of the 25 Czech ministers should be Communists and that Fierlinger, a nominal socialist but a man completely in tow of the Communists, become Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the government set up after the liberation was representative. True, the Communists insisted on having their favorite ministries, Interior and Defense. But the May 1946 elections in Czechoslovakia were free elections. The Communists emerged as the single largest party with 38 per cent of the vote. Klement Gottwald became Premier. Theirs was the party that had liberated Prague and had been associated with the Soviets, the victors of Stalingrad, whose forces had borne the brunt of the war against Hitler.

THE ORIGINS of Czech Communism are related to the growth of the Left in European socialist movements as a result of Social Democratic support of their respective governments in World War I. A highly industrialized, if small state, Czechoslovakia experienced the widespread unemployment and hardships of the depression of the thirties. There were sufficient reasons in Marxist analysis, for the rise of Communism in Czechoslovakia, but oddly, one disadvantage of Czech Communism came from the Marxist fathers themselves. The Czechoslovak state was born after centuries of national oppression by German, Austrian, Hungarian rulers. This never should have happened, according to Karl Marx. Jointly with Engels, Marx in *Germany: Revolution and Counter-revolution* denigrated both Czechs and Slovaks. Marx and Engels believed that "the German element in the Slavonic frontier localities" was a bearer of superior culture. In the eyes of the Marxian founders, the Germans were destined for supremacy in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia.

The revolutionary events of 1848 were accompanied by a revival of Czech liberation struggles. This annoyed Marx and Engels. In their article "Poles, Czechs, and Germans," published on March 5, 1852, they wrote:

> But as it often happens, dying Czechian nationality, dying according to every fact known in history for the last four hundred years, made in 1848 a last desperate effort to regain its former vitality—an effort whose failure, independently of all revolutionary contradictions, was to prove that Bohemia could only exist, henceforth, as a portion of Germany, although part of her inhabitants might yet, for some centuries, continue to speak a non-German language.[3]

It was an egregious error, this failure to appreciate the vitality of the national factor in European history. Czechoslovakia's short but vibrant existence between the two world wars was very much related to its five centuries of struggle for national self-determination. The Hussite wars intermingled social and national aims as did the long period of struggle against Germans and Austrians—and now against the Russians.

[3] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II (International Publishers, 1933).

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II

THOUGH the Minister of the Interior in the post-World-War-II Czech government was a Communist, the Minister of Justice was not. By the end of 1947 that created problems. The Minister of Justice uncovered plots to murder Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, Deputy Premier Petr Zenkl, and himself, Justice Minister Prokop Drtina. Also, while the Interior Ministry was trying to staff the police force with Communists, the Justice Minister was opposing efforts to imprison non-Communist police officers. And then, in November 1947, came the unkindest cut of all. The Communists had been building up their "own" Social Democrat, Fierlinger, in order to assure a united front dominated by Communists. The Social Democrats, however, showed alarming signs of vitality and intelligence. They grew in membership and took the unpardonable step of ousting Fierlinger, in order to assure that Social Democrats would be in the leadership of the Social Democratic party. The final threat came from a Gallup-type poll. In January 1948 the Institute for Public Opinion Research conducted a survey which showed that the CP vote would go down to 28 per cent from the 38 per cent it had in the 1946 elections. (That 1946 poll had been off only ½ per cent.)[4]

In February 1948 the Communists fulfilled a pledge they had made 18 years earlier in the Czech parliament. On December 21, 1929, Gottwald had risen to reply to taunts that his party was following a Moscow line. Gottwald had declared: "You are saying that we are under Moscow's command and that we go there to learn. And do you know what? We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to break your necks, you patriots."[5] So they now proceeded to break the necks of all opposition; in a few days Jan Masaryk was dead and Czechoslovakia had a totalitarian regime.

[4] Edward Taborsky, *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
[5] *Ibid.*

If Moscow had its trials of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and Bukharin, if Hungary had its Rajk trial and Bulgaria its Kostov trial, Prague had its Slansky trial. He was General Secretary of the Czech party and second only to Gottwald in the hierarchy. As late as May 17, 1951, Slansky keynoted a special 30th anniversary meeting of the Central Committee. The minutes of that meeting record that Slansky was interrupted 19 times by "stormy and long standing applause." Four months later Slansky was removed from office; within seven months he was expelled from the party, and within a year he was on trial for his life. He was accused along with others who had been arrested in 1949, 1950, and 1951.

Of the 14 leading Communists on trial 11 were Jewish and never had a Communist regime used open anti-Semitism as blatantly as this one now. The accused were attacked as "Zionists" although each one had an unwavering record of opposition to Zionism. They were assailed as "cosmopolites" although each had remained faithful to the Stalinist definition of internationalism, namely, loyalty to Soviet foreign policy. They were pilloried for having their real capital in Jerusalem even though those of Jewish origin had long renounced any kinship with the Jewish people of Czechoslovakia, let alone Israel.

When Nikita Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade in the late spring of 1955, it was inevitable that all the Communist trials would be exposed as the frame-ups they were. The Soviet party leaders had decided upon reconciliation with the Yugoslav Communists; so, they would have to wipe off the slate the "trials" of Rajk, Kostov, Slansky, and others, who, among other imaginative charges, were found guilty of conspiring with the "fascist Tito clique." Indirectly the Russians were also admitting that the Moscow trials were frame-ups; this Khrushchev did, finally, in his speech nine months later.

The long and bitter struggle for exonerating the Czech trial victims became a factor in the events that culminated in the ouster of Antonin Novotny and the 1968 liberaliza-

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tion. Novotny, Gottwald's successor as Stalin's proconsul, had been deeply involved in the Slansky trial. Belatedly, the Czech party leaders had taken mincing steps toward the admission that the Slansky trial was completely contrived; some of the victims who had escaped executions were released. But it was typical of the Novotny leadership that it prevented a public review of the trial. When Rudolf Barak, Minister of the Interior, tried in 1962 to bring about a more complete exoneration of the trial victims, he was slapped down. Barak himself had not been directly involved in the Slansky trial. But Novotny had been, up to his ears, so he jailed Barak for his pains. Then, in September 1963, some Party Presidium members who had been deeply implicated in the Slansky trial were removed, including Viliam Siroky and Karol Bacilek. It was Slovak party leader Alexander Dubcek who seconded the motion of expulsion.

IF WE WANTED to go back far enough in a search for the origins and roots of the 1968 Czech events we would have to return to Jan Hus. But for present purposes it suffices to take the year 1956 as the great divide. The crisis that engulfed the Communist world 12 years ago was no transient development, for 1956 inaugurated a permanent crisis of Communism.

Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress, opened up the very fundamentals of Communism for review, at least as something to think about. The easing of the terror and concentration camp regime enabled people and viewpoints suppressed for two generations to surface and even to find some mode of expression. There was the thaw in literature which enabled poets and novelists to throw off their chains. The Soviet Union was in a crisis because of its technological success; the incantations of Stalin could hardly be a guide for a modern nation. The effort to maintain colonialism in Eastern Europe created conflict. Polycentrism replaced Moscow's tight control. It was no longer possible to speak of a world communist movement, and the Soviet empire began to fall apart.

For a while it seemed that the social earthquakes in Eastern Europe would avoid Czechoslovakia. This is not to say that after the death of Stalin the winds of revolt did not blow over that land. Seemingly out of nowhere there were demonstrations in June 1953 in Pilsen and other cities, demanding free elections—of all things. Pictures of Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes suddenly appeared. (It was only two weeks later that demonstrations broke out in East Germany.)

In April 1955 Czech writers and students demanded restitution of the rights of victims of the Stalinist terror. The poet Frantisek Hrubin told the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers Union: "The poet hollows out within himself the biggest possible space for freedom. The larger the area for freedom he excavates within himself, the larger the area he wins for it outside also, for his nation, for humanity."[6] The poets didn't seem to derive inspiration from Marx. Surprisingly, the poet Jaroslav Seifert quoted John Stuart Mill on liberty. And students circulated demands for information about who really owned the Czech uranium mines at Jackymov.

After Soviet Communist leaders inaugurated de-Stalinization at the 20th Congress, Czech Communists warned their people of the limitations that must be observed in eradicating "the cult of personality." Czech party leader Vaclav Kopecky explained: "The condemnation of the cult of the personality does not mean that the party line has changed."[7] Novotny gave the official answer to rising demands for a free press: "Independence of the press from the party and its ideas we have always rejected and will continue to do so."[8] Even Dubcek, while still party leader in Slovakia, and still obedient to the Novotny

[6] Hubert Ripka, *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

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leadership, rejected notions of Slovak autonomy, declaring, "We follow the directives of the Czechoslovak Central Committee . . ."[9] How "smoothly" a totalitarian society legislates is indicated by the fact that from 1948 to 1960 there was not a single dissenting vote in the National Assembly.

Still, long before the 1968 events there were efforts by writers, students, and intellectuals to rectify the injustices. In fall 1956 came the student-worker rebellion in Hungary and at that time, too, there was the Polish spring in October. In 1956-57 the Soviet-Chinese cleavage indicated that a new era of conflicts among Communist nations had begun. By 1963-64 the Soviet and Chinese comrades were at each other with a ferocity paralleled only by the religious wars of the past, and border fighting erupted along the long Soviet-Chinese frontier. And then in 1963-64 Rumania, one of the staunchest of Stalinist regimes, took an indepedent path in utter disregard of Moscow's wishes.

In the exchange of Chinese and Soviet recriminations, considerable truth could be gleaned. Soviet Communists had adopted rather traditional methods of economic imperialism in their relations with Eastern Europe. They set up joint corporations in which the Soviets were invariably the senior partners. The Soviets bought cheap and sold dear to their allies; they secured raw materials at prices that suited their needs, whether uranium from Czechoslovakia or oil from Rumania.

By the time the Communist states set up their economic mutual aid organization, Comecon, the Soviets were ready to assign to each nation its specialization for the "common" good. This set things up for the Chinese party's letter to the Soviet party on February 29, 1964, in which they charged:

> You infringe the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries and oppose their efforts to develop their economy on an independent basis in accordance with their own needs and potentialities. You bully those fraternal countries whose economies are less advanced and oppose their policy of industrialization and try to force them to remain agricultural countries and serve as your source of raw materials and as outlets for your goods.[10]

Czechoslovakia's foreign trade became predominantly dependent on the Soviet Union. This became a factor in its growing economic difficulties.

III

A MODERN INDUSTRIAL STATE needs scholars and scholarship. The obscurantism that was encouraged after the 1948 coup served to suppress sociology as an academic discipline. One branch of sociology that became anathema was the measurement of public opinion, and the Institute for Public Opinion Research was the first to go in 1948. Also abolished was the Masaryk Sociological Society. Belatedly, change was registered and in April 1964 the Czechoslovak Sociological Society was reconstituted. Its secretary, D. Slejska, proposed a Gallup-type public opinion poll. He argued that public opinion must play a role in the direction of society. The revival of scholarly research became a factor that made the continuation of the Novotny rule more and more incompatible with the development of Czech society.[11]

The striving to attain a measure of pluralism in a society that had been suffocated so long was expressed in striking fashion in the writing of Michael Lakatos, a Slovak legal theorist. In an article published in 1964 in the monthly journal of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, he discussed "Some Problems of Socialist Democracy from the viewpoint of the Citizen's position in our Society." He examined the problem that arises from the conflict between "those who are subjects and

[9] Richard F. Star, *The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

[11] Edward Taborsky, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia," in *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1965.

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make political line and those who are primarily objects." He distinguished sharply between "those who rule and those who are manipulated." He stressed the participatory role of the citizens in a democracy and proposed that the National Assembly, as well as local legislative bodies, "must really, and not only formally, contribute to the forming of the political line." He suggested the reorganization of the election process to allow for expression and representation of "group interests." Elections "must offer a selection among several candidates," he argued. While refraining from anything as "drastic" as a multiparty system, he urged contested elections. His discussion of "group interests" was especially important as a critique of the mythology of a harmonious, classless society. Socialist societies, like others, Lakatos writes, are heterogenous and differentiated. People are grouped according to income, the type of job they have, ethnic origin, etc., and they are frequently in conflict, as he pointed out. Lakatos sought a role for trade unions, youth organizations, professional societies beyond the formal right to ratify what the party had already established as the line.[12]

Even the official Party paper, *Rude Pravo,* took worried notice of the consequences of the politics, or rather, the lack of politics that resulted from the controlled society of the regime. On May 6, 1966, the paper complained that "the majority of young people are hardly active politically." Even more serious, youths were expressing "criticism of the socialist system" and "there is the danger that they will be alienated from it."[13]

To the demands for pluralism and the right of opposition there was the answer of the regime, expressed, for example, by Ota Brozek in the organ of the Writers Union, *Reporter*: "The basic line is binding for the National Assembly, for the government, and for the ministries," he warned. But he indicated the magnanimity of the regime when he explained that in the "application" of the line, citizens were allowed to be frank.[14]

For some time before the 1968 events the Novotny regime recognized the need for basic economic reforms. While industrial output continued to grow in the fifties, there was a drastic decline in the growth rate during the sixties. In 1963 Czechoslovakia had a rather unhappy distinction—*it was the only industrial country in the world with an absolute decline in industrial output, national income, and real wages.* Novotny was still the chief when the Czech party plenum of January 1965 approved a "new economic model." Provision was made for reducing the galloping centralization of economic management, and local enterprises were given some authority in managing their affairs. A profit and market mechanism was introduced to some extent, in an effort to move the economy out of stagnation.

Economic difficulties and the need for reform of the economy are important considerations in evaluating the events of 1968. It is too easy to interpret them solely as a revolt by intellectuals, students, artists, and writers. Was their dissatisfaction and demand for greater freedom sufficient to move Czech society as deeply as it did this year?

IV

THE START of the liberalization process can be placed in June, 1967, at the Czechoslovak Writers Congress. At that congress novelist Ludwik Vaculik attacked the party's ruling caste and said that whatever progress had occurred in the country happened despite those leaders. Playwright Pavel Kohut assailed censorship and read the stirring letter of Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, protesting suppression of freedom in art and society. But the regime hit back with ideologist Jiri Hendrych, who declared that the patience of the leadership had ended. Novotny himself entered the discussion to warn the writers against voicing the kind of criti-

[12] Morton Schwartz, "Czechoslovakia: Toward One-Party Pluralism?" in *Problems of Communism,* January–February 1967.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*

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cism they were leveling against his leadership.[15]

In June 1967 another event had a powerful influence on the course of events in Czechoslovakia. The quick, automatic manner with which the Novotny regime obediently took the Arab side against the Israelis in the six-day war elicited an equally quick and profound revulsion among the people. Czechs made little secret of their sympathies with the Israelis. But the East Germans and Poles had their revenge when they were awarded a place of honor in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And *Neues Deutschland*, of the East German CP, explained: "Zionist forces have taken over the leadership" of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. And the Polish party paper, *Trybunu Ludu,* resumed its anti-Semitic campaign with the charge that "Zionists" in Czechoslovakia were responsible for the "real threat of transition from socialism to capitalism."

Again and again the name and heritage of Thomas Masaryk was invoked by those seeking a measure of freedom. In September 1967 Jan Prochazka, a leader of the Writers Union, published an article marking the 30th anniversary of the death of Masaryk. It was a stirring tribute to his role in the fight for national independence and democratic liberties. In retaliation the Novotny leadership expelled three Writers Union members from the party, removed Prochazka from his Central Committee post and closed down the Writers Union newspaper.[16]

Prague students conducted demonstrations at the end of October, including a candlelight parade protesting the lack of light and heat in their dormitories. Police assaulted the students, using clubs and tear gas, and 13 students and three policemen required hospital attention.[17]

Critics of the Novotny leadership on the Central Committee finally joined in unprecedented debate with that leadership at an October 1967 plenary session. Three currents merged in this attack—those seeking liberalization, those pressing for more consistent and far-reaching economic reforms, and Slovaks striving for greater autonomy for their 30 per cent of the nation. Though Novotny remained in his post, the meeting was a prelude to the changes effected in December and January. In December Novotny felt himself so threatened he asked the Soviets for help and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet party secretary, paid a surprise visit to Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev apparently refused to intervene decisively, an early indication that the Soviet party leadership was divided.

At successive December and January sessions the Central Committee ousted Novotny from leadership. On January 5 the election of Alexander Dubcek as first secretary was announced. This happened after the liberal faction withdrew its first choice, Oldrich Cernik, who had been a leader of the effort to secure economic reforms. Cernik soon became Premier of the government.

Novotny's followers then attempted a military coup. The intrigue was organized by Miroslav Mamula, head of the Central Committee's security department, and General Jan Sejna, head of the Party organization in the Defense Ministry. Troops were mobilized to pressure the Central Committee, and General Sejna solicited support among the generals for a petition demanding that Novotny be retained. It was General Vaclav Prchlik who warned the new leadership about the plot and, logically enough, Dubcek appointed Prchlik to replace Mamula. General Sejna fled, seeking asylum in the United States. The Czech press quickly blossomed out with accounts of General Sejna's record of corruption, smuggling, profiteering, and an exceedingly varied sex life, as well as details about the attempted military plot.[18]

The people of Czechoslovakia were now enjoying their newspapers as never before. On television, too, newsworthy and dramatic

[15] *New York Times,* March 31, 1968.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*

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programs were broadcast; the heady wine of free speech and press created an atmosphere that only the older Czechs could remember to have ever experienced.

Correspondents used the word "euphoria" to describe the atmosphere created in the country as liberalization took place. David Caute in the June 21 issue of the London *New Statesman* reported how "an utterly conventional Communist lady told me that Novotny was to be awarded the Nobel Prize for medicine, having been the first surgeon to transplant the heart of a nation into the arsehole of the Soviet Union." Caute felt that this was mainly a middle-class revolution. But an ordinary worker was interviewed on Prague TV who said:

> Why is the Czech crown worth so little and foreign currency so much? Why are our prices so high and our wages so low? Why are the best goods our country produces sold only in the Tuzex stores for foreign currency and not for Czech crowns?

Slansky's widow made a dramatic appearance on Prague television and told the country how she couldn't even recover her husband's ashes. Also on the TV screen, Czechs saw a vivid program which contrasted the huge amount of newspaper space devoted to the Slansky trial in 1952 and the tiny, flat announcement of the "rehabilitation" of the trial victims in 1963. The impact of the revelations about the Communist terror cannot be overstated. There was a collective shudder in the land when the April issue of the Writers Union paper, *Literarni Listy* and the May issue of the *Reporter* carried installments of Dr. Evzen Loebl's memoirs of the Slansky trial of which he was a surviving victim.

Dr. Loebl had been an official of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1949 and a veteran and loyal Communist. He was arrested in January 1949; after the arrest of Slansky, Loebl was charged with belonging to that "antistate conspiratorial center." He was sentenced to prison and not released until May 1960.

The first and to me major fact, established by Loebl's memoirs, is that the Russian secret police inspired and directed the Slansky trial, the Czech prison system, the torture and the entire Nazi-type "justice" which was the rule in Communist countries. *Throughout the staging of the trial, Loebl wrote, everything had to be translated into Russian for the "teachers."*[19]

In Czech as in Russian, serving time in prison is "to sit." The one thing Dr. Loebl could never do in that interminable period before the trial was to sit. "I had to stand during the examinations, and I was not allowed to sit down in the cell." He was interrogated for 16 hours a day and had to stand 18 hours a day. He was "allowed" six hours of sleep, though *"every ten minutes the guard pounded on the door, and I had to jump to attention and report: 'Detainee* 1473 *reports: one detainee, everything in order.'"*[20] He was awakened 30 or 40 times each night and when the knocking on the door at ten-minute intervals didn't wake him, he was kicked awake by the guard. That worse things were happening all about him, Dr. Loebl writes, he knew from "the dead bodies being dragged outside" and the "cries of tortured men and women" that assailed his ears. Then he was drugged until he felt as though he were losing his mind. And throughout there was "the knowledge that I was the victim of my own party, for which I had lived and to which I had given all I possessed . . ."[21] All this appears under the heading "Why I confessed" and one recalls with shame and revulsion discussions in the thirties, of "Why did they confess?" The trial itself, Dr. Loebl describes as Kafkaish, or better still, like the "backstage in a small repertory theater."[22]

V

IN THE PROTESTS against the Novotny regime and then during the liberalizing process itself,

[19] Dr. Evzen Loebl, "Why I Confessed," in *East Europe*, July 1968.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*

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a program of democratic demands could be discerned. These included: a parliament with real power to legislate and, even more important, with opposition parties; trade unions that stand up for and defend workers' rights and interests; free speech, press, and assemblage; an end to censorship; independent courts based on law and not party control; the right of free scholarly inquiry. In economic matters the major demand was for a socialist structure combined with a free market as a regulator and aid to consumer needs; in nationality matters, the Slovaks wanted full equality. Overall, Czechoslovakia wanted independence from Soviet domination. The Dubcek leadership went along partway with this program; it carefully avoided any affront to the Soviet Union and affirmed its loyalty to both the Warsaw pact and Comecon.

While the ferment among students, artists, and intellectuals was an important factor behind the events of 1968, even more basic or pressing forces had to operate in order to motivate a majority of the party leadership to embark on a daring new course. *The underlying sources of the Czech events can be traced to economic failure in the only industrialized nation that has ever been taken down the Communist path.* Economic failure is endemic to Communism. This statement is made despite the general impression that Communism is backward only in respect to human freedom and that in economic matters it creates means for rapid industrialization and growth, often far swifter than in capitalist or mixed economies.

Perhaps a centrally directed and planned economy with nationalized industry can be highly successful. It never has been so far. Such an economy might succeed if it were given a democratic framework that encouraged innovation, promoted talent, provided proper success indicators, spurred research and development, and created incentives for efficient work and inventiveness. But that kind of framework has never been available for a centrally directed economy with nationalized industry. Totalitarian controls have effectively hampered the economy, in every country that has tried Communism even or especially in Russia, where real and often rapid industrial growth did take place.

The Soviet Union and all the other Communist countries have been compelled to devise facsimiles or substitutes for a market mechanism, for profits as success indicators, and material incentives for management and workers in order to overcome stagnation imposed by totalitarian economic controls.

Problems have piled up on top of problems in the Soviet economy; let us mention some of these accumulated disadvantages:

- the absence of a meaningful service sector of the economy;
- the lack of a modern highway system;
- a consumer goods sector inferior to that in the backward Western nations;
- absence of a modern automobile industry, with the Italians now invited to start them off on passenger car production;
- continuation of a housing shortage so acute that Khrushchev, just a few years ago, promised the Russians that under Communism in 1980 newlyweds would be able to get their own apartments;
- a continuing inability to apply ingenuity and innovation in those industries and services that provide amenities of life for working people;
- low productivity in agriculture with a far higher use of labor power in the agrarian sector than that in any modern nation of the world, and the chronic absence of fresh vegetables and fruits for a good part of the year;
- a continued lack of balance in the economy.

These are glaring examples of failure in the ambience of considerable progress in space, atomic science, military achievement, and a generally high level of industrial production that places the Soviet Union second in gross industrial production in the world.

But regardless of the successes and failures of Communist industrialization in other

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lands, Czechoslovakia was a special case. It had an advanced and modern economy before the Communists took over. Nor did progress halt after the takeover. In the fifties, for example, 10 and 11 per cent annual industrial growth and 7 or 8 per cent increase for national income were not uncommon. But in the sixties accumulated problems brought stagnation and decline to the economy, and the comments of the Czech economists are a helpful guide to why this happened.

Ota Sik, head of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences and Deputy Premier, played a key part in the economic reforms undertaken in 1965. His book, *Plan & Market Under Socialism*, is a remarkable exposition of how economic failure was impelling Czechoslovakia toward liberalization and reform.[28] The ideas of this book were first developed in 1957-58 when Czechoslovakia's command economy was still making progress but already exhibiting the lack of balance and built-in hindrance which brought on the stagnation of the sixties.

Sik pays tribute to Marx but hastens to explain that Marx couldn't foresee what would happen under socialism. He often reminds his readers that the man who influenced the course of the Czech economy was Stalin, not Marx. Sik says: "Methods of the 'cult' had deleterious effects" on the Czech economy. In a truly Marxian analysis, Sik shows how Stalinist economics became a brake on the development of Czechoslovakia. In 1962-63, he writes, "there was a general stagnation of economic activity." While Novotny was paying lip service to the working class as the "elite" of Czech society, "average nominal wages," Sik says, "declined in the 1960-64 period to a level that no longer provided sufficient wage-incentive for an increase in productivity of labor." Sik describes some of the problems:

- disproportionate growth of production investment in heavy industry;
- worn-out machinery still in use and little technical change-over to new machinery;
- an increase in the length of time for realizing capital investment;
- a constantly growing volume of construction started but not completed;
- an increase in the ineffective use of fixed assets and in unused plant capacity.

Sik points out that merely continuing to increase gross production in an industrialized country is far from sufficient. There had been rising output in Czechoslovakia, but without regard for modernization, and heedless of the threat of stagnation. "Year by year," Sik writes, "the technical development of our production lagged further behind the world technical development and did not use sufficiently the newest findings of science and research that had already been applied throughout the industrially advanced world."

A basic reason for the stagnation that overtook Czech industry, Sik finds, was an "excessive and ineffective expansion of plant and machinery." There was extensive, rather than intensive, development of the economy. In other words, rather than investing for technical innovation and in higher productivity, there was greater and greater investment in more raw materials and more labor, and these were not efficiently used. Extensive rather than intensive economic development brought the following results, according to Sik:

- high material inputs;
- ineffective use of plant and machinery;
- disproportionate growth of investment costs;
- slowing down of the growth of labor productivity;
- marked decline in the rate of growth of national income;
- a growing share of net investment in national income.

All of this, he notes, brought a greater rise of production costs than of social production

[28] Ota Sik, *Plan and Market Under Socialism* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Science Press, 1967). All quotes from Sik are from this English translation.

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and of the input-output ratio. Real wages declined in 1963, as already indicated, but this was even more pronounced for technicians, educators, scientists, and medical personnel. Their salaries were relatively lower than ever before and the leveling of incomes, Sik says, was hampering scientific and industrial development.

While industry faced these growing problems, "unrealistic plans for agriculture had not been carried out for years," Sik writes. We might add from another source that up to World War II industrialized Czechoslovakia was also practically self-sufficient in food; but after the Communist coup she relied to a greater extent on imports. For example, in 1966 she had to buy 1.3 million tons of wheat from Russia and 800,000 tons from Canada.[24]

Sik describes the growing discrepancy between market supplies and demand. Goods that were needed were often not produced and other goods that were produced were not needed. That kind of planlessness in a centrally planned economy brings to my mind a long queue I once encountered on the way to my flat in Moscow in 1952. My wife and I joined at the end and then we asked the person standing directly in front of us what the line was for. He said he didn't know nor did the two or three persons in front of him. We finally discovered, after fifteen minutes on the line, that we were queued up for a new calendar. Sik dryly describes the situation in Czechoslovakia, "unconvertible purchasing power, with people losing time . . . looking for various types of goods."

VI

CZECH FOREIGN TRADE resembled the domestic turnover because goods did not correspond to demands of the world market; domestic raw materials were not exploited and "our costs of production were higher than the world level," Sik stresses. That was achieved, it must be added, despite Czech wages, which were lower than those of any of the Western countries. Sik carefully avoids discussion of Soviet domination of Czechoslovak foreign trade. But Sik's comment is Marxist: "we had to export year by year more of our own labor." Again, without naming the Soviet Union, which controlled both the kind of foreign trade and its proportions, Sik argues that the Czech economy would have done much better exporting more consumer goods and importing new machinery. The latter has become an urgent requirement of the economy that was steadily falling behind the industrial nations of the West.

After the decline of production in 1963 there was an increase again in 1964. But Sik notes that there was 5 per cent less production per unit of industrial means of production than in 1963; there was an immense rise of material inputs but the national income was about the same in 1964 as the year before. Sik gives a Marxist critique of the anarchy of production under capitalism but cautions his countrymen that "even under socialism there are conflicts of people's interests, and hence in their attitudes as well." There are, he points out further, general economic laws for all economic systems, especially those involving growth, balance, and productivity. Then he drops a comment that is probably the most devastating criticism of the type of economics that Communists have persisted in calling "socialist." Sik says: "*Finally, social production must serve final consumption and its growth, and not 'production for production's sake.'* " Planning, yes, says Sik, but "development of production forces throughout society cannot be directly managed by a central governmental organization." The loneliness and powerlessness of the consumer in a Communist country is made amply plain by Sik as he argues for a market mechanism so that people as consumers will feel every decision they made on production. Sik uses a felicitous Marxist phrase when he discusses "socialist associated labor." Too many students of Marxism have accepted a non-Marxist and false definition of socialism, as simply nationalized industry. That the state can own in-

[24] Star, *op. cit.*

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dustry under fascism or even under slavery is often passed over. Sik, however much he pays tribute to the "socialism" of the Communist regimes, knows that socialism, in the Marxist sense at least, requires democracy, worker and consumer control and influence, and free, associated labor.

Sik describes the achievements as well as the failures of the economy. With all the disadvantages noted, the Czech people were not going hungry; per capita food consumption went up along with general industrial production. But there is an acute housing shortage, Sik adds, and there is little variety of vegetables and fruit; most families do not have refrigerators, and there are very few cars. The Czech economy faces further stagnation, he says, unless it adopts drastic reforms. He favors planned management, but when he actually describes it, it is surprisingly like a Federal Reserve Board, and the kind of direction that should come from the center, in his view, is from general knowledge and regulation of interest rates. The central planning institutions can have knowledge and "indirectly guide the development of the productive forces," but the specifics have to be "ascertained concretely in the enterprises."

Despite the utopia described in Lenin's *State and Revolution* and in Bukharin's and Preobrazhensky's *ABC of Communism,* Sik gently reminds his readers that even under communism it will still "be necessary for one group of people to give orders to another group." The need for market relations, to allow the laws of supply and demand to function, "arises from the conflicts of interest objectively caused by the development of productive forces," according to Sik. He would give enterprises investment credits which would be repaid by interest. There would be "free price movement" as against "prices by directive" and "market competition" as against monopoly.

At the close of his book, Sik reproves the Chinese "economists" and their American friends whom he names, Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, who have criticized "the ideas of socialist commodity relations" alleging that these "would finally lead to a revival of capitalism."[25] The Chinese and their comrades, Sweezy and Huberman, "preserve and re-enforce the ideological dogmas that arose in the Stalin era of Marxist thinking and do immense harm to the actual development of socialist economics," Sik says. It is not amiss to add that on an earlier occasion Huberman and Sweezy had proffered advice on economics to Castro when he was embarked on a Stalinist phase of economic management in Cuba. Huberman and Sweezy urged Castro to follow Stalin's precept of priority for investment in heavy industry—in Cuba! The consequences soon made their disastrous impact. Castro and Guevara built plants that turned out goods readily available at less than half the price and twice the quality abroad. The plants lacked raw materials to keep them running and they would have run the country into the Caribbean if Castro had continued to take the advice of his "advisers."

In a final appeal for rational economic development Sik reminds his readers that dogmatists prefer to offer people "moral stimuli" of the type that Stalin and Mao put forth. It is very easy, Sik says, "to pronounce political appeals, slogans, moral entreaties. . . . It is much more difficult to create the proper economic incentives . . . or to make complex economic analyses to seek the true reasons for certain negative economic activities . . ."

VII

THE CZECH CRISIS which impelled reform in 1968 was a crisis of both freedom and economics. It is difficult to say which had a greater direct influence on the course of events. But the economic problems must have had greater impact within the ranks of Communist leadership. Furthermore, the crisis of freedom and of economics is very much related. Just as the physical sciences are hampered without free inquiry, so too in econom-

[25] Sik refers to "Peaceful Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?" by Huberman and Sweezy, *Monthly Review,* March 1964.

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ics the exposition of conflicting views becomes an essential condition for arriving at meaningful theories and plans. *The economic failures of all the Communist regimes are inseparable from the destruction of freedom.*

As the liberalization process swept the land in 1968 the question asked everywhere, before August 20, was whether the Russians would intervene. In many ways this was an academic question even before the Soviet invasion. There were the convenient Warsaw pact maneuvers and the slow-motion "withdrawal" of Soviet troops. There was less and less secrecy about Soviet military threats *before* August 20. Thus, on May 6 *Le Monde* of Paris quoted Soviet General Alexei Yepishev as saying that the Soviet army was ready to "safeguard socialism" in Czechoslovakia. *Literarni Listy* of Prague acknowledged that General Yepishev had denied the report. The only trouble with that denial, the Czech paper said on May 30, was that it simultaneously received a letter from a Czech soldier who described an incident that occurred in his barracks on May 12. The Czech soldier wrote: "We were visited by Soviet army General Zhadov. Among other things he told the soldiers assembled there that they did not know the situation in their country fully." The Russian general warned the Czech soldiers about "negative forces . . . attempting to reverse our road to socialism." The General concluded, "that the good Communists in our country have no reason to be afraid because a simple call will suffice—the entire Soviet army as well as the armies of friendly nations will be ready."

The Czech soldier who wrote that letter was certainly no "good soldier Schweik." Nor was the comment of *Literarni Listy* composed in the manner of Schweik's speeches to the Austrian army officers of another war. "If the General does not know that our road to socialism will be decided by ourselves," the paper declared, "by our elected organs and not by 'the good Communists,' and still less by foreign military forces—then it is in the interest of our alliance with the Soviet Union to tell him so simply and firmly."[26]

For more than five centuries Czechs and Slovaks have striven to establish their own state. For 20 years, under Masaryk and Benes, and with a National Assembly that legislated for the country, they had their own state. Though the Dubcek leadership could not speak its mind on the paramount issue of independence from the Soviet Union, it is all too clear that this is the one that has to be resolved for the future of Czechoslovakia. Only for a very brief interval was the Czech press allowed to print some of the facts about the Soviet role in establishing and maintaining the terror under Gottwald and Novotny. In July, at Cierna it appeared to many observers that a compromise has been reached between the Russians and the Czechs on the question of a free press. But the road to Cierna should be revisited. Its consequences are already terrible to behold. What brought practically the entire Soviet Politburo to Cierna at the end of July?

Twenty years of Stalinism had not washed the real meaning of democracy out of the minds of the Czech people. It was a poll, again, as in 1948, which revealed the enormous gap between official policy and the opinions of the people. On June 27 *Rude Pravo,* the central newspaper of the Czechoslovak Communist party published the results of a poll it had taken among its readers. It showed that 90 *per cent of its nonparty readers favored the legalization of opposition parties.* And an absolute majority of the party members also supported the creation of a multiparty system.[27]

The popularity of Masaryk among the Czech people was an indication of the value they placed on national independence and parliamentary democracy. In May, when the Czech press was enjoying a freedom not exercised since before the war, Soviet attacks on Czech democratic values did not go unanswered. Thus, when the Soviet press car-

[26] *East Europe,* July 1968.
[27] *New York Times,* June 28, 1968.

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ried a scurrilous criticism of Masaryk a number of Czech papers quickly replied and rose to his defense. It was around this time, too, that the Slovak youth paper *Smena* published disclosures about the manner in which the Soviet party and secret police supervised the purges that followed the 1948 coup.

In July General Vaclav Prchlik, then the Czech party's chief spokesman in the army, suggested that the Warsaw pact would be strengthened if it were controlled jointly by all its members and not just by one. He proposed a rotation of command instead of always having a Soviet commander. He also suggested that a provision should be included in the treaty barring its use for applying political pressure. The strenuous efforts of the Dubcek leadership to avoid offense to the Soviets was indicated when General Prchlik was removed from his post for making these moderate suggestions.

Early in July a public statement, which became known as "The 2,000 Words" was issued by a group of 70 prominent Czech intellectuals, Olympic champions, and other public figures. The statement said:

> The greatest deception perpetrated by the rulers of Stalinist Czechoslovakia was that they presented their arbitrariness as the will of the workers. If we wanted to believe this deception we would now have to blame the workers for the decline of our economy, for the crimes against innocent people, for the introduction of censorshop which made it impossible for all this to be written about.

The statement went on to hail the democratic revival since the beginning of the year and it reminded their countrymen and also those abroad, that "It began in the Communist party." The statement called upon the people to apply pressure in localities to secure the resignation of all officials who abused their power in the past and who acted dishonestly and brutally. The means proposed to apply such pressure were quite unexceptional for any democratic country—resolutions, demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. For a Communist country it was impossible.

Pravda's reply to "The 2,000 Words" was to remind Czechoslovakia of what happened in Hungary in 1956. In Czechoslovakia the limits of the democratic revival were made clear when the party and government condemned the statement. But the condemnation was relatively mild; it admitted the good intentions of the signers and denied that democratization would be halted.

Successfully resisting the demands of the Soviet and four puppet parties to meet in conference on the internal policies of Czechslovakia, the Czech party agreed to a meeting with the Soviet party. That meeting held in the little railroad junction town of Cierna, near the border, was preceeded by a most extraordinary exchange between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, joined by four of its more pliant allies. The five parties—Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian—had met in Warsaw to discuss Czechoslovakia. Their letter to the Czechs, released on July 18, was surely one of the most important documents issued by a top Communist authority since the "21 Conditions" drawn up by Lenin in 1920 and adopted by the Communist International. Lenin's "21 Conditions" prescribed the kind of organization and program all Communist parties must have. Regardless of where the party might exist, it had to be pledged to violence, to eternal enmity to "bourgeois democracy," Social Democracy, and liberalism. The "21 Conditions" also made it incumbent on every Communist party, regardless of the situation in their respective lands, that they set up an illegal, underground organization pledged to violent overthrow of all existing social conditions; they also required establishment of illegal organizations within the armies of their own countries.

VIII

THE FIVE-PARTY LETTER to the Czechs is in direct line of succession to the "21 Conditions." The Yugoslav Communists saw it as

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a succession from another chapter of Communist history, more directly related to them. The Yugoslav Communist newspaper *Politika* published the five-party Warsaw letter under a headline that said, simply: "Cominform 1968."

As an exposition of current Soviet doctrine the Five-Party Letter contains a clear message. The letter describes the democratization of 1968 in Czechoslovakia as a threat which "jeopardizes the interests of the entire socialist system." These events are defined as the products of "hostile forces," pushing Czechoslovakia "from the road of socialism" and threatening to sever "Czechoslovakia from the socialist community." Bluntly the Soviets say: "This is something more than your cause."

The main burden of the Five-Party Letter is its insistence that changes will never be permitted in Communist countries if those changes come under a Soviet definition of a threat to Communism. And it doesn't matter, the letter explains, whether the threat is domestic or foreign.

In many ways the Five-Party Letter was an explosion of brutal frankness. Thus the Soviet Communists make it clear that they are little concerned with external or military threats to the Communist countries. The national security of the Soviet Union or of its allies has nothing to do with the issues raised during the entire Czech crisis, and this is underlined by the Five-Party Letter. "The frontiers of the socialist world have moved to the center of Europe, to the Elbe and the Sumava mountains," the letter says. And the Soviets will brook no "threat" to these regimes even if the "threat" originates within the country itself, "using ways peaceful and non-peaceful, making a gap from the inside or from the outside in the socialist system."

The Letter then makes a long list of the admittedly peaceful changes in Czechoslovakia and, the Soviet party says, "we shall never agree . . . being put to the threat":

- interpretations of Marxism-Leninism which the Soviet party doesn't accept;
- "hamstringing of the leading role of the Communist party . . .";
- weakening "democratic centralism" which includes, the letter pointedly explains, "transforming the party into . . . a debating club";
- adopting any stand "in opposition to the other socialist countries";
- allowing "political organizations and clubs . . . outside the framework of the National Front . . .";
- permitting Social Democrats to exist;
- allowing "revisionist forces" to lay hand "on the press, radio and television, making of them a rostrum for attacking the Communist party, disorienting the working class and all working folk";
- failure to suppress the "2,000 Words" and allowing its publication;
- permitting "party rank-and-file and leadership" to "second" the "2,000 Words";
- "voices are heard demanding a revision of our common coordinated policy as regards the Federal Republic of Germany. . . ."
- Ever on the prowl for quislings, the letter calls on "forces that exist in Czechoslovakia" and it defines them as "healthy forces," to struggle against "counterrevolution."

In a measured, conciliatory reply the Czech Communists rejected the major accusations of the Five-Party Letter. They denied "any realistic reasons permitting our present situation to be called counterrevolutionary . . ." They pledged fealty to Comecon and the Warsaw Treaty. Guardedly, they referred to "some doubts in the minds of our public" that "occurred only after the repeated changes of the time of departure of the allies' armies from the territory of Czechoslovakia at the end of the exercise." The Czechs declared there would be no return to Novotny or a Novotny-type regime.

The Soviet party had shown in the Five-Party Letter that it was concerned about two matters above all others: *first, preventing any Communist country from adopting, or even flirting with a multiparty system; and second, eliminating free press, speech, and assemblage whenever these dragons raise their heads*

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in any Communist country. Neither "American imperialism" nor "German revanchism" were the targets, only the "threat of democratic change and free expression under Communism.

The Czech Communists revealed the limits which they themselves had placed on democratization. Stoutly they defended the measure of freedom that had been attained, but they promised that there would be no multiparty system or legal political opposition. The Dubcek leadership said in its reply to the Five-Party Letter: "The National Front is now discussing the proposal for its statute which is a binding form of organization insuring the socialist political orientation of all parties and organizations." On the other hand they also proclaimed "the abolition of censorship in our country and the enactment of freedom of expression and of the press."

The fraternal embraces at Cierna became the convenient backdrop for the speedy, secret, and "successful" preparation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Considerable attention has been paid to the support the Czechs have received from foreign Communists. One count shows that only two-and-a-half parties, outside of Eastern Europe, supported the Russians. These were the CP of Chile; the CP of the U.S.A.; the half party is that portion of the Greek CP which has its headquarters in East Germany. The actions of the Soviet Union had placed the Communist parties abroad in a completely untenable position. The Five-Party-Letter and the invasion of Czechoslovakia proclaimed the doctrine of the irreversibility of history under Communism. Once a country goes Communist, no matter by what means—conquest, election, revolution or putsch—the Soviets have said there can be no turning away. To assure that, no Communist country can permit opposition parties or civil liberties. There can be none of the freedoms that the French Communist party, for example, has been promising for years they would uphold in France. The Russians have told them in just so many words, nonsense, we won't permit it—if it's within the grasp of our armed force. The support for Czechoslovakia and the criticism of the Soviet invasion by the governments of Yugoslavia and Rumania may be indications of a revived—this time a Communist—"little entente." It is an indication of how difficult it is for the Soviet Union, with all its military might, to impose its will on Eastern Europe.

What the Russians really fear was indicated by the appearance of an essay—made public in July—entitled "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," by the noted Soviet physicist, Andrei D. Sakharov. The prominence of the author, the closely reasoned defense of intellectual freedom, and the strong plea for all other intellectuals and citizens to join the discussion, apparently sent tremors through the Soviet land. Sakharov named the foremost tyrannies of our time, those which threaten civilization itself—Stalin's, Hitler's, and Mao Tse-tung's. In his discussion of economics, of peaceful coexistence and especially of civil and intellectual liberty Sakharov paralleled a good deal of the ferment in Czechoslovakia. He saw the role that the Czech events played at this juncture of man's march to freedom and wrote:

> Today the key to a progressive restructuring of the system of government in the interests of mankind lies in intellectual freedom. This has been understood, in particular, by the Czechoslovaks and there can be no doubt that we should support their bold initiative, which is so valuable for the future of socialism and all mankind.

We too owe the Czechs our support. But how difficult was it for our country to support Czechoslovakia since we had so tarnished and undermined our position in world affairs by military intervention in another little country, Vietnam. The issues raised by the outrageous Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia are worldwide. More than half a millenium has gone by since Jan Hus proclaimed that "Truth will Prevail." Hopefully, time moves faster in the last third of the 20th century.

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A Voice from India

Asoka Mehta, the socialist leader of India, resigned this past September from Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet, in protest against its failure to take a strong stand of protest against the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia. Below are a few excerpts from his speech before the Indian parliament:

It was said that 10 days shook the world in 1917 and two days shook the world in 1968. In these two days, the people of Czechoslovakia have shown that, given the unity, they are able to assert their will to a great extent. If they have not succeeded fully, it is because we have failed them; it is the peoples of the world who have been somewhat mute in their support to the people of Czechoslovakia. We salute them for their solidarity, strength, determination and the dedication that they have shown. It is our failure. Let us accept that at this critical hour, when people, not with arms but with their bare bodies, with their hearts and minds, were trying to oppose aggression and tyranny, we did not stand up for them. . . .

For me, it is a matter of deep sorrow and abiding regret that our Parliament is the only Parliament in the world that has gone on record saying that there has been no violation of the United Nations Charter. . . .

May I next invite your attention to what the President of the National Assembly has said:

> Czechoslovak party and Government leaders today worked against time to find a communist party leadership acceptable both to Czechoslovakia and Moscow and to restore order throughout the country.

They have to find a leadership acceptable to someone outside their country! That is what that country is being called upon to do. It is being called upon to give up a part of its liberalization program. What is the crime that Czechoslovakia has committed? It has given freedom of the press and freedom of expression. This the Soviet Union calls counterrevolutionary. In this House, we are functioning in a multiparty Parliament. In this country, there is full freedom of speech and full freedom of the press. If this is counterrevolution, I have no doubt that every single democrat in this House would be proud to be called a counterrevolutionary.

If revolution is to smother the free voice of Czechoslovakia, I say, fie upon that revolution. If counterrevolution is to let the people speak out and express their legitimate right, that counterrevolution is something which the Indian people have cherished. Therefore, let no attempt be made to deceive people by using these words. This House stands fully, firmly and squarely, behind the rights for which the Czechoslovak people are fighting.

God forbid, that our country should ever face this kind of situation. But if it ever does, I hope and trust that our people and Parliament would behave in the manner in which the Czechoslovak Parliament and people have done. This is the only tribute I can pay to Czechoslovakia. If ever such a situation comes, we shall emulate that illustrious example.

Why did the Russians do it? Mr. Ota Sik, one of the Deputy Prime Ministers of Czechoslovakia, was asked by the world-famous Italian novelist Alberto Moravia, what he thought was the motive of the invasion. This is what the Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia had to say:

> Certain groups in power felt threatened by the happenings in Czechoslovakia. If our attempt had succeeded, for them it would have been the end. Hence the reaction. It was a reaction not against a definite change, but against any sign of life or movement. It was the pure and simple defense of the political status quo. . . .

There are many writers here. I also claim to be a humble writer. The occupation forces in Czechoslovakia have recently destroyed, razed to the ground, the Writers' Building because of their wrath against writers. As a humble writer, I would like to convey to the writers in Czechoslovakia that they can raze the structure, but they cannot destroy the spirit. . . .

May I, therefore, appear to the House, to both sides of the House, that the Government, Parliament, and the people must, in unequivocal terms, continue to support the people of Czechoslovakia because it is only then that they can be free. . . .

—from *Janata* (Bombay), Sept. 8, 1968

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Deborah Meier

Learning Not to Learn

Everybody in the family is okay except my brother. He bothers me. And when he runs into trouble of getting a whipping he really kills me. By hitting me real hard. And curses at me.

DANIEL WAS REPEATING first grade in a run-down Chicago school — big, dingy, half-lit rooms and old-fashioned screw-down desks. I was the fourth teacher he had had that fall, and before the year was over he would have many more. According to the school records he couldn't read or write and lacked "verbal ability." Yet how could one explain the above composition? During the reading of the primer available to that class (and 20 of these basal readers were the only books in that particular room of about 35 children) he would, it is true, stare blankly at every other word as though he had never before encountered it.

Daniel was a student in my first all-Negro class. He produced this story in the first week of my month's stay as his teacher. It was the beginning of an experience that was disturbing, fascinating, and revealing for me, for the same incongruities appeared over and over and over again—in schools with good physical conditions and up-to-date materials as well as in openly demoralized and uncared-for schools.

What was unexpected was the kind of written work that the children handed in. On one hand, I had rarely seen such uniform and neat handwriting. Eddie, for example, handed in an essay consisting of partial phrases copied at random from the blackboard:

Family

What you like to do
Plans for the weekend
How you sister uncle
Brother see the ball

From top to bottom his paper was "flawless" —perfect spacing, neat lettering, good margins and no erasures or cross-outs. But also no communication!

On the other hand, I was struck time after time in my years of teaching by the honest perception and apt phraseology of the many "Daniels" in our ghetto schools. It would be misleading to imply that it was the "norm"—but the number of such papers seemed out of proportion to what I would expect to find even in upper-middle-class white schools (and more fluent than my own children usually produced at the same age). Yet such papers were never commented on by the teachers I met or the educators I had come across in my teacher training. Nor, in searching through rooms that I taught in for one- and two-day stands in Chicago's South Side ghetto school district did I see evidence that other teachers obtained such superior written material. Could I be mistaken? Was I reading things into this work because of my own feelings for the children? I was reassured, however, by the reaction of friends to the stories and poems I showed them and by eventually encountering other teachers with drawers full of similar "evidence."

I knew that these outpourings could not be explained merely as the result of inspired teaching. The following essays, for example, were obtained in an average second-grade class which I taught for only two days.

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To help them "get going" I had put four "key" words on the board: *fight, child, night,* and *star.* But what I wanted, I stressed, was their own story, with or without these words. Neither spelling nor grammar counted, I assured them: "Tell me a story!" Gwendolyn produced the following:

in The night time The stars are bright.
when I look out The window I saw a fight
who do you think was fighting
it was a child
I did call my mother to stop The fight.
when I went to school the next day
I saw another fight
I went to get The teacher but she
could not come to stop The fight.
The teacher had to work. She had
no time for children so I stop The
fight and the fight was over. The
End.

With the same list of "key" words seven-year-old Norburke wrote:

My dady brought me some toys last night
He went back out for more and had a fight.
Then he saw a star going by.
He saw a child runing to.
He tried to call the childs Mother.
But who will he call.
so he saw a poilecman and tole
him to take The child home
but at first the child oh most
cryed but when The poilecman said
that he was going to take the child
home the child did not cry.
But when the child got home the
child went sleep.
Whil the star was passing by.
Then Dady went back out to get
me some more toys for me and I
will play with them on christmas day.

The End

Emile wrote this short but effective version:

In the night I saw a child
looking at a Star
the Star was very far away
from the little girl
way far from her and the
first time She looked at it
she was very happy
and then I was happy too.

Cynthia, considered the slowest child in the room, retold instead, in her own words, a story once read to the class. (I have edited her very frequent letter reversals—*ilrg* for *girl, seh* for *she.*)

Ones ther was a girl who had a dog
his name were black
he ran away one day
she was said and star to cry
he mother came to her and say
I seen your dog
he is in the homes.
Oh black Black, she said
I like you so
do not run away a gend
she cry happy

On the verge of a highly literate language, struggling as all seven- and eight-year-olds do, with spelling, punctuation, grammar, and the sheer mechanics of handwriting, most of these second graders could tell an effective story and communicate a live experience. Still most were labeled "slow learners," a category the vast majority of black children fall into. This particular second-grade group told me that while they were not "the dummies," they weren't the "good" class either.

In later years when I worked as a regular teacher with pre-school and kindergarten children, who did not have to cope with technical problems of spelling and handwriting and with whom I developed a year-round relationship, the dictated stories I obtained were equally if not more impressive. There were some paralyzed and withdrawn children who had suffered damage that no normal school setting could undo. But few teachers or experts in the field seem aware of the resources of language, ideas, and concepts that even the withdrawn children possess.

A quiet four-year-old living with grandparents, the child of an unwed working mother, asked me to write this for his Father's Day card:

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My grandfather is good.
Because he's a generous father
because his kids love him.
That's why he's a generous father.

Walter, age four, frequently absent from school—the eldest of five children living in three crowded rooms with an aunt and a violent, often unemployed father—dictated to me:

I said to mother, "Rebecca, can I go to school?"
She said, "no." She say no more. I cried.
Stevie no cry. Not Stevie. He go.
I can't go. Cause I aint got no clean clothes.
I'm no good. I stink.
Everybody stink.

On another occasion, Walter came and asked me to write down this variation on a familiar child's complaint:

I'm afraid in the dark the bogey ghost going to take
me out and throw me out the window.
He's in the closet. He's in there now.
He looks like my daddy.
He throw me out the window cause some one wearing his clothes.
I told my mother, "going to get a gun and shoot that bogey ghost in the head."
He's gone now. He's in the hospital now.
He going to say there. He gone. Not in the house.
He gone, gone gone now. I shot him in the head.
I'm not scared in the dark anymore.
I be superman and hit the dark in the head and I run away.
I'll bust that bogey ghost.
"Bogey ghost, I'll bust your head."

This "inarticulate" deprived child ended his very verbal tale with a grand flourish, smiling victoriously.

Passive, withdrawn Regina, just five years old, a compulsively neat and "unresponsive" five-year-old, tells articulately of her place in the family order:

My mother sometimes gets mad at the little kids,
my sisters. Because they throws things out windows.
She says, "Stop! Stop throwing things out.
You just do that, right now!"
Then they jump jump on the bed. They act bad.
When I tell them to act right they act bad again.
My mother likes them. But she sometimes whips them.
She never whips me. She never gets mad at me.
Cause I never fight and never act bad.

THE IMPORTANCE of these stories (which are by no means exceptions but in fact run-of-the-mill examples) goes beyond their literary quality or their psychological suggestiveness. The single fact of their existence forced me to reevaluate certain theories which I had always taken for granted and which form the basis of most current approaches to Negro lower-class children and their educational problems. Were these, after all, the same children who, as we are told in popular magazines and journals of education, are nonverbal and lacking in adequate vocabularies, are defective in speech patterns and unable to speak in complete sentences, unable to relate an event in sequence and in need of structured drill in listening and noticing? Are these the children whom Shelley Umans, Ph. D. of Teachers College and Title II director for the New York Board of Education, is referring to when she says that reading is "based on oral language, and disadvantaged youngsters never learn the art of listening"? To the contrary, these youngsters expressed a precocious insight into what they saw and particularly what they heard.

Yet I knew that my surprising kindergarteners would soon be labeled retarded, slow learners, unteachables. Their skill would soon be manifested in school only by their unusual success in tormenting each other and the authorities. Why is it that they would soon appear so dumb, so maddeningly dumb, so completely incapable of handling the simplest school curricula?

What has been most appalling in my ex-

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perience of big-city schools is not a Dickensian 19th-century cruelty (which does exist in places) but the pervasiveness of a daily low-key atmosphere of tension, anxiety, and fear even in schools and classes with decent, unbiased and intelligent teachers (and even in schools with large proportions of white children). The teachers are not monsters, and for sheer fortitude and dedication in the usual sense many are indeed impressive. Yet in ways I had not expected, the schools and teachers were more inadequate than I had dreamed, and the contrast between the potentialities that lower-class Negro children enter school with and their failure by the time they reach high school is staggering.

After the first six formative years of life, Negro and white children are only about a half year apart according to the usual testing devices. After three years of contact with our "common cultural heritage" and exposure to middle-class norms *in* the schools, the gap grows to one year. After six years it is more than two, and so on. The comparison between white and Negro *boys* is even more appalling. Negro boys become "literate" in the literal and traditional sense, but no more. They know the mechanics of how to read, but that crucial reading explosion which middle-class children undergo during early adolesence never occurs for them.

This increasing gap shows up even in IQ scores. While the scores of New York City's white children increased between the first and sixth grade, where they leveled off, Negro children's scores went steadily down after first grade. (The white poor, incidentally, show scoring patterns similar to those of the black poor.)

It is evident from all this that most of these children first come to school sufficiently fit to receive a decent education, highly experienced in the ways of their world, and able to articulate their experiences. They may be slightly behind in specific areas, but they have for their ages competent perceptual ability, skills, and linguistic know-how. They probably have a disproportionately high rate of emotional and ego problems. But even the most "stable" children are dropping way behind their middle-class white counterparts, some of whom are quite disturbed themselves. Not all emotional problems, after all, need to be so completely transformed into learning blocks, and not all stability is conducive to learning.

This is not to deny that some of the Negro children's present psychological and environmental problems would not always be a handicap to developing their fullest intellectual powers. So long as the reasons for psychological problems remain, so long as their environment is difficult and exhausting, some handicaps will exist. What we need to ask is whether the school reinforces children's angers and self-hatred or alleviates them? Does the school require the child to use his limited energies to protect his ego from further assault, or does it leave him relatively free to use those energies creatively?

The children of lower-class homes are also no doubt handicapped by the intellectual shortcomings of their families—the lack of books and intellectual discussion at home, the absence of parents who could help with homework or explain the mysteries of science or literature. Perhaps the most serious intellectual shortcoming with which Negro children enter school is their failure to verbalize curiosity. They do not ply adults with incessant "whys." They do not expect answers. They do not assume that life does or should make sense. In contrast, middle-class, favored children often have an exaggerated notion of the extent to which the adults in their lives have all the answers and ultimately can control and make sense out of everything. Their disillusionment is guaranteed, but the extent to which they presume adult omnipotence and omniscience is educationally motivating. It means that they assume that there is a way of finding all things out.

It would seem obvious that the ghetto school should then go out of its way to welcome questions and to see that answers are

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given. It should try harder than the average school to see that the small puzzling aspects of a child's environment are explored and explained. Within the four walls of the school surely we should never give children reason to fear being curious or admitting confusion.

HOW CAN WE EXPLAIN the fact that we create just the school environment that most exaggerates both the psychological and intellectual handicaps of lower-class children? Do we want to fail? Unlike some recent critics (whose views I often share), such as Herbert Kohl and Jonathan Kozol, I doubt whether a conscious or unconscious desire for failure explains why so many teachers are inadequate, nor do I believe that racial or class bias, sadism, or laziness are the only factors present. The evidence is considerable that, although I prefer their kind of failure, even teachers who are gentle, kind, and pro-black fail. From the very earliest introduction into the school system our traditional approach to education creates for lower-class children in general, and blacks in particular, an alienation so severe as to make the school and teacher a relatively useless educational instrument.

The child of Harlem comes to Kindergarten or Headstart with special fears that go beyond the usual separation anxieties. He knows first of all that his parents are afraid of the school, a fear they may express by timidity or belligerance. The discomfort of his mother or father will visibly increase as the teacher or school clerk scolds them for ineptness in following directions, inadequacy in providing the proper equipment, etc. If his parents are made uneasy and afraid, how can the child feel safe?

Even physically the middle-class child perceives things differently. The environment of the classroom is familiar to him. The teacher speaks in a familiar way and she understands his way of talking, even if he still talks baby talk. She is not puzzled by his habits or patterns of living and her value system coincides rather closely with that of his own family. He knows as a result what he dare say in school and what should be withheld, knows it unconsciously since the rules of the game are those he has already adapted himself to.

When the lower-class child (and this holds true, more or less, for white or Negro) has difficulty understanding his teacher, he is generally led to believe that this is his fault. The teacher has difficulty understanding him—and she may even consciously avoid trying to understand him since she sees her task as altering his speech pattern, not adjusting to it. (And often she mistakes the immaturity of a four- or five-year-old's speech for some special ghetto language problem!) Her values and those of his family are often quite different, if not in violent collision, and so are the manners by which these values are expressed. Even if the teacher understands the child's view of life, she sees her first and foremost task in presenting him with a different and superior view.

One of the sophisticated long-range tasks of a good education is, of course, to introduce children to alternative approaches to life. But this long-range task is hardly made easier if the child feels, at the outset, that his teacher hopes to erase as much as possible of the memories, associations, and skills with which he comes to her. The teacher sees the play corner and the doll house not as centers of fantasy where a child can explore and reexamine his own experiences; but as places to practice his newly acquired proper habits. Thus she seeks to have him set the table properly, say "please" and "thank you," match place mats with forks and knives, learn proper phone manners, or appropriate ways to greet visitors. She may do this skillfully and introduce such "improvements" in a playful and imaginative way, thus believing that she avoids "imposing" upon a child's fantasies or explorations, or avoids implying censure toward his parents or their manners. But in fact, she is both imposing and censuring. For the play corner was intended to serve a child's

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exploration of *his* life. Such an exploration, an imitation of what the child sees and hears, is a prerequisite for later objective examination. Thus the teacher warns him, by her impositions, that there is danger in letting slip a spontaneous expression. She is reminding him, even if gently, that this is not the place to deal with the meaning of what he actually sees or hears. If he does she will be embarrassed, confused, indignant, horrified, tell him he is "wrong" or "not nice," or perhaps pretend not to hear him at all. Of course, let us not forget, that very often she may also pinch him, shove him, or humiliate him to cover her own frustration or disgust.

No matter which way she does it, the child does not lose sight of the fact that his own world is despised by his teacher as a wrong model, a bad model, or at the very least, an irrelevant one.

The openly strict, no-nonsense teacher at least provides some easy-to-follow guidelines. She requires certain rote learning; she demands very defined classroom standards of behavior; she gives credit and blame evenly. By watching her movements for clues, by handling routines in standardized ways, and by knowing when it is safe to withdraw, a child can survive many years in such classrooms. He may not learn much, but he will not go to pieces either. The reforming, motherly type, anxious to like and be liked, poses greater dangers, especially to the very young child whom she most likely wants to teach. She entices. The child is eager for her attention, praise, and affection. He tries to remold himself. The "answers" she wants from him—whether they be in the area of numbers, colors, health habits, or personal data—rarely make sense nor are they always consistent with his own view of reality. The more he wants or needs her approval, the more he finds this distressing and seeks some way of adapting himself. He begins to look for the answers in her face, becomes more sensitive to her moods, and gives up any attempt to understand either her logic or his own. The easiest way to gain approval, if he can accomplish it, is to please her in areas of manners, style, and neatness. To avoid pain he learns to charm her, to con her with special techniques and looks, to manipulate her own desire to be liked.

In Kindergarten and to some degree in first grade, the minimal learning of rote rules, the dependence on superficial manners and neatness of lettering, and the ability to charm, may produce considerable success for some children. But as the child grows older and more is expected of him in terms of real school skills, this avenue provides fewer and fewer rewards. Most children soon put an end to the whole game, label themselves or the system "stupid," and drop out in one form or another.

The reforming early-childhood teacher protests. She says that "her children" really like her and learn "for" her. But years of experience as just such a teacher convinces me that children are remarkably skillful at playing our game. They hug, flatter, enthuse, and praise. But all the time they are dreading that day when we will ask that "innocent" question to test their academic ability. How they wish we would lay off that stuff. At the first sniff of a question they take on that glazed look so common in ghetto children that many teachers and observers assume to be brain damage of widespread proportions. What that glazed look says is, "Leave me alone. Don't meddle. Don't judge me where it counts. There is only so much I can deal with in this school."

The teacher repeats her question and they turn her off, they give any arbitrary and stupid answer that comes into their head, without concern for its sense or meaning. "I knew it was wrong all along, so who cares what the teacher says about it." Or they ponder, weigh, rethink, clench their fists, bite their lips, until the teacher capitulates and supplies the answer or calls on another. They watch her face for clues, or withdraw into a complete fantasy world. None of these techniques are

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unique to ghetto schools, and the best description I ever read of them is John Holt's account of middle-class private schools. Yet in few places outside of lower-class schools will one find these techniques so refined and so universal as to replace all other kinds of learning. Nowhere else does a child depend less on his own "common sense," his own generalizations about life than in the ghetto classroom.

EDDIE WHO COPIED random words from the blackboard under the guise of doing an assignment on "My Family" may or may not be stupid. He had, after all, figured out some things his teacher cared about and complied on the level of handwriting, neat margins, and accurate copying. The teacher's criticism could only be leveled at the meaninglessness of his story. This could cause him no pain, however, because there had never been any intention to produce meaning. But suppose he had tried to? Suppose he had permitted the teacher to share something of his own life, his own perceptions?

"Now Stanley, over there," said a highly respected teacher to me as she figured out aloud which child I should tutor "stand up, Stanley. Thank you, dear. He's a sweet boy. He just cannot learn to read. He's bright enough, but can you blame him? His home life is impossible. Impossible. Look at how his mother dresses him. Stanley, did your mother pack you a lunch today? She's drunk, you know, half the time and there's a different father, if you know what I mean, every week." Stanley, an exceptionally alert, six-year-old, explained to me during later tutoring sessions, "My mother will teach me to read, you don't have to. I don't need to learn the alphabet, my mother will buy me one soon." When I foolishly explained this to his teacher, she gently turned to him and said, "Stanley, your poor mother won't help you. She can't read herself. You know, Mrs. Meier, she's illiterate."

I had a boy named Gary in my Kindergarten one year who never seemed to understand anything I asked him. He would nod "dumbly" if I asked, "do you have two brothers?" or "Do you have ten brothers?" He decided whether the answer should be "yes" or "no" by looking at my face or at the expression on the faces of the other children. Yet when he did not realize I was observing him, something in the style of his play, in his relationship with other children, in the vitality of his eyes made me suspect him of greater intelligence. I took him with me to the Museum of Science and Industry along with my four-year-old son. In this unsupervised, non-school environment he manipulated the instruments and figured out the gadgets with speed and accuracy, far outshining my own child. He never did talk to me; his communication remained almost monosyllabic. (His mother insisted that he was terribly chatty at home.) But his fear and self-doubt when confronted by the representatives of the outer world—a world with which his mother had minimal contact—paralyzed him.

Gary's case was extreme. But there are many borderline children whom we push into becoming Garys. For example, a booklet publicizing Headstart pointed to the "shocking" fact that poor city children do not know where milk comes from, because they typically answered: the store, a bottle, mother, the ice box. The acceptable answer is supposed to be: "cow." But when I asked a bright middle-class child where milk comes from, she told me, "the mailman brings it." Her mother was not alarmed; she knew that her daughter was not culturally deprived or stupid—she had simply confused the milkman and mailman! In fact, the child had accurately perceived a certain similarity.

In telling children no more insensitive than this child that their responses to life are constantly wrong, or at least irrelevant, when in fact the relevance and accuracy are often merely overlooked by the teacher, we do them a serious disservice. Instead of helping the child connect his own perceptions to a

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broader reality, and this broader reality to schooling, the teacher is continuously severing all these vital intellectual connections to reality, connections that are crucial to generalization, abstraction, inventiveness, and creativity. And the lower-class child does not have parents who know how to undo the school's damage in this area.

Our continuous attempt to undermine a child's confidence in the utility of his own judgments and perceptions is most dramatically illustrated in the first reading material with which he is confronted. Much has been written on the "Dick and Jane" syndrome. Yet despite these many exposés, the latest rash of reading readiness material is even more sterile! The class and racial bias is less critical than the exclusion of honesty. Why is the word "like" all right but not "love" or "hate"? Why does no one hug or kiss, hit or fight? What makes us so afraid to talk of the truly powerful human situations? How can children who feel threatened by the anger and passion around them feel secure among people who are so fearful that they dare not even deal with life symbolically? How can reading, symbolic expression, be useful to children if they are told that their own lives are not proper material, that they are too terrible ever to put down on paper?

To suggest that school should permit and encourage an honest response to life, literature, science, etc., as a prerequisite to a student's coming to understand and investigate it more thoroughly, seems elementary. But if one spends much time observing normal classrooms and class room materials, it is clear that, in fact, this would be a radical departure. In our relations with children in school we display our greatest hypocrisy, demanding from children behavior we do not expect of ourselves or other adults. We demand that they pay attention and be observant at all times, and we then censure most of their observations. As a result children rarely expect that they will or should understand what we teach them. We reinforce constantly by our own words and deeds a feeling that this whole educational enterprise is some vast test of their endurability. Intelligence is only a weapon to use against others or to escape punishments. School, the one place where verbal and symbolic observations and explorations should be *most* appropriate, is probably the institution in which they are, in fact, most taboo!

Even if the teacher avoids open hostilities, or half-disguised antagonisms, she needs to recognize that her world, however enticing she might make it, cannot be "offered" as though a moral choice of value systems was involved. The child may be deprived of experiences we wish all children could have. But *ersatz* experiences are not a substitute. Our starting point must be the child's own life. The teacher cannot substitute her "good world" for his, however much he might want to choose it. For when the teacher abandons him, as she must, he cannot follow her into that world of hers. He is left with his own. She cannot replace his mother—however inadequate his own might be. The child is obliged, out of his need for protection and security and out of family loyalty, to resist any entrapment that might immobilize him in dealing with his own environment.

SOME CHILDREN RESIST entirely the enticements offered by very kind and sensitive teachers. Some immediately retaliate with nasty words and insults. Others appear to go along only to betray their trusting teacher later by acts of theft or violence, acts which finally succeed in getting her to turn against them (as they knew she must). Such disillusioned teachers then conclude that "being nice is a mistake." In all cases the children's resistance takes the form of withdrawing the best and most important intellectual potentialities they possess from school and teacher.

If loyalty to their own kind and safety from sudden humiliations requires failing in school, then, in a sense, many children actually do "choose" failure. In some cases they

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lose access to their intellectual potentialities entirely, and a deep apathy pervades all their mental life. For others, fortunately, this apathy is only a mask worn at school.

I suspect that even our more successful lower-class students are handicapped in competing with middle-class children because of the mental strait-jacket in which they have learned to function. In succumbing to the school they have often been obliged to cut themselves off from their own world and their own experience and thus, since they cannot actually replace it with another, they dangerously limit their intellectual base. In assuming such tight control over their spontaneity they also reduce the insights they can stumble upon, and many become particularly pedantic or superficial students.

Many such children have merely substituted an imitation of middle-class style for learning. In stressing social manners and confusing them with academic content, we often in effect denigrate the substantive stuff of education. We create the impression that what distinguishes the educated from the uneducated is a matter of style—speech patterns, social know-how, the use of certain lingo, good handwriting, proper spelling, letter-writing forms, etc. Some succeed at copying this style only to be disappointed when they later discover that being "mistaken" for an educated person is insufficient. Since most do not have any idea how they have failed, they often attribute their defeat not to an actual educational deficit but to naked racial bias (of which there is plenty). Others turn angrily on the teachers who failed to perform the Pygmalion magic. And, increasingly, in the black "soul" rhetoric they turn the tables and contend that if it is only a matter of style, why shouldn't their style be equally valid? And if academic requirements are just certificates of competence in the white man's ways, then why shouldn't the black man control his own schools and issue his own documents? The black power militants may overstate their case, but as teachers we have rarely demonstrated the respect for learning that might disabuse our students or their parents of such anti-intellectual notions.

TO ENABLE CHILDREN to go through the long course of learning required by contemporary society we have got to be able to call upon what Jerome Bruner calls "the natural energies that sustain spontaneous learning." The force behind such energy lies at least in part in the desire to make sense of and control life. The existence of vital life problems can be an asset to such an intellectual effort. But it requires an environment in which teachers do not constantly demand that children defend their existence and ignore their own perceptions. Few schools are so explicitly organized to do this as are our lower-class schools. And few lower-class schools are as destructively hostile to students as the all-black urban lower-class school. Not—as it is the fashion to claim these days—because it is "too middle-class" but because unlike good middle-class education (whether at home or at school) it does not respect children's learning drives and experiential backgrounds.

If we intend to create a one-class educational system in America we must begin to look at not only what we are failing to teach children, but what the school, albeit often unintentionally, *is* teaching them. For what too many children who can least afford it are learning every day in our schools is a set of habits and defenses that rule out what we claim to seek.

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Richard Robbins

The U.S. as a Model

THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE, by J.-J. Servan-Schreiber. New York: Atheneum. 320 pp. $6.95.

JEAN-JACQUES SERVAN-SCHREIBER belongs to that small but influential group on the democratic Left in France which regards technological innovation as a key to a more progressive social order in Europe. These men pride themselves on their pragmatism, their lack of dogma in developing flexible combinations of public and private initiative under the spacious tent of democratic planning. They are drawn to the American rather than the Soviet model, although they remain aware of our racism and problems of poverty and urban blight. At the same time, with no illusions about the Soviet regime, they continue to evaluate both the achievement and deficiencies of Soviet centralized economic planning.

The administrators, teachers, *polytechniciens,* and social scientists who comprise this coalition are bound together not by a rigid program or complex organization but by a point of view. In the postwar era they considered themselves French *and* European. At home they wanted to shake their country loose from narrow nationalism, encrusted protectionism, bureaucratic stagnation. Equally, they wanted France to relinquish the "dream" of holding on to a colonial empire in the face of an irresistible counter-nationalism in Africa and Asia. They are a kind of new class.

The American Challenge presents effectively their point of view. When it appeared in France in 1967 as *Le Défi Américain,* the critical and financial response was dramatic. A phenomenal half million copies were sold in France within a few months. Now the American edition, in a spare, clear translation by Ronald Steel, is enjoying a similar reception. Arthur Schlesinger is moved to remark in his foreword that if Europeans can implement M. Servan-Schreiber's thesis—the necessity to adapt the organizational skill of the modern American corporation to the sluggish European social order—his book "may do for European unity very much what Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* did for American independence." A large claim, not altogether justified.

Insofar as Servan-Schreiber concentrates on what must be done by Europeans to revitalize economic planning, reshape educational preparation for careers, and restructure investment and productivity within a truly European economic community (the Common Market is only a beachhead), he is sensible and sound. However, insofar as he argues that the American corporation and its managerial elite provide the best yardstick for assessing the European effort, he seems excessively restrictive. In order to dramatize the *American* challenge he has, I think, underestimated European capacity for economic growth and social innovation. By the same token, he has also overestimated the value of the modern corporation as the essential catalytic of change in the era of the postindustrial society and the organizational revolution.

The core of M. Servan-Schreiber's argument is that the European economic community is in deep trouble ("a state of collapse"). And he states familiar reasons: archaic business practices, a static labor force, an unadventurous approach to investment and growth, unwillingness to revamp outmoded educational systems, resistance to creating a truly integrated common market; above all, a failure to invest, if that is the word, in human resources so as to provide maximum social mobility and a new elite, a meritocracy of drive and talent.

In the absence of all this in Europe, enter the Americans; or rather, enter the largest American corporations, already favorably

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placed for growth and advanced research by virtue of generous support from the federal government and close cooperation with the scientific community. It is a selective invasion on the part of the giants; as Robert Heilbroner has observed, *The American Challenge* is not about Macy's taking over Grandes Galeries.

WITH STATISTICS and quiet eloquence M. Servan-Schreiber outlines the situation. American investment in Europe now comes to about $14 billion in capital, in fixed assets. But money is only the point of departure. The great frontiers for investment are the highly advanced, technologically complex industries, such as electronics, the strategic centers for the "second industrial revolution." Here the American impact is remarkable. For example, American corporations now control 80 per cent of computer production in Europe, 95 per cent of the market in integrated circuits. Europe benefits, of course, as the results of American technological innovation are applied, and in the short run she shares in the general progress. In the long run, however, Europe is left unprepared for the coming great age, Daniel Bell's "post-industrial society." If present trends continue, she will become a dependency.

To avert this static future a European country could expel IBM or General Motors—but they would only go elsewhere, playing off one country against another. A country might nationalize an American corporation—but that would not work either, since the powerful support and financing from Washington, to say nothing of the great effort in research and development (R & D), cannot be conveniently had at the same time. And without flexible governmental planning and extensive corporation research, postindustrial industrialism loses its dynamism. (It is estimated that by 1970 the Americans will devote about 4.6 per cent of their national product to R & D as against a European 2.5 per cent.)

How, then, should the American challenge be effectively contained so that the role of American corporate investment can be reduced while its beneficial results are retained in the European community? The first point, according to M. Servan-Schreiber, is to understand the secret of the American success. And over and above the technical factors I have previously mentioned, the basic secret is no secret. The Americans have worked out "a close association between business, university, and the government [which] has never been perfected nor successful in any European country."

Thus the European problem is not simply to try to raise factory production and reduce inter-European tariffs; it is nothing less than "to transform the whole system: business, intellectual talent, education, research." This will not require the elimination of cultural diversity in Europe; M. Servan-Schreiber is properly scornful of those who think an integrated European effort means a German police chief in Paris. But it will require a new transnational political initiative for which the present leadership, Left and Right, seems utterly unprepared.

That Europe commands the intelligence and resources to produce such dramatic change, no one can doubt. When it comes to inventions Europeans are usually first; the gap arises because the Americans have learned how to organize and manage inventions in a superior way.

The American Challenge ends on this prophetic note:

> The American expeditionary corps will leave Vietnam where there is nothing more to gain and everything to lose. But American industry will not leave Europe . . . Even if we were not faced with such a challenge by the Americans, we ought to find in ourselves the power and the desire to build a more intelligent and bountiful post-industrial society.

Agreed. Europeans should indeed "build a more intelligent and bountiful" system. But in my judgment they will never do so if they succumb to the idea that the most effective route to social improvement lies in developing, in spirit and letter, an exact replica of the American technological-corporate order. In the first place, Western Europe is not doing as badly as Servan-Schreiber implies. If it lags behind America in terms of absolute growth, it is without question continuing to improve its standard of living and productivity relative to its own past.

Moreover, if we take as a measure something Americans love to talk about pridefully, the quality of consumer goods, the Europeans —and the Japanese—seem to have little difficulty in competing. The most recent data in-

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dicate that import sales of automobiles are now reaching an annual one million; in the nation, one in ten (in California, one in five) of every car sold is European or Japanese. It may be argued that the explanation is simply lower labor costs abroad, which means lower prices. Yet Detroit's insensitivity to consumer needs, its scornful reaction to "the little cars you wind up," until forced to produce its own, its preoccupation with vast and wasteful advertising budgets, its commitment to "planned obsolescence"—all this hardly suggests the model of dazzling innovation and responsible planning set before us in *The American Challenge.*

More important, if Servan-Schreiber's central thesis—the ingenuity of American corporate management, together with our dedication to education, research, and mobility—is to hold up, then he must demonstrate the dynamic quality of our institutions here at home as well as abroad. It is simply not sufficient to show American business performing with such derring-do in Paris and Brussels without raising some fundamental questions about its role in New York and Chicago. And here, unfortunately, *The American Challenge* is virtually silent. That should certainly give us pause. For if the new industrial state, as Galbraith calls it, is at best performing poorly in meeting its social responsibilities here in the United States, then its export to Europe could be, at best, a mixed blessing. And its striking conquest-by-computer of the European economy could be less a matter of the American "secret" than simply a combination of European weakness and American corporate strength based not on "the spirit of dynamism" but on the fortuitous association of the technological giants with military contracts and the defense establishment. (I am aware of M. Servan-Schreiber's rebuttal; nearly all of American investment in Europe is self-generated from European resources. But the cushion for this strategic advantage comes, in the first instance, from the military-industrial complex here at home.)

TO ADVANCE THIS CRITICISM of *The American Challenge* is to be forced to describe how and why the American corporate structure is "performing poorly" where it could, if it would, perform superbly in building "a more intelligent and bountiful post-industrial society" here in the United States. Such an analysis is indeed being forged, I believe, by Michael Harrington, Robert Theobald, Bayard Rustin, and many others whose pragmatic radicalism is not so distant, after all, from the outlook of Pierre Mendès-France, Gaston Defferre, and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Here it suffices by example to show how Servan-Schreiber has left the vital issue untouched.

- He is enormously impressed by the proportion of our young people in college compared to Europe and by our much higher percentage of sons of workers and farmers who reach college. But there is not a word on the great debate in this country over the quality and value of our experiment in higher education.
- Schreiber's quintessential representative of the "new men" of the postindustrial era is Robert McNamara; an entire chapter consists of a McNamara speech verbatim. Yet not a word on the fact that the former Secretary of Defense could not recognize until too late and at terrible human cost that the bombing of North Vietnam was bound to fail.
- The only comment on the Negro and the racial dilemma is an interesting one—our federal structure prevents decisive action when crisis breaks out in Mississippi. Not a word, however, on the failure of leading corporations and some major unions to promote equality of employment opportunity for Negroes, thereby wasting lives and money on the grand scale.

There is ample tribute to the organizational skill of the oil, automobile, and electronic companies abroad. Not a word on Big Steel, whose failure to incorporate new, European-invented technical processes is a national scandal, and whose usual answer to challenge is: raise prices. Not a word on the drug industry whose R & D ratio is in fact *low,* whose "discoveries"

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are mostly and tardily borrowed (i.e. the disgraceful story of penicillin), and whose interests demand a powerful effort to combat effective federal regulation.

My illustrations are by no means atypical. It would be unfair to fault M. Servan-Schreiber for lack of detailed knowledge of our economic and social system were it not for the fact that he himself has chosen the American model for export to Europe as a solution of *its crisis.*

Most thinking Europeans recognize that for all its defects the United States remains a democratic society, however fragile and imperfect. They know that our problem is not to overturn our remarkable technology—we could not even if we wanted to—but to harness the new industrial state to a radically different set of social priorities. They know that a common use of the word "planning" and a common investment in the wonders of aerospace technology does not make American and Soviet society identical.

The great virtue of *The American Challenge,* as directed to European readers, is to underline for them again that American technology and organization is not as such dangerous and oppressive, but potentially liberating if they will make their own fundamental changes in their own European social order. Perhaps the half-million copies the book has sold (so far) will dispose finally of the fairy tale of the rigidly doctrinaire wing of the Left in France: the lovely but impractical maiden, *La Belle France,* who loves to read and to talk about life with her old friend, Descartes, in her garden, "crushed by technology,"[1] applied by the two wicked and identical giants on either side of the garden, Sov. Union and Yew S. America. And Europe can certainly benefit from a *selective* application of American-style, ideas, about resources, technology, organization, and the stimuli of upward mobility and education. But an overenthusiastic response to what is indeed valuable in *The American Challenge* runs the risk of replacing Fairy Tale with Magic Key.

[1] The language is Simone de Beauvoir's: "In every country in the world, socialist or capitalist, man is crushed by technology, alienated from his work, enslaved and brutalized." *Les Belles Images* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).

George Eckstein

Look into the Abyss

NATIVE REALM: A SEARCH FOR SELF-DEFINITION, by Czeslaw Milosz. New York: Doubleday. 300 pp. $5.95.

CZESLAW MILOSZ belongs to the small group of contemporary writers who have "looked into the abyss" and survived the experience, scarred but without having lost their integrity as writers and human beings. His book *The Captive Mind* established him some 15 years ago as an articulate and sensitive analyst of this searing experience.

Milosz was born in Poland, country at the crossroads of East and West European culture and buffer between two big and—during the critical years of his life—totalitarian powers. He grew up in a part of Poland that was annexed from Lithuania, and he combined a heritage of Lithuanian peasant stock with that of small Polish gentry. Like many of his contemporaries in the newly independent Poland between the two world wars, the young Milosz, a Catholic, was attracted to the Left.

In his twenties he spent some time in Paris, then the Mecca of stifled East European students. There he saw much of Oscar Milosz, a distant cousin and expatriate of an older generation, who had become a French poet, well respected in a small circle of connoisseurs.

A budding poet himself, Milosz worked for the Polish state radio until the outbreak of World War II. When Poland was overrun and defeated, he found himself in the Russian zone of occupation. But he returned, at great risk, to German-occupied Warsaw, to work there as a writer and publisher in the "underground state" that developed in occupied Poland complete with a political spectrum from Right to Left.

Though an independent leftist, he served the Polish Communist regime from 1946 to 1951 as cultural attaché in Washington and Paris. His defection in 1951, at the height of the Stalinist persecutions, was brought about by a final, recognition that "Socialist Realism," the cultural strong arm of the totalitarian state,

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was to the writer and artist more than the imposition of a style; it was a command to lie, and therefore the destruction of his integrity and creativity. After his defection, Milosz spent 10 years in Paris; then he came to the United States. He now is a professor of Slavic literature at Berkeley.

In this new book, fittingly subtitled *A Search for Self-Definition,* Milosz traces the formation of his personality and the shaping of his mind, through the years of his geographic and spiritual wanderings, to his break with the Communist regime and his exile at the age of 40. As an autobiography this is a very unstylish, impersonal one. The historical background, the social and intellectual context at all times overshadow the personal. And much of what Milosz says here he has told in slightly different form in *The Captive Mind* and in his novel *The Seizure of Power.* Still, this "voyage into his own, yet not only his own, past" is worth our attention precisely because the central problems of our time have "occupied" Milosz more directly than most of us.

The complexities of Catholic doctrine as much as Hegelian dialectics produced in him early that "intoxication with the bitterness of dualism" that runs like a thread through his writing. This intoxication attracts him to his various spiritual mentors: cousin Oscar Milosz in Paris, viewing the doom of a Victorian West; later, the philosopher-poet Boleslaw Micinski; and, in the underground, another bitter philosopher nicknamed "Tiger."

Working for the underground, Milosz realized that "when everything is outside the law, nothing is outside it" and that the "danger [of illegal publishing] was no greater than walking down the street." The immensity of events then and later "calls for dryness" in the telling, and he tries to rid himself of the romantic sentimentality prevalent in the Polish character. On his hazardous journey, at the start of his underground activity, from the Russian-occupied zone through German territory to Warsaw, he stays curiously detached, almost as if in suspension. The war years of underground work in Warsaw liberated his thought and his poetry. He felt a new "purity in the air . . . Now even the most personal poem translated a human situation."

THE FATE OF HIS FRIENDS, under the Nazi and the Soviet terror, does not cease to haunt him. Told very quietly, this is the story of a European generation, complicated in Poland by the exposure to the two behemoths, and by the ambiguous attitude of Poles toward the Jews, in and out of the Ghetto. Toward the end of the war, his Socratic mentor "Tiger," not unlike Brecht or Sartre, allied himself with "the right camp of the future"—fully and sarcastically aware that this camp would have little use for subtle minds, but with a kind of masochistic urge to submit to "historic necessity." To "deify the force that crushes us" becomes a perverted form of saving one's dignity.

News of the fate of his friends, stories of torture, death, and corruption, did not end with the war. Such stories acquired added poignancy later when they reached Milosz at his desk in the Polish Embassy in the Washington of the late forties. They made him feel foolish at his tasks and outraged by his surroundings. An absurdity, the pile of paper work covering a letter smuggled out of a Siberian labor camp; an outrage, Manhattan unscathed in 1946 "as if nothing had happened"; an outrage, too, the lying and feigning of his colleagues at the Embassy.

Milosz writes of his visions of death and apocalypse: a killed friend's "short, fat fingers clawing at the moss in a death spasm." Like Alexander Herzen a hundred years earlier in Paris, he sees the West "dying," envisions "time with civilizations trickling through the hourglass." For him, America lacked a sense of history, or what is the same—a sense of the tragic. He felt attracted by the exceptions: Robert Lowell, T. S. Eliot, Faulkner, Henry Miller, and Dwight Macdonald's *Politics.*

The intellectual air here seemed to him free after the oppressive atmosphere in satellite Europe. And through the lakes and forests of Maine he recaptured the Lithuanian landscape of his youth.

During his last years as an official of Communist Poland it became more and more difficult to smooth over with dialectics the inner conflicts between Milosz the writer and Milosz the official of a Stalinist satellite. He asked counsel of Albert Einstein who advised against exile. Milosz returned to Poland—only to feel like a fool for his misplaced loyalty, and to

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find his moral scruples dissolved after a direct confrontation with the Stalinist nightmare. With the help of old friends in the Party he managed another assignment to Paris; once there, he made his break in good conscience.

Yet he keenly felt the distance between East European and Western Leftists:

> We Easterners . . . had to gaze into the hells of the century. . . . Time . . . exploded the barriers between the individual and the social, between style and institution, between aesthetics and politics. . . . There are no boundaries to the knowledge of what is human . . . we are always pupils in an introductory class. . . .

To the poet in Milosz the "Spirit of History" appears with a "face large as ten moons, a chain of freshly cut heads around his neck." The search for self-definition ends on this note of tragic knowledge and somber hope.

Neil Compton

Assenting Academy

THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION, by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman. New York: Doubleday. 580 pp. $10.

IF BOOKS about the university continue to appear at the present rate, we may have to establish one of those new interdisciplinary fields that many of their authors favor—*academiology*: the study of higher education and its pedagogical, philosophical, social, and cultural implications. There are plenty of classic and semi-classic texts, from Plato to Paul Goodman, and staggering quantities of information and opinion about the contemporary scene. Already, the bibliography of Berkeley and its troubles is big enough to be mined for Ph.D. theses; and the continuing stories of Columbia and Paris will undoubtedly inspire comparable collections of narratives, interpretations, and polemics.

It is not the fault of Jencks and Riesman that the title of their book may lead readers to expect an account of campus apocalypse in the 1960's. *The Academic Revolution* must have been already in the press when the eruptions at San Francisco State demonstrated that there was to be nothing unique about what happened at Berkeley. Nevertheless, they are almost as unlucky in their timing as their hero Clark Kerr, whose excessively complacent (but unjustly maligned) *The Uses of the University* appeared at just the right moment to serve as anathema to a generation of academic radicals. This book may suffer a similar fate, unless the present mood of student rebelliousness subsides as suddenly and mysteriously as it arose. While this would be a pity, because it is in many ways a valuable work, it would not be wholly unfair. *The Academic Revolution* demonstrates that members of establishments—even (especially?) if they are sociologists—are unlikely to be very rigorous judges of the institutions which grant them such status. The authors display a formidable range of first- and second-hand knowledge about their subject, and they know how to make sense of much of it, but many an untenured assistant professor could have warned them that they were not quite telling it like it is.

The revolution described in this book is a process which is bringing the one-time religious, ethnic, geographical, and intellectual heterogeneity of American higher education into conformity with the standards of a relatively homogeneous national, meritocratic, upper-middle-class culture—by nature "cosmopolitan, moderately universalistic, somewhat legalistic, concerned with equity and fair play, aspiring to neutrality between regions, religions and ethnic groups." Though a variety of national institutions exist to support and express this life-style, the great graduate-school universities and the undergraduate "university colleges" which send their best students on to them have been assigned a crucial task—the preliminary sorting out and certification of those destined to rise or fall in status within the system.

Whoever controls these institutions is thus in a position to dominate most of the routes to high status and affluence. The authors suggest that over the past few decades the power structure within the universities has shifted along lines similar to what has been happening in the great business corporations. Formal power continues to be vested in boards of trustees, but real power is exercised by the academic equivalent of middle management, the tenured faculty. (I am not altogether happy about this

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analogy, but let it pass.) Competition among universities for highly qualified staff has tended to liberate scholars from dependence upon boards, students, or the local community: as professionals, organized on a national scale in the great scholarly associations, they insist on the right to judge one another according to their own criteria, and to control admission to their profession through the Ph.D. system. When prospective colleagues are assessed, aberrant religious, sexual or political behavior or opinions of a kind which once provided occasions for many a campus drama (in both fact and fiction) are now hardly noticed. Appointment committees concentrate on scholarly production and national professional reputation.

Teaching—particularly at the undergraduate level—remains an obstinately local activity and contributes little to professional status. Consequently, graduate programs ignore the teaching function, and ambitious academics take care to spend as little time in the classroom as possible. Students are rated according to the same system as their mentors: their instructors eschew any concern for their moral or psychological welfare, and judge them solely on the basis of their performance in a specialist discipline. Those who show no promise as potential graduate students are, at best, tolerated but ignored; or, at worst, dismissed as "not college material."

The upshot of all this is that the institutions of American higher education are, to an ever increasing extent, mobilized as part of an immense national hierarchy, ranging from the richest and most prestigious graduate schools at the top to an undefinable jumble of Negro, sectarian, and community colleges at the bottom. Universities whose students were once geographically and ethnically homogeneous but intellectually diverse, now find themselves becoming geographically and ethnically diverse but intellectually more homogeneous, as institutions recruit freshmen from all over the continent and gradually settle into a recognized sector of the meritocratic scale. High schools that hope to place their graduates at good universities have to adjust their curricula to meet these national expectations. Thus, the entire educational system of the United States is being geared to serve the rather specialized interests of a comparatively small academic elite who enjoy this power because of their usefulness to the military-industrial complex of the national establishment.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN would be astonished to return to life and discover that the grandsons of the lowly academics he described in *The Higher Learning in America* have acquired such extraordinary power over the fate of their fellow Americans; he would not be surprised to learn that this power is often exercised arrogantly and selfishly. Jencks and Veblen's biographer Riesman are well aware that the values of the academic revolution are in many ways irrelevant to the real needs of both students and society. They devote a good deal of space to sensible, if inadequate, proposals for reform. However, they are inhibited by their fundamental skepticism and conservatism from contemplating any really radical alternatives. Their characteristic response to the more glaring anomalies of contemporary academic life is to lapse into a Gibbonian (or, perhaps, Veblenesque) irony.

Whatever their reservations about some aspects of the revolution, the authors believe that only a handful of elite colleges (such as Bennington, Antioch, or Monteith) can afford to ignore or oppose it and hope to remain academically significant. Much of the book is devoted to the history and problems of institutions which have either chosen or been forced to remain islands of particularism amidst the universalistic mainstream: colleges for women, Negroes, Roman Catholics, or Protestant sectarians. A gloomy future is predicted for all of them, but especially for the black colleges. The only hopeless chapter in a book that errs on the side of optimism describes the self-perpetuating cycle of weak students and poor teachers that condemns all but a half dozen Negro institutions to be no more than "ill-financed, ill-staffed caricatures of white higher education." The authors have ideas that would enable weak Negro or Catholic colleges to solve some of their problems, but fundamentally they believe that "all American institutions must be on the make if they are not to stagnate," and the way to make it is to join the academic revolution. Thus, like the poor in the affluent society, these schools seem doomed to ever-

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increasing inferiority in relation to the test of the academic community.

The unsentimental (but not unsympathetic) realism that enables Jencks and Riesman to describe and interpret not only the splendors but also these miseries of American higher education can only be admired. They were surely right to adopt a normative approach and avoid the kind of pious rhetoric that made (say) much of Theodore Roszak's recent symposium on *The Dissenting Academy* so irritating to read. Nevertheless, a reader like myself, who belongs to a less brilliant but also less inhumanly strenuous and stratified academic tradition (that of Canada), cannot help thinking that there is something very neurotic about the values tacitly accepted in this book. Why are American academics and intellectuals—so dedicated in theory to the liberal virtues of fraternity, cooperation, and polymorphous pleasure—in practice so obsessed with production, competition, and "success"? What is the dirty little secret that leads not only Norman Podhoretz but also apparently Christopher Jencks and the author of *The Lonely Crowd* (of all people) to believe that "making it" is an ambition likely to foster healthy academic and intellectual rivalry?

Jencks and Riesman might retort that to describe is not to approve; they might support their claim to detachment by pointing to dozens of sardonic asides throughout the book. However, they would probably not deny that they think the present state of affairs is about as good as one can expect in an imperfect world. They have little patience with and apparently less interest in the radical critique of current academic values associated with the new student rebels and their older sympathizers.

The authors devote a chapter to "The War between the Generations," in which they show that they understand everything about undergraduate discontent except what makes it important in 1968. It would be hard to fault their account of the forces that have alienated senior faculty from the great mass of students, or their analysis of the way in which the combination of increased precocity with prolonged and enforced dependency encourages the young to create their own make-believe world based on the denial of adult values. However, my middle-aged satisfaction about the ease with which the infuriating moralism of youth has thus been put down is tempered by an uneasy consciousness that students have no monopoly on illusion or self-deception. The radical-youth style is repellent in its arrogance, its ignorance of history (and of much else), its paranoiac distrust of institutions, and its unkempt shagginess. How irritating, therefore, that the young have so often insisted upon being right when most of us were quite resigned to being wrong!

Never has this been more true than during the past three or four years, in which time radical students have taken a lead in exposing secret bacteriological warfare research institutes, CIA corruption of political science departments, the criminal idiocy of Operation Camelot, and many less spectacular examples of academic wickedness or chicanery. These were all perpetrated by universities or scholars "on the make"—which makes it all the more odd that Jencks and Riesman have almost nothing to say about the increasingly close relationship between the academic world and the politico-military-industrial establishment, surely a phenomenon worth at least a chapter in so encyclopedic a survey. Veblen would not have left that out!

In *Constraint and Variety in American Education,* David Riesman advocated a kind of cultural Keynesianism, a pedagogic technique in which the creative educator will deliberately oppose the dominant and accepted trends of his culture by practicing countercyclical teaching. The time seems ripe for countercyclical measures against the values of the academic revolution. Such tendencies are already apparent: the revulsion of many a moderately gifted scholar from the mindless productivity now considered essential for advancement, the bitterness of junior faculty scrambling for tenure, the increasing unwillingness or inability of many brilliant undergraduates to make the kind of professional commitment the system demands, the "free universities" (about which the authors write with considerable disdain). From the top of the academic chain of being, these may not seem to be very significant stirrings, but more contemptible proletariats than this have tumbled empires in the past.

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LETTERS

On Socialism and the Jews

Editor:

George Lichtheim is to be commended for bringing to the attention of your readers certain aspects of the problem of socialism *and* anti-Semitism ("Socialism and the Jews," DISSENT, July—August 1968). The more so since he poses the problem of a permanent stain which has flecked the banner of international socialism from its very beginnings. Here is the way he puts it: "That a particular form of socialist anti-Semitism arose in 19th-century Europe may have been due to transitory factors which are no longer operative. On the other hand, it may also reflect a problem permanent enough to warrant some consideration." Yet, for all his effort, his "remarks," as he calls them, fall largely into the category of the literature of apologetics on the subject. For what is unique about the "problem" is not that "European socialism in general, and French socialism in particular [finally] shed its anti-Semitic aspects," but that the socialist movement, all of it, "in every land," according to Professor Edmund Silberner who is the most distinguished of Lichtheim's authorities, was rooted in a Jew-hatred so profound as to have left its mark indelibly on its thoughts and actions.

Now all varieties of socialism sucked from the common teat provided by the utopian anti-Semites in France (Fourier and Company), which nourished the racial theories of Dühring and the "scientific" anti-Semitism of Marx and Engels. Lichtheim is of course correct in pointing to Saint-Simon and Fourier as the originators of the socialist doctrine. He is somewhat remiss, however, in not pointing out that the very word "socialism" was coined by the notorious Pierre Leroux whom Lichtheim reincarnates into a "Christian socialist." It was he who wrote these deadly words into his manifesto of Jew-hatred: "It is quite evident, is it not, my friends, that when we speak of Jews we mean the Jewish spirit, the spirit of profit, of lucre, the spirit of commerce, of speculation, in a word, the banker's spirit." Here we may as well agree with Sartre that all anti-Semitism leads to the death of the Jews.

Leroux's anti-Semitism and that of the Saint-Simonians who held identical views with regard to the "Jewish spirit," ultimately served to supply Marx with a similar contempt for that "spirit," and yet there are those who find all kinds of excuses for Marx writing what he did—and it was not some "private jokes about Lassalle," or some "public sneers about Jewish finanicers," as Lichtheim suggests. It was full-bodied and full-throated, and the gutturals came out in such gutter terms as "kike," and "sheeny," and "nigger," especially when referring to that "Jewish nigger," Lassalle. Nor was all this venom directed against "Jewish financiers," but against the poorest of the poor Jews in Poland whom Marx and Engels characterized as "the filthiest of all races." Yes, "the filthiest of all races," they called them, and not in some private jest either. Heine, who knew Marx better than all of us, once said, "Marx saw in the Jew only the dog with dog's thoughts, and not the man with human feelings."

But to get back to Fourier. I think Lichtheim does your readers a disservice by suggesting that the discoverer of the "passions of the human soul" was intent on attacking capitalists in general, and since Jews, in large part, were engaged in trade, they were singled out almost as if by accident, like the looting of a shopkeeper's store in Harlem which so often happens to belong to a member of the "tribe of reptiles," as Plekhanov called them. On the contrary. Fourier was intent on showing that the Jewish businessman was Judas Iscariot incarnate, and that throughout the ages he has had only one impulse, one desire, and that was to bankrupt honest, God-fearing, French merchants. This story of Judas Iscariot, with its lunatic economics and socialist Jew-hatred, so attracted Frederick Engels that he had it translated into German from which it was translated into Russian by the early Bolsheviks in the "glorious" days of the October Revolution. It appeared there in 1922 in *Under the Banner of Marxism,* the great socialist journal of culture and light. Which only proves that nothing anyone writes ever really goes to waste, since ideas do have consequences—for good or bad.

Actually, what is most disquieting about the Lichtheim piece is that it gives the impression that early French socialist anti-Semitism was ephemeral and did not embrace too large a movement. Yet the one source he did not consult, at least it does not show up in his eye-disturbing numerals directing the reader to the back of the essay, is Zosa Szajkowski's extensive researches on the subject. Having concluded his voluminous findings, Szajkowski adds the following troublesome postscript:

> In quoting only the antisemitic pronouncements of the French socialists, the writer may be suspected of having ignored the pro-Jewish statements. In order to allay any such suspicion, the writer wishes to say explicitly that his efforts to find sympathetic references to the Jews in the French socialist literature, from Saint-Simon to the date of Drumont's first appearance, have been futile.

How sad, indeed. Not one kind word for the Jews in all the literature of early French socialism and it was from there, I repeat, the doctrine spread aound the world. So that when Lichtheim mentions Bakunin, pointing out *his* revilement of the Jews, and pointing to the *Narodnaya Volya* which demanded that Czar, Jew, and noble be attacked, he again misses the point which may be embodied in the query: Why did Jewish boys

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"leave the *heder*," as the historians report, to join the movement of the People's Will to hand out leaflets calling on the peasants to kill Jews—along with the Czar and the nobles? That, too, is part of the problem and is perhaps one of the most serious aspects of it. Why did Jews—so many of them—flock to the banner of their revilement? Now anyone can find reasons for race hatred, but reason has a thousand reasons for being unreasonable.

The facts are that the socialist movement—utopian and scientific—was rooted in a common tradition of Jew-hatred which explains the *seeming* distortions of the doctrine when practiced in Soviet Russia. Certainly, when Lichtheim chides the Russians for refining some of the more gruesome passages in the works of the masters (Marx and Engels), he must be aware that all good socialists did likewise before the Bolsheviks came on the scene. For instance, an early American socialist translation of *Ludwig Feuerbach*, by Engels with Marx's "Theses" appended, eliminated the nasty words "dirty Jewish" from the first Thesis. But Marx meant "dirty Jewish," and he said "dirty Jewish," much the way a southern redneck says "dirty nigger," period. All the rest is exegesis. Yet the question persists: Why have so many Jews flocked to this stained secular banner when all—I repeat *all*—the leaders of all the varieties of collectivism whether you call it socialism, communism, anarchism, syndicalism, Fabianism, Menshevism, bolshevism, international socialism, or National Socialism have called for the elimination of the Jews or of Judaism or the Jewish spirit. The solid underlying factor in the equation still remains why Jews, having been rejected by socialism, want to have any truck with it at all?

Now the reason why early socialism which Marx and Engels borrowed from the French "Utopians" and their later "scientific socialism" which they borrowed from Proudhon was knee-deep in the mire of anti-Semitism requires little equivocation to explain it. In each instance the Jew was identified with the class enemy. And all the teachings of all the varieties of socialism require an assault on the class enemy, the capitalist, and he is always identified in the sacred literature of socialism, until well into the twentieth century, as the Jew, as Judas Iscariot, the thieving, lying, bankrupting, international Jew whom Fourier ("I find him most attractive," wrote Engels to Marx) fixed upon the movement. And any current effort to explain Soviet anti-Semitism as an aberration from the original doctrine is sheer nonsense. Any Soviet bureaucrat with only a smattering of reading in the international socialist literature can easily find refuge in the Masters.

Of course, some of Mr. Lichtheim's observations are cogent enough—so far as they go. But they do not go far enough in explaining the depths of anguish which the Jews felt when they found that the best men of the Enlightenment, men like Voltaire and Diderot and d'Holbach in France and Fichte in Germany, had marked them for contempt, although it can be said for Voltaire the he counseled against "burning the Jews." Being a close student of the Bible, he had read in Ecclesiastes that there is a time and place for everything. And that was not *yet* the time for burning. It would take the works of dedicated Communards like Duchesne (he edited *The Commune*), seminal socialists like Toussenel (he influenced Marx), and socialist senators like Edmund Picard (in Belgium) to come up with the Jew as Moloch, a theme they couldn't get enough of, until that parvenu of a socialist arrived in Berlin from Vienna and started lighting up the faggots for the final destruction of the Jews and the final solution of the Jewish problem. For it must be understood that all socialism from its inchoate beginnings has had this problem on its agenda.

Much much more can be written about the problem of socialist anti-Semitism, but limitations of space, I am afraid, will not permit it at this time.

MAX GELTMAN

GEORGE LICHTHEIM *Replies:*

I hope to be able at a later stage to expand my essay into a short book. I shall then take occasion to deal in passing with some standard misconceptions on the subject, including those that Mr. Max Geltman reproduces on the basis of what he has found (or thinks he has found) in Silberner. In the meantime I have a few suggestions for him:

a) that he should read Tsuzuki's biography of Eleanor Marx, if he wants to get the hang of this particular subject, instead of relying (as he seems to be doing) on the grotesque rubbish about Marx produced by Mr. Robert Payne;

b) he should read Silberner's essay on Lassalle if he wants to find out what "Jewish anti-Semitism" and self-hatred among that generation of Jewish intellectuals was *really* like;

c) he should ask someone to translate for his benefit Moses Hess's remarks on the "Moloch" character Jehovah (in his early writings; see Silberner's biography of Hess, p. 130). He will then discover that Marx's notorious utterances (which no sensible person today is going to defend) were only a pale reflex of what he had learned from Hess. Of course, the Orthodox and the Zionists have forgiven Hess, the repentant sinner, but that is no reason why the truth about these matters should continue to be buried in learned works and academic periodicals, while the general public is fed the sort of stuff about socialist anti-Semitism that conservatives delight in reproducing for their own purposes when it suits them.

Incidentally, Silberner is not by any means alone in regarding Leroux as a "Christian socialist": that is exactly what he was, and to treat his (for his

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time) very conventional utterances about the Jewish "spirit of lucre" as being in any way unusual or "deadly" just shows a lamentable incomprehension of the whole tone of French Catholic culture.

Odd as it may seem to Mr. Geltman, Leroux's spiritual descendants included Péguy, who fought for Dreyfus, and those French Christian Democrats who helped Jews at considerable risk to themselves during the German Occupation. All very paradoxical, but that is what the real world (as distinct from the private demonology of the ideologist) is really like.

The Morality of Research

Editor:

Joseph Bensman's article ("Who Writes What in the Bureaucratic University?" DISSENT, July–August 1968) can best be described as *kitsch* criticism, on three counts: it purports to be something it isn't; it draws a unified picture of something that in fact is very complex; and it uses a familiar theme that is meant to appeal to the public.

Mr. Bensman provides us with a picture of *the* researcher, especially *the* principal investigator of research (every one of them?) attached to universities (all of them?) as a con man, who "knows where the money is," "knows how to lay his hands on grants," and is a "capable and sometimes supersalesman." He has subordinates do the work for him, but he is "expected" to make it appear "as if he did the work." "Protocol requires that he be sole or principal author of the final report. This is so even though *the* principal investigator has not written a line or is incapable of writing a line." Since recognition must be somewhat distributed, "this problem is resolved by power, by statesmanship, by bargaining, and by occupational mobility." "*The* principal investigator who is destined to be the conventional author serves as a mediator between technicians and professional writers. . ." And "The conventional author . . . can eliminate recommendations or evidence" (the implication being that he indeed does) and "is expected to censor copy." (Italics mine.)

But is all research based on these crooked practices? In the natural sciences? In the social sciences? Although Mr. Bensman does not tell us and takes care of all research in one big sweep (and of all universities at the same time), I assume that his ire is directed primarily at his colleagues in the social sciences. I submit that he engages here in monumental distortions.

Like all distortions, and all *kitsch*, this diatribe takes off from something real. Social science research has only recently reached—though not completely—the complexity of research in the natural sciences, with specialization, division of labor, and division of technical know-how. This means that even where the main research is conducted by a handful of people, there are, indeed, ambiguities about authorship. In many places it is assumed that a department head automatically takes senior authorship.

But very often a senior man, and the main contributor to a paper or a project, will put his name last only because he does not need senior authorship for his already established reputation and wants to give his student a break. Yet, it is true that the distribution of recognition gives rise to much discontent, often justified, on the part of those who believe, rightly or wrongly, that they had a greater part in a project than they were given credit for. It even happens—and I know of such cases just as Mr. Bensman does—that a research director publishes his assistant's writing under his own name. Such unethical behavior is, however, exceptional, although Mr. Bensman is correct in assuming that it happens more often to graduate students. And I may add: to women.

But does this entitle Mr. Bensman to claim that "it is understandable why graduate students see themselves as the most exploited class in America"? (He implies, of course, that they are right in seeing themselves that way.) Come, come: more exploited than migrant agricultural workers? Laundry workers, steelworkers, garbage collectors, or what have you? And are all graduate students being exploited all the time, and do they all see themselves that way? Are they never taught anything, do they never learn, never write their own papers with their own names on them? And are there never any professors and project directors who spend hours in informal sessions teaching their assistants, or days on end editing and often rewriting their students' dissertations (so that they may appear less illiterate, to use Mr. Bensman's favorite expression)?

But Mr. Bensman does not ask questions, he *knows*. He knows that *the* principal investigator is "illiterate," he knows that "In a large-scale project, *literally* dozens of people will have worked on the research." Just how many, and where? He also *knows* that "consultants are brought in to rescue a phase of a floundering study." Thank God they do, but let me continue asking: are all consultants always brought in only if a study is floundering? Has none of them ever been called in to give useful counsel to worthwhile research ventures? And further, is recognition always distributed through "power, statesmanship, bargaining, and occupational mobility"? Does merit, or specific contribution, have nothing to do with it at all? One is tempted to ask the question once posed to a psychoanalyst: "But Doctor, is the zeppelin *only* a phallic symbol? Is it not *also* a means of transportation?"

I am more trusting in my colleagues than Mr. Bensman. My trust is not based on a belief in altruism, but on the fact that social control ema-

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nates from colleagues, and that *they* can estimate (unlike the college president who makes appointments on the basis of publications which he knows nothing about) who is capable and who is not. And if a number of people do escape such control and violate some canons of competence or decency, we can take it in our stride. For the inept also deserve to be protected, as long as those who are able and decent receive recognition and help distribute it by and large where it belongs.

I would like to see in DISSENT a serious analysis of the structure of research, of its norms and values, its legitimate as well as not so legitimate practices. Or you might want to publish a witty satire, highlighting the conflicts and ambiguities. Mr. Bensman's paper is neither. He is a sensitive writer when he writes on matters other than his own colleagues. Why does he not use in this case the analytical distinctions he is capable of? After all, I am sure some of Mr. Bensman's best friends are principal investigators.

ROSE LAUB COSER

JOSEPH BENSMAN *Replies:*

Rose Laub Coser, in attempting to "quantify" my essay "Who Writes What in the Bureaucratic University," intersperses in her summary of it such questions as "all of them?" "every one of them?" and asserts quantities such as "*the* principal investigator" (her italics). She then proceeds to answer her own question to her own satisfaction. In doing so she neglects such qualifying phrases from the text as . . . "It is possible for quasi-illiterates to become authors." (Does she deny that?) She neglects such phrases as "such an author . . . more typically . . . most cases. . . . In general . . . the possibility of scandal serves to guarantee authorship." She seems to be unaware of the conditional mood.

However, the gist of her critique is that what I report is true. "I know of such cases as Mr. Bensman does . . ." but that ". . . such unethical behavior is, however, exceptional." The point of difference is the extent to which it is "exceptional."

Let me say that there are no "hypothetical" cases in my article. I have in the past 20 years been able to observe personally, time and time again, each and every type of action described in the article. But in order to check my personal observation, I have, by use of the methods of interviewing described in my book *Dollars and Sense,* checked my observations with an uncountable number of ghost writers, editorial specialists, researchers, project directors, publishers, grant-givers, and scores of expert infomants. This inquiry covered more than a dozen universities which specialize in large-scale research. Obviously, this sample is not representative of all universities or all departments within them. Moreover, I focused primarily upon research organizations doing large-scale research both within and without universities.

It is undoubtedly true that many professors do spend hours teaching their assistants and editing and rewriting students' dissertations. Some will even accept second authorships. Yet this appears to have little to do with large-scale research in university research institutes—the subject of my essay. I will even grant that some principal investigators do their own writing of project reports, though in most cases where I had previously suspected this, my suspicions disappeared with knowledge. I have no doubt whatever that Mrs. Coser writes her own reports.

Mrs. Coser argues "social control emanates from colleagues . . . who can estimate who is capable and who is not." Whether colleagues are willing and able to control usurpation of authorship is an open question. Our answer depends on our estimate of the incidence of such usurpation. If the colleagues themselves operate as described in the essay, then the social control will not operate in the direction indicated by Mrs. Coser.

The fact that many graduate students see themselves as the most exploited class in America is, it seems to me, hardly open to doubt. That they are, is, of course, nonsense.

I would agree with Mrs. Coser that more definitive work should be done in this area. I would propose a large-scale study of principal investigators, ghost writers, and research workers. Perhaps we can write a proposal to attract a large grant from a government agency or foundation interested in the area. As principal investigators, we will then ask other principal investigators if they attach their names to works of their juniors; and we can ask the juniors and ghost writers (if we can raise them) if they function as ghosts, and if the rewards are ghostly or manifest. We need not worry whether the project will founder; there are always consultants, ghostly and non-ghostly, who can make whatever we find sound academically respectable and dignified.

After all, some of my best friends are ghosts.

For the Record

Editor:

In your May–June issue Jervis Anderson in "Black Writing: The Other Side," says of Larry Neal, "Last year he edited an anthology of poetry in memoriam of Malcolm X called *Poems for Malcolm." For Malcolm; Poems on the Life and the Death of Malcolm X* was edited by Dudley Randall and Margaret G. Burroughs, and was published by Broadside Press. Larry Neal had two poems in the anthology.

DUDLEY RANDALL
Broadside Press

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